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1.	  Introduction	  
	  
This	  chapter	  does	  not	  pretend	  to	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  survey	  of	  the	  vast	  literature	  that	  
has	  been	  written	  on	  economic	  growth	  during	  the	  20th	  century:	  for	  such	  a	  task,	  not	  even	  a	  
book	  would	  suffice.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  a	  brief	  interpretative	  essay,	  which	  aims	  to	  place	  the	  20th	  
century	  growth	  experience	  into	  a	  broader	  historical	  context,	  and	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  
in	  which	  the	  field	  of	  economic	  history	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  study	  of	  economic	  growth.	  	  
	  
A	  theme	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  that	  the	  20th	  century	  saw	  the	  gradual	  working	  out	  of	  several	  long-­‐
run	  implications	  of	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution:	  the	  latter	  was	  a	  massive	  asymmetric	  shock	  to	  
the	  world	  economy,	  which	  set	  in	  train	  a	  variety	  of	  long	  run	  adjustment	  processes	  which	  are	  
still	  ongoing,	  and	  which	  seem	  set	  to	  define	  the	  economic	  history	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
We	  will	  be	  emphasizing	  two	  key	  features	  of	  the	  economic	  history	  literature.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  
focus	  on	  institutions,	  following	  the	  insights	  of	  North	  (1990)	  and	  others.	  While	  institutions	  
have	  certainly	  become	  a	  central	  focus	  of	  mainstream	  empirical	  work	  on	  economic	  growth	  
(e.g.	  Acemoglu,	  Johnson	  and	  Robinson	  2001),	  economic	  historians	  tend	  to	  be	  quite	  nuanced	  
in	  their	  view	  of	  how	  institutions	  matter,	  recognizing	  that	  different	  institutional	  environments	  
may	  be	  appropriate	  at	  different	  points	  in	  time	  and	  in	  different	  countries.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  is	  a	  detailed	  interest	  in	  the	  mechanics	  of	  technological	  change.	  The	  endogenous	  
nature	  of	  technological	  change,	  and	  the	  consequences	  which	  this	  has	  for	  economic	  growth	  
in	  both	  leader	  and	  follower	  countries,	  will	  be	  a	  constant	  theme	  of	  the	  chapter:	  while	  
theorists	  like	  Acemoglu	  (2002)	  have	  recently	  brought	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  growth	  
theory,	  economic	  historians	  such	  as	  Habakkuk	  (1962)	  have	  been	  emphasizing	  such	  themes	  
for	  many	  decades.	  
	  
2.	  	  Setting	  the	  Stage	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  look	  at	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  and	  its	  19th	  century	  
aftermath.	  	  This	  period	  saw	  the	  advent	  of	  ‘modern	  economic	  growth’	  (Kuznets	  1966)	  in	  what	  
came	  to	  be	  the	  advanced	  economies	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  along	  with	  a	  big	  shift	  in	  the	  centre	  
of	  gravity	  of	  the	  world	  economy	  away	  from	  Asia	  and	  towards	  Europe	  and	  North	  America.	  	  
The	  world	  economy	  of	  1900	  was	  hugely	  different	  from	  that	  of	  1700	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  
technological	  capabilities,	  the	  income	  levels	  in	  leading	  economies,	  the	  extent	  of	  
globalization,	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  international	  specialization	  in	  production.	  
	  
2.1	  The	  Beginnings	  of	  Modern	  Economic	  Growth	  
	  
Recent	  research	  has	  made	  considerable	  progress	  in	  quantifying	  growth	  in	  the	  world	  
economy	  prior	  to	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution.	  	  Table	  1	  reports	  estimates	  of	  income	  levels	  
measured	  in	  purchasing-­‐power-­‐parity	  adjusted	  1990	  dollars	  for	  selected	  countries.	  	  In	  this	  
metric,	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  a	  ‘bare-­‐bones	  subsistence’	  income	  is	  about	  $400	  per	  year.	  	  	  
The	  estimates	  indicate	  that	  European	  countries	  had	  incomes	  well	  above	  this	  level	  long	  
before	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution,	  and	  the	  same	  was	  true	  of	  China	  in	  medieval	  times.	  The	  
implication	  is	  that	  the	  pre-­‐industrial	  era	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  in	  which	  people	  were	  in	  a	  
very	  low	  income	  Malthusian	  Trap	  equilibrium.	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Nevertheless,	  the	  overall	  picture	  of	  Table	  1	  is	  that	  growth	  was	  at	  best	  very	  slow	  in	  these	  pre-­‐
industrial	  centuries.	  	  Growth	  of	  real	  income	  per	  person	  averaged	  0.2	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  in	  
England,	  a	  relative	  success	  story,	  between	  1270	  and	  1700	  (Broadberry	  et	  al.	  2010)	  while	  at	  
the	  other	  extreme	  Chinese	  income	  levels	  almost	  halved	  between	  1086	  and	  1800.	  	  These	  
estimates	  re-­‐assert	  the	  traditional	  story	  of	  the	  ‘Great	  Divergence’,	  namely,	  that	  the	  most	  
successful	  parts	  of	  Europe	  overtook	  China	  and	  pulled	  significantly	  ahead	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  
Industrial	  Revolution.	  They	  also	  reflect	  a	  ‘Little	  Divergence’	  within	  Europe	  between	  North	  
and	  South,	  with	  Italy	  and	  Spain	  losing	  out	  relative	  to	  England	  and	  Holland.	  
	  
What	  were	  the	  underpinnings	  of	  this	  modest	  pre-­‐industrial	  growth	  in	  England?	  	  The	  answer	  
seems	  to	  be	  a	  combination	  of	  increases	  in	  hours	  worked	  per	  person	  and	  Smithian	  growth,	  
rather	  than	  any	  major	  contribution	  from	  technological	  change.	  	  The	  length	  of	  the	  work	  year	  
may	  have	  roughly	  doubled	  between	  the	  mid-­‐14th	  and	  late-­‐18th	  century	  (Allen	  and	  Weisdorf	  
2011).	  This	  largely	  accounts	  for	  the	  long	  run	  tendency	  for	  income	  per	  person	  to	  grow	  slowly,	  
despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  real	  wage	  rates	  were	  stationary	  until	  1800	  
cannot	  be	  rejected	  (Crafts	  and	  Mills	  2009).	  	  Growth	  in	  the	  successful	  parts	  of	  Europe	  was	  
also	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  trade	  expansion.	  This	  improved	  productivity	  and	  sustained	  
wage	  levels	  in	  the	  face	  of	  demographic	  pressure	  (Allen	  2009).	  
	  
The	  term	  ‘Industrial	  Revolution’	  is	  commonly	  used	  to	  characterize	  the	  unprecedented	  
experience	  of	  the	  British	  economy	  during	  the	  later	  decades	  of	  the	  18th	  and	  early	  decades	  of	  
the	  19th	  century.	  	  Taken	  literally,	  it	  is	  a	  misleading	  phrase	  but	  carefully	  deployed	  it	  is	  a	  useful	  
metaphor.	  	  These	  years	  saw	  a	  remarkable	  economic	  achievement	  by	  comparison	  with	  earlier	  
times,	  but	  it	  must	  be	  recognized	  that	  by	  later	  standards	  this	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  modest	  
beginning.	  	  	  
	  
The	  idea	  of	  an	  ‘industrial	  revolution’	  conjures	  up	  images	  of	  spectacular	  technological	  
breakthroughs,	  the	  triumph	  of	  the	  factory	  system	  and	  steam	  power,	  the	  industrialization	  of	  
an	  economy	  hitherto	  based	  largely	  on	  agriculture,	  and	  rapid	  economic	  growth.	  	  Indeed,	  
these	  were	  the	  directions	  of	  travel	  for	  the	  British	  economy	  but	  when	  they	  are	  quantified	  the	  
numbers,	  although	  impressive	  once	  put	  into	  context,	  do	  not	  live	  up	  to	  the	  hyperbole.	  While	  
the	  economy	  withstood	  formidable	  demographic	  pressure	  much	  better	  than	  could	  have	  
been	  imagined	  in	  the	  17th	  century,	  the	  growth	  of	  real	  income	  per	  person	  was	  painfully	  slow	  
for	  several	  decades.	  	  Not	  much	  more	  than	  a	  third	  of	  the	  labour	  force	  worked	  in	  agriculture	  
even	  in	  the	  mid-­‐18th	  century.	  	  In	  1851,	  more	  people	  were	  employed	  in	  domestic	  service	  and	  
distribution	  than	  in	  textiles,	  metals	  and	  machine-­‐making	  combined.	  	  Until	  about	  1830	  water	  
power	  was	  more	  important	  than	  steam	  power	  in	  British	  industry.	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  was	  established	  on	  a	  different	  trajectory	  
from	  that	  of	  a	  hundred	  years	  earlier.	  	  In	  particular,	  sustained	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  
based	  on	  steady	  technological	  progress	  and	  higher	  levels	  of	  investment	  had	  become	  the	  
basis	  of	  significant	  growth	  in	  real	  income	  per	  person,	  notwithstanding	  rapid	  population	  
growth.	  	  This	  was	  ‘modern	  economic	  growth’,	  as	  distinct	  from	  real	  income	  increases	  based	  
on	  Smithian	  growth	  and	  working	  harder.	  	  That	  said,	  growth	  potential	  was	  still	  quite	  limited	  
by	  20th	  century	  standards:	  education	  and	  scientific	  capabilities	  were	  still	  quite	  primitive,	  the	  
scope	  to	  import	  technological	  advances	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  was	  modest,	  and	  
institutions	  and	  economic	  policies	  suffered	  from	  obvious	  limitations.	  
	  
Table	  2	  reports	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  TFP	  growth	  more	  than	  doubled	  from	  0.3	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  in	  
1760-­‐1801	  to	  0.7	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  in	  1831-­‐1873.	  	  This	  can	  certainly	  be	  interpreted	  as	  
reflecting	  acceleration	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  technological	  progress	  but	  TFP	  growth	  captures	  more	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than	  this.	  	  No	  explicit	  allowance	  has	  been	  made	  for	  human	  capital	  or	  hours	  worked	  in	  the	  
growth	  accounting	  equation.	  	  Prior	  to	  1830	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  any	  contribution	  from	  
extra	  schooling	  or	  improved	  literacy	  was	  negligible,	  but	  in	  the	  period	  1831-­‐73	  education	  may	  
have	  accounted	  for	  around	  0.3	  percentage	  points	  per	  year	  of	  the	  measured	  TFP	  growth	  in	  
Table	  2	  (Mitch	  1999).	  	  For	  1760-­‐1801	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  average	  hours	  
worked	  per	  worker	  per	  year	  were	  increasing	  sufficiently	  that	  if	  the	  growth	  in	  labour	  inputs	  
were	  adjusted	  appropriately	  TFP	  growth	  might	  be	  pushed	  down	  very	  close	  to	  zero	  (Voth	  
2001).	  	  Overall	  then,	  a	  best	  guess	  might	  be	  that	  the	  contribution	  of	  technological	  progress,	  
as	  reflected	  in	  TFP	  growth,	  went	  from	  about	  zero	  to	  a	  sustained	  rate	  of	  about	  0.4	  per	  cent	  
per	  year	  by	  the	  time	  the	  classic	  Industrial	  Revolution	  period	  was	  completed.	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Neoclassical	  growth	  accounting	  of	  this	  kind	  is	  a	  standard	  technique	  and	  valuable	  for	  
benchmarking	  purposes,	  if	  nothing	  else.	  	  However,	  it	  does	  potentially	  underestimate	  the	  
contribution	  of	  new	  technology	  to	  economic	  growth	  if	  technological	  progress	  is	  embodied	  in	  
new	  types	  of	  capital	  goods,	  as	  was	  set	  out	  in	  detail	  by	  Barro	  (1999).	  	  This	  was	  surely	  the	  case	  
during	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution;	  as	  Feinstein	  put	  it,	  “many	  forms	  of	  technological	  advance	  ...	  	  
can	  only	  take	  place	  when	  ‘embodied’	  in	  new	  capital	  goods.	  	  The	  spinning	  jennies,	  steam	  
engines,	  and	  blast	  furnaces	  were	  the	  ‘embodiment’	  of	  the	  industrial	  revolution”	  (1981,	  p.	  
142).	  
	  
Table	  2	  also	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  an	  exercise	  that	  allows	  for	  embodiment	  effects.	  	  The	  
‘modernized	  sectors’	  (cottons,	  woollens,	  iron,	  canals,	  ships	  and	  railways)	  are	  found	  to	  have	  
contributed	  0.46	  out	  of	  0.64	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  growth	  in	  labour	  productivity	  over	  the	  period	  
1780-­‐1860	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  this,	  0.34	  compared	  with	  0.12	  per	  cent,	  coming	  from	  TFP	  
growth	  as	  opposed	  to	  capital	  deepening.	  	  If	  the	  contribution	  of	  technological	  change	  to	  the	  
growth	  of	  labour	  productivity	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  capital	  deepening	  in	  the	  modernized	  sectors	  
plus	  total	  TFP	  growth,	  then	  this	  equates	  to	  0.54	  out	  of	  0.64	  per	  cent	  per	  year.	  	  It	  remains	  
perfectly	  reasonable,	  therefore,	  to	  regard	  technological	  innovation	  as	  responsible	  for	  the	  
acceleration	  in	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  that	  marked	  the	  industrial	  revolution	  as	  the	  
historical	  discontinuity	  that	  Kuznets	  supposed,	  even	  though	  the	  change	  was	  less	  dramatic	  
than	  was	  once	  thought.	  
	  
It	  may	  seem	  surprising	  that	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  delivered	  such	  a	  modest	  rate	  of	  
technological	  progress	  given	  the	  inventions	  for	  which	  it	  is	  famous,	  including	  most	  obviously	  
those	  related	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  steam	  as	  a	  General	  Purpose	  Technology	  (GPT).	  	  It	  should	  be	  
noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  well-­‐known	  stagnation	  of	  real	  wage	  rates	  during	  this	  period	  is	  
strong	  corroborative	  evidence	  that	  TFP	  growth,	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  weighted	  average	  of	  
growth	  in	  factor	  rewards	  (Barro	  1999),	  was	  modest.	  
	  
Two	  points	  can	  be	  made	  straightaway.	  	  First,	  the	  impact	  of	  technological	  progress	  was	  very	  
uneven	  as	  is	  implied	  by	  the	  estimates	  in	  Table	  2.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  service	  sector	  other	  than	  
transport	  was	  largely	  unaffected.	  	  Textiles,	  metals	  and	  machine-­‐making	  accounted	  for	  less	  
than	  a	  third	  of	  industrial	  employment	  –	  or	  13.4	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  employment	  -­‐	  even	  in	  1851	  
and	  much	  industrial	  employment	  was	  still	  in	  ‘traditional’	  sectors.	  	  Second,	  the	  process	  of	  
technological	  advance	  was	  characterized	  by	  many	  incremental	  improvements	  and	  learning	  
to	  realize	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  original	  inventions.	  	  This	  took	  time	  in	  an	  era	  where	  scientific	  
and	  technological	  capabilities	  were	  still	  very	  weak	  by	  later	  standards.	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Steam	  power	  offers	  an	  excellent	  example.	  	  In	  1830,	  only	  about	  165,000	  horsepower	  was	  in	  
use,	  the	  steam	  engine	  capital	  share	  was	  0.4	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  and	  the	  Domar	  weight	  for	  
steam	  engines	  was	  1.7	  per	  cent	  (Crafts	  2004b).	  	  The	  cost	  effectiveness	  and	  diffusion	  of	  
steam	  power	  was	  held	  back	  by	  the	  high	  coal	  consumption	  of	  the	  original	  low-­‐pressure	  
engines	  and	  the	  move	  to	  high	  pressure	  –	  which	  benefited	  not	  only	  factories	  but	  railways	  and	  
steam	  ships	  -­‐	  was	  not	  generally	  accomplished	  until	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  	  The	  
science	  of	  the	  steam	  engine	  was	  not	  well	  understood	  and	  the	  price	  of	  steam	  power	  fell	  very	  
slowly,	  especially	  before	  about	  1850.	  	  The	  maximum	  impact	  of	  steam	  power	  on	  British	  
productivity	  growth	  was	  delayed	  until	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  –	  nearly	  100	  
years	  after	  James	  Watt’s	  patent	  –	  when	  it	  contributed	  about	  0.4	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  to	  labour	  
productivity	  growth.	  	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  subsequently	  leading	  economies	  
have	  become	  much	  better	  at	  exploiting	  GPTs.	  	  The	  reasons	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  found	  in	  a	  
superior	  level	  of	  education	  and	  scientific	  knowledge,	  improvements	  in	  capital	  markets,	  
government	  policies	  that	  support	  research	  and	  development,	  and	  thus	  a	  greater	  volume	  of	  
and	  higher	  expected	  returns	  to	  innovative	  effort.	  
	  
Indeed,	  from	  an	  endogenous	  growth	  perspective	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  British	  economy	  still	  
had	  many	  weaknesses.	  	  The	  size	  of	  markets	  was	  still	  very	  small	  in	  1820,	  when	  modern	  
globalization	  was	  yet	  to	  begin	  (O’Rourke	  and	  Williamson	  2002),	  and	  real	  GDP	  in	  Britain	  was	  
only	  about	  one	  twentieth	  of	  its	  size	  in	  the	  United	  States	  a	  century	  later.	  	  The	  costs	  of	  
invention	  were	  high	  at	  a	  time	  when	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  formal	  education	  could	  still	  
make	  only	  a	  modest	  contribution.	  	  This	  was	  clearly	  not	  a	  time	  of	  high	  college	  enrolment,	  and	  
the	  highly	  educated	  were	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  old	  professions,	  not	  science	  and	  engineering.	  	  
Investment,	  especially	  on	  equipment,	  was	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  GDP.	  	  Intellectual	  property	  
rights	  were	  weak	  since	  the	  legal	  protection	  offered	  by	  patents	  was	  doubtful	  until	  the	  1830s,	  
and	  even	  if	  Britain	  had	  less	  rent-­‐seeking	  than	  France,	  rent-­‐seeking	  in	  the	  law,	  the	  
bureaucracy,	  the	  church	  and	  the	  military	  remained	  very	  attractive	  alternatives	  to	  
entrepreneurship,	  as	  is	  attested	  by	  the	  evidence	  on	  fortunes	  bequeathed	  (Rubinstein	  1992).	  	  	  	  
Accordingly,	  TFP	  growth	  was	  modest,	  although	  by	  the	  1830s	  it	  was	  still	  well	  ahead	  of	  the	  
rate	  achieved	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  averaged	  0.2	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  during	  1800-­‐1855	  
(Abramovitz	  and	  David	  2001).	  
	  
2.2	  Directed	  Technical	  Change	  and	  the	  First	  Industrial	  Revolution1	  
	  
If	  the	  transition	  to	  modern	  economic	  growth	  entails	  a	  sustained	  acceleration	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  
technological	  progress,	  why	  did	  this	  happen	  first	  in	  Britain	  in	  the	  late	  18th	  century?	  	  Over	  
time	  many	  answers	  have	  been	  suggested,	  but	  a	  recent	  interpretation	  by	  Allen,	  building	  on	  
Habakkuk	  (1962)	  and	  David	  (1975),	  has	  rapidly	  gained	  currency.	  	  His	  conclusion	  is	  
deceptively	  simple:	  “The	  Industrial	  Revolution...was	  invented	  in	  Britain	  because	  it	  paid	  to	  
invent	  it	  there”	  (Allen	  2009,	  p.	  2).	  	  Allen’s	  argument	  comes	  from	  an	  endogenous	  innovation	  
perspective	  but	  is	  based	  on	  relative	  factor	  prices	  and	  market	  size	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  
superiority	  of	  British	  institutions	  and	  policies,	  at	  least	  compared	  with	  its	  European	  peer	  
group:	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  demand	  for	  innovation,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  supply	  side.	  	  
In	  particular,	  Britain’s	  unique	  combination	  of	  high	  wages	  and	  cheap	  energy	  plus	  a	  sizeable	  
market	  for	  the	  new	  technologies,	  which	  were	  profitable	  to	  adopt	  only	  in	  these	  
circumstances,	  is	  held	  to	  be	  the	  key.	  	  	  
	  
Allen’s	  analysis	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  expected	  profitability	  to	  justify	  the	  substantial	  
fixed	  costs	  of	  the	  investment	  required	  to	  perfect	  good	  ideas	  and	  make	  them	  commercially	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	  This	  section	  draws	  in	  part	  on	  Crafts	  (2011).	  
2	  Acemoglu	  (2010)	  extended	  this	  analysis	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  labour	  scarcity	  on	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viable.	  	  The	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  adopting	  inventions	  in	  textiles,	  steam	  power,	  and	  coke	  
smelting	  was	  a	  lot	  higher	  in	  Britain	  than	  elsewhere	  and	  so	  the	  potential	  market	  for	  these	  
inventions	  was	  much	  greater.	  	  This	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  model	  of	  ‘directed	  technical	  change’	  
proposed	  by	  Acemoglu	  (2002).2	  	  Allen	  supports	  his	  conclusions	  by	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  the	  
profitability	  of	  adoption	  of	  several	  famous	  inventions	  (Hargreaves’s	  spinning	  jenny,	  
Arkwright’s	  mill,	  and	  coke	  smelting)	  at	  British	  and	  French	  relative	  factor	  prices.	  The	  
conclusion	  is	  that	  in	  each	  case	  adoption	  would	  have	  been	  rational	  at	  the	  former	  but	  not	  the	  
latter.	  	  Eventually,	  after	  several	  decades,	  a	  cumulative	  process	  of	  ‘micro-­‐invention’	  had	  
improved	  these	  technologies	  to	  the	  point	  where	  adoption	  became	  profitable	  in	  other	  
countries,	  and	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  began	  to	  spread.	  
	  
Allen’s	  hypothesis	  is	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  and	  theoretically	  defensible	  although	  more	  
research	  is	  required	  to	  establish	  that	  it	  stands	  on	  really	  solid	  empirical	  foundations.	  For	  
example,	  Crafts	  (2011)	  presents	  evidence	  suggesting	  that	  it	  may	  have	  been	  high	  machinery	  
costs,	  rather	  than	  low	  wages,	  which	  impeded	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  spinning	  jenny	  in	  France.	  
Strikingly,	  it	  also	  appears	  that	  it	  would	  have	  been	  very	  profitable	  to	  invent	  and	  adopt	  the	  
jenny	  in	  the	  high-­‐wage	  United	  States.3	  Perhaps	  the	  key	  disincentive	  there	  was	  small	  market	  
size	  relative	  to	  the	  fixed	  development	  costs	  of	  the	  invention.	  There	  are	  also	  a	  number	  of	  
other	  detailed	  issues	  about	  the	  robustness	  of	  Allen’s	  calculations	  that	  have	  arisen	  in	  the	  
debate	  prompted	  by	  his	  book.4	  Allen	  himself	  recognizes	  that	  the	  supply	  side	  of	  the	  market	  
for	  innovation	  mattered	  as	  well	  as	  the	  demand	  side:	  to	  claim	  that	  relative	  factor	  prices	  alone	  
were	  the	  key	  to	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  would	  be	  a	  bit	  too	  bold.	  Even	  so,	  Allen’s	  
contribution	  has	  been	  extremely	  valuable	  in	  focusing	  attention	  on	  the	  incentives	  facing	  
innovators.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  subsequent	  British	  relative	  economic	  decline	  and,	  especially,	  
American	  overtaking,	  his	  suggestion	  that	  the	  key	  to	  getting	  ahead	  in	  the	  Industrial	  
Revolution	  was	  relative	  factor	  prices	  together	  with	  large	  market	  size	  has	  the	  clear	  
implication	  that	  British	  leadership	  would	  be	  highly	  vulnerable.	  	  Insofar	  as	  high	  wages,	  cheap	  
energy	  and	  a	  market	  sufficient	  to	  allow	  fixed	  costs	  of	  research	  and	  development	  continued	  
to	  be	  conducive	  to	  faster	  technological	  progress,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  a	  more	  
favoured	  location	  later	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  as	  has	  become	  abundantly	  clear	  in	  the	  literature	  
on	  the	  Habakkuk	  (1962)	  hypothesis.	  
	  
	  
2.3	  Catch-­‐Up	  and	  Overtaking:	  the	  Transition	  to	  American	  Leadership	  
	  
By	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  as	  Table	  3	  reports,	  modern	  economic	  growth	  had	  spread	  to	  most	  of	  
Western	  Europe.	  Rates	  of	  growth	  of	  real	  GDP	  per	  person,	  although	  modest	  by	  later	  
standards,	  were	  generally	  well	  above	  those	  achieved	  by	  Britain	  during	  the	  Industrial	  
Revolution	  (0.4	  per	  cent	  per	  year)	  and	  during	  the	  second	  and	  third	  quarters	  of	  the	  19th	  
century	  (1	  per	  cent	  per	  year).	  	  Faster	  growth	  often	  went	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  industrialization,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Acemoglu	  (2010)	  extended	  this	  analysis	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  labour	  scarcity	  on	  
the	  rate,	  rather	  than	  the	  bias,	  of	  technological	  progress	  and	  showed	  that	  this	  is	  
positive	  if	  technological	  change	  is	  strongly	  labour	  saving,	  i.e.,	  reduces	  the	  marginal	  
product	  of	  labour.	  	  This	  might	  be	  when	  machines	  replace	  tasks	  previously	  
undertaken	  by	  workers	  as	  in	  Zeira	  (1998).	  
3	  This	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  true	  of	  the	  Arkwright	  mill	  where	  the	  prospective	  rate	  of	  
return	  to	  adoption	  was	  32.5	  per	  cent	  (Crafts	  2011).	  
4	  See	  the	  further	  discussion	  in	  Crafts	  (2011)	  and	  the	  interchanges	  between	  
Gragnolati	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  and	  Allen	  (2011),	  and	  also	  between	  Humphries	  (2013)	  and	  
Allen	  (2013).	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and	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  but	  not	  perfect	  correlation	  in	  1913	  between	  industrial	  output	  and	  GDP	  
per	  head.	  	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  remained	  the	  European	  leader	  in	  1913	  but	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  
was	  slowly	  catching	  up	  on	  it,	  and	  Britain	  had	  been	  overtaken	  by	  the	  United	  States	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  19th	  century.	  	  The	  hypothesis	  of	  unconditional	  convergence	  across	  Europe	  during	  
1870-­‐1913	  is	  rejected,	  however	  (Crafts	  and	  Toniolo	  2008).	  Southern	  Europe	  clearly	  lagged	  
behind	  Northern	  Europe	  while	  nevertheless	  opening	  up	  a	  substantial	  gap	  with	  China.	  
	  
TABLE	  3	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
Table	  4	  shows	  that	  crude	  TFP	  growth	  remained	  quite	  slow	  until	  it	  increased	  appreciably	  in	  
several	  countries	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  second	  
industrial	  revolution.	  	  Even	  so,	  nowhere	  in	  Europe	  was	  there	  a	  growth	  experience	  that	  
resembled	  the	  picture	  famously	  drawn	  by	  Solow	  (1957)	  for	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  first	  half	  
of	  the	  20th	  century	  in	  which	  the	  residual	  accounted	  for	  seven	  eighths	  of	  labour	  productivity	  
growth.	  	  For	  almost	  all	  countries,	  technical	  change	  came	  primarily	  from	  the	  diffusion	  of	  
advances	  made	  elsewhere,	  but	  technological	  diffusion	  was	  still	  relatively	  slow.5	  	  	  	  	  
	  
TABLE	  4	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  implement	  a	  full	  analysis	  of	  conditional	  convergence	  given	  data	  
limitations	  but	  Table	  5	  offers	  some	  clues.	  	  Years	  of	  schooling	  increased	  everywhere	  but	  were	  
generally	  much	  higher	  in	  Northern	  Europe	  and,	  by	  1913,	  were	  way	  ahead	  of	  the	  2.3	  years	  of	  
the	  cohort	  born	  before	  1805	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  (Matthews	  et	  al.	  1982).	  	  In	  the	  period	  
before	  World	  War	  I,	  industry	  was	  attracted	  to	  market	  potential	  and	  cheap	  coal	  (Crafts	  and	  
Mulatu	  2006,	  Klein	  and	  Crafts	  2012)	  which	  again	  favoured	  the	  North	  over	  the	  South.	  
Institutions	  improved	  with	  regard	  to	  underpinning	  the	  appropriability	  of	  returns	  to	  
investment,	  especially	  in	  Northern	  Europe,	  as	  reflected	  in	  the	  ‘Political	  Constraint	  Index’	  
which	  Henisz	  (2002)	  shows	  was	  positively	  related	  to	  private	  sector	  investment	  in	  
infrastructure.	  There	  was	  a	  widespread	  improvement	  in	  legislation	  enabling	  capital	  markets	  
to	  function	  (Bogart	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  Even	  so,	  a	  recent	  study	  (Kishtainy	  2011)	  suggests	  that	  only	  
Switzerland	  (after	  1848)	  and	  Norway	  (after	  1899)	  could	  be	  classified	  as	  ’open-­‐access’	  
societies	  with	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  competition	  that	  is	  regarded	  as	  essential	  to	  
becoming	  an	  advanced	  economy	  by	  North	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  	  Nevertheless,	  much	  of	  Europe	  was	  
on	  the	  verge	  of	  attaining	  that	  ‘open	  access’	  status	  and	  this	  contrasts	  starkly	  with	  the	  
continuation	  of	  a	  closed-­‐access	  society	  dominated	  by	  a	  coalition	  of	  rent-­‐seekers	  that	  stifled	  
innovation	  in	  China	  (Brandt	  et	  al.	  2013).	  
	  
TABLE	  5	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
In	  growth	  accounting	  terms,	  as	  Table	  4	  shows,	  American	  overtaking	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  
late	  19th	  century	  acceleration	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  TFP	  growth	  to	  a	  pace	  far	  in	  excess	  of	  that	  
achieved	  during	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution.6	  	  	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  did	  not	  match	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Germany	  and	  the	  UK	  together	  accounted	  for	  53	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  foreign	  patents	  
taken	  out	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  1883	  and	  57	  per	  cent	  in	  1913	  (Pavitt	  and	  Soete	  
1982).	  	  The	  diffusion	  rate	  of	  inventions	  made	  before	  1925	  was	  less	  than	  a	  third	  of	  
those	  made	  subsequently	  (Comin	  et	  al.	  2006)	  
6	  These	  estimates	  take	  no	  account	  of	  education	  but	  this	  would	  not	  make	  much	  
difference	  according	  to	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  (2001)	  who	  found	  that	  adjusting	  TFP	  
growth	  on	  this	  account	  would	  reduce	  TFP	  growth	  by	  0.0,	  0.1	  and	  0.2	  percent	  per	  
year	  in	  1855-­‐1890,	  1890-­‐1905	  and	  1905-­‐27,	  respectively.	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acceleration.	  	  The	  origins	  of	  faster	  technological	  change	  in	  the	  United	  States	  may	  well	  be	  
along	  the	  lines	  of	  Habakkuk	  (1962).	  	  He	  famously	  claimed	  that	  land	  abundance	  and	  labour	  
scarcity	  in	  the	  United	  States	  promoted	  rapid,	  labour-­‐saving	  technological	  change.	  	  New	  
economic	  historians	  spent	  quite	  a	  long	  time	  trying	  to	  pin	  down	  these	  arguments.	  	  Eventually,	  
it	  was	  found	  that	  the	  US	  was	  able	  to	  exploit	  complementarities	  between	  capital	  and	  natural	  
resources	  to	  economize	  on	  the	  use	  of	  skilled	  labour	  in	  an	  important	  subset	  of	  American	  
manufacturing	  (James	  and	  Skinner	  1985),	  and	  that	  scale	  economies	  and	  technological	  
change	  biased	  in	  favour	  of	  capital	  and	  materials-­‐using	  were	  pervasive	  in	  manufacturing	  (Cain	  
and	  Paterson	  1986).	  	  This	  may	  partly	  have	  been	  based	  on	  localized	  learning	  as	  suggested	  by	  
David	  (1975),	  and	  partly	  on	  directed	  technical	  change	  as	  in	  Acemoglu	  (2010).	  	  	  
	  
Either	  way,	  looking	  at	  late	  Victorian	  Britain,	  the	  flip-­‐side	  of	  this	  story	  is	  that	  innovations	  that	  
were	  made	  in	  the	  United	  States	  were	  frequently	  ‘inappropriate’	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  
Atlantic	  because	  they	  were	  not	  cost-­‐effective	  at	  British	  relative	  factor	  prices	  and/or	  market	  
size;	  had	  they	  been	  profit-­‐maximizing,	  competition	  in	  product	  markets	  would	  have	  ensured	  
rapid	  adoption	  (Crafts	  2012).	  	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  lower	  TFP	  in	  British	  industry	  was	  largely	  
unavoidable.	  	  Unlike	  the	  inappropriate	  technology	  literature	  in	  development	  economics,	  
however,	  this	  episode	  concerns	  the	  development	  of	  North-­‐North	  rather	  than	  North-­‐South	  
technological	  differences.	  
	  
Although	  American	  overtaking	  has	  usually	  been	  thought	  of	  as	  centring	  on	  industry,	  this	  is	  
only	  part	  of	  the	  story.	  	  During	  the	  years	  1871-­‐1911,	  the	  gap	  between	  British	  and	  American	  
labour	  productivity	  growth	  was	  a	  bit	  larger	  in	  services	  than	  in	  industry,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  employment	  in	  both	  economies	  shifted	  strongly	  towards	  services.	  	  In	  the	  services	  
sector,	  American	  technological	  advance	  was	  founded	  on	  new	  hierarchical	  forms	  of	  
organization	  based	  on	  large	  volumes	  and	  reduced	  costs	  of	  monitoring	  workers	  due	  to	  falling	  
communication	  costs	  (Broadberry	  2006).	  	  More	  generally,	  US	  productivity	  across	  much	  of	  
the	  economy	  during	  this	  period	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  organizational	  innovations	  that	  permitted	  
the	  development	  of	  the	  modern	  business	  enterprise	  and	  moves	  towards	  mass	  production	  
and	  mass	  distribution	  (Chandler	  1977).	  
	  
2.4.	  Divergence	  Big	  Time	  	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  transition	  to	  modern	  economic	  growth	  happened	  first	  in	  Britain,	  and	  then	  
in	  Continental	  Europe	  and	  North	  America,	  had	  obvious	  implications	  for	  the	  international	  
distribution	  of	  income.	  True,	  buoyant	  markets	  in	  the	  industrial	  economies	  offered	  new	  
export	  opportunities	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  but	  this	  was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  prevent	  a	  large	  
increase	  in	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  industrial	  rich	  and	  the	  non-­‐industrial	  poor.	  
	  
Table	  6	  provides	  data	  on	  per	  capita	  incomes	  in	  the	  major	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  data	  are	  
mostly	  taken	  from	  Bolt	  and	  van	  Zanden’s	  (2013)	  revision	  of	  Maddison	  (2010),	  although	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  Africa	  we	  have	  preferred	  Maddison’s	  original	  data.7	  We	  distinguish	  between	  
Western	  Europe	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  since	  industrialization	  first	  took	  hold	  in	  the	  former	  
region,	  while	  the	  English-­‐speaking	  settler	  economies	  of	  North	  America	  and	  Oceania	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  	  Bolt	  and	  van	  Zanden	  present	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  the	  available	  data,	  but	  since	  
the	  only	  available	  data	  are	  for	  countries	  in	  North	  Africa,	  as	  well	  as	  Ghana	  and	  South	  
Africa,	  this	  almost	  certainly	  leads	  to	  an	  overstatement	  of	  average	  African	  incomes.	  
We	  prefer	  Maddison’s	  data,	  which	  involved	  making	  ad	  hoc	  judgments	  about	  incomes	  
in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  continent,	  and	  have	  adjusted	  the	  world	  per	  capita	  figures	  
accordingly.	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considered	  jointly	  under	  the	  heading	  ‘British	  offshoots’.	  What	  stands	  out	  from	  the	  table	  is	  
the	  explosive	  growth	  in	  incomes	  in	  the	  British	  offshoots,	  where	  they	  quadrupled	  between	  
1820	  and	  1913.	  As	  a	  result	  this	  was	  by	  far	  the	  richest	  region	  in	  the	  world	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  
Great	  War.	  Incomes	  increased	  by	  two	  and	  a	  half	  times	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America,	  
another	  European	  offshoot,	  during	  the	  period,	  and	  by	  slightly	  less	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  the	  
richest	  region	  in	  1820.	  They	  increased	  by	  much	  less	  in	  Asia	  and,	  especially,	  Africa.	  Since	  
these	  two	  regions	  had	  already	  been	  the	  poorest	  in	  the	  world	  in	  1820,	  and	  since	  the	  British	  
offshoots	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  richest,	  the	  result	  was	  a	  substantial	  divergence	  in	  living	  
standards	  –	  “divergence,	  big	  time”,	  as	  Pritchett	  (1997)	  has	  termed	  it.	  
	  
TABLE	  6	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
This	  divergence	  was	  due	  to	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  the	  leaders,	  not	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  followers.	  
Incomes	  rose	  everywhere	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  century,	  although	  in	  Asia	  the	  data	  show	  a	  
slight	  decline	  in	  average	  incomes	  between	  1820	  and	  1870,	  perhaps	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
deindustrialization	  (Williamson	  2011).	  From	  1870	  onwards	  all	  regions	  were	  growing,	  and	  
ended	  the	  century	  more	  prosperously	  than	  they	  had	  begun	  it.	  	  Between	  1820	  and	  1913,	  
average	  incomes	  rose	  by	  52	  per	  cent	  in	  Africa,	  but	  by	  just	  17	  per	  cent	  in	  Asia.	  
	  
The	  net	  effect	  was	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  international	  income	  differentials.	  In	  1820,	  the	  
then	  richest	  region,	  Western	  Europe,	  had	  an	  average	  income	  twice	  the	  world	  average,	  and	  
three	  and	  a	  half	  times	  the	  African	  average.	  By	  1913,	  Western	  European	  incomes	  were	  129	  
per	  cent	  higher	  than	  the	  world	  average,	  a	  small	  increase,	  but	  five	  and	  a	  half	  times	  the	  
African	  average,	  a	  sizable	  one.	  Over	  the	  same	  period	  incomes	  in	  the	  British	  offshoots	  rose	  
from	  being	  84	  per	  cent	  higher	  than	  the	  world	  average	  to	  being	  243	  per	  cent	  higher.	  By	  1913	  
they	  were	  more	  than	  eight	  times	  those	  in	  Africa.	  Bourguignon	  and	  Morrison	  (2002,	  p.734)	  
find	  that	  the	  Theil	  between-­‐country	  inequality	  coefficient	  almost	  quintupled	  between	  1820	  
and	  1910.8	  
	  
It	  is	  clear,	  then,	  that	  the	  19th	  century	  saw	  a	  large	  increase	  in	  global	  inequality,	  driven	  above	  
all	  by	  the	  rapid	  income	  growth	  of	  some	  countries	  but	  not	  others.	  It	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  the	  
primary	  cause	  of	  this	  rapid	  income	  growth	  was	  industrialization	  in	  Europe	  and	  North	  
America.	  Strikingly,	  however,	  some	  countries,	  such	  as	  Australia	  and	  Argentina,	  had	  among	  
the	  highest	  incomes	  in	  the	  world	  while	  remaining	  largely	  specialized	  in	  primary	  production.	  	  
To	  explain	  this	  apparent	  paradox,	  we	  would	  follow	  Arthur	  Lewis	  (1978),	  and	  point	  to	  the	  
immigration	  policies	  of	  these	  resource	  abundant	  countries.	  While	  countries	  such	  as	  Burma	  
saw	  the	  large-­‐scale	  immigration	  of	  workers	  from	  China	  or	  India,	  the	  temperate	  settler	  
economies	  restricted	  immigration	  to	  Europeans	  only.	  Racism	  was	  undoubtedly	  a	  factor	  here,	  
but	  the	  policy	  also	  helped	  maintain	  living	  standards.	  As	  Lewis	  (1978,	  p.	  188)	  put	  it,	  “The	  
temperate	  settlements	  could	  attract	  and	  hold	  European	  emigrants,	  in	  competition	  with	  the	  
United	  States,	  only	  by	  offering	  income	  levels	  higher	  than	  prevailed	  in	  North-­‐West	  Europe”.	  
By	  appropriately	  regulating	  immigration	  flows,	  and	  by	  absorbing	  the	  capital	  and	  new	  
technologies	  of	  the	  core,	  resource-­‐abundant	  settler	  economies	  could	  thus	  import	  rising	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8	  	  Based	  on	  the	  data	  in	  Maddison	  (1995).	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The	  fact	  that	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  reduced	  manufacturing	  costs	  so	  substantially	  during	  
the	  nineteenth	  century,	  but	  only	  in	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  the	  world,	  created	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  
stark	  international	  division	  of	  labour.	  Falling	  transportation	  costs	  and	  relatively	  liberal	  trade	  
policy	  allowed	  this	  potential	  to	  be	  realized.	  Northwest	  Europe	  and,	  especially,	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  exported	  manufactured	  goods	  and	  imported	  primary	  products,	  while	  the	  exports	  
of	  Oceania,	  Latin	  America	  and	  Africa	  consisted	  almost	  entirely	  of	  primary	  products.	  North	  
America	  was	  an	  intermediary	  case:	  its	  vast	  natural	  resources	  implied	  net	  exports	  of	  primary	  
products,	  but	  rapid	  industrialization	  meant	  that	  the	  United	  States	  switched	  to	  being	  a	  net	  
exporter	  of	  manufactures	  just	  before	  World	  War	  I.	  Asia	  was	  another	  intermediary	  case:	  
while	  it	  conformed	  to	  the	  peripheral	  pattern	  of	  net	  primary	  exports	  and	  net	  manufactured	  
imports,	  its	  manufactured	  exports	  were	  non-­‐negligible.	  	  
	  
The	  Great	  Specialization,	  as	  Dennis	  Robertson	  (1938)	  called	  it,	  between	  an	  industrial	  North	  
and	  a	  primary-­‐exporting	  South,	  thus	  dates	  from	  the	  19th	  century.	  Its	  causes	  were	  
straightforward	  enough:	  geographically	  unbalanced	  technological	  change,	  and	  a	  dramatic	  
reduction	  in	  transport	  costs.	  Its	  consequences,	  especially	  for	  the	  South,	  were	  less	  so.	  On	  the	  
one	  hand,	  booming	  Northern	  markets	  and	  falling	  transport	  costs	  implied	  rising	  terms	  of	  
trade,	  especially	  prior	  to	  the	  1870s	  (Williamson	  2011),	  and	  this	  benefited	  commodity	  
exporters.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  insofar	  as	  this	  further	  hastened	  deindustrialization,	  it	  
potentially	  imposed	  dynamic	  costs	  on	  Southern	  economies,	  by	  depriving	  them	  of	  the	  
growth-­‐enhancing	  externalities	  associated	  with	  manufacturing,	  by	  leading	  to	  rent-­‐seeking	  
behaviour	  associated	  with	  an	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  resource-­‐based	  production,	  or	  by	  exposing	  
them	  to	  greater	  terms	  of	  trade	  volatility	  (ibid.).	  	  Many	  of	  the	  great	  policy	  debates	  of	  the	  20th	  
century	  thus	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  this	  period.	  Should	  developing	  countries	  rely	  on	  exports	  of	  
primary	  commodities	  to	  generate	  growth,	  a	  strategy	  which	  worked	  for	  several	  countries	  in	  
the	  late	  19th	  century	  (Lewis	  1969,	  1970)?	  Or	  did	  such	  an	  outward-­‐oriented	  strategy	  give	  rise	  
to	  Dutch	  Disease	  problems,	  suggesting	  (on	  the	  assumption	  that	  there	  are	  growth-­‐promoting	  
externalities	  in	  industry)	  the	  need	  for	  policy	  interventions	  (such	  as	  import-­‐substitution	  
strategies)	  to	  increase	  industrial	  production?	  The	  way	  in	  which	  these	  debates	  influenced	  
policy	  decisions	  would	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  regional	  growth	  experiences	  once	  the	  
developing	  world	  regained	  policy	  independence	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  
	  
It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  this	  period	  several	  parts	  of	  the	  periphery	  
were	  reindustrializing.	  The	  best-­‐known	  example	  is	  Japan,	  but	  there	  was	  also	  rapid	  industrial	  
growth,	  albeit	  from	  a	  low	  base,	  in	  several	  Asian	  economies,	  e.g.	  in	  Korea,	  the	  Philippines,	  
Taiwan,	  and	  parts	  of	  China.	  There	  was	  also	  rapid	  industrial	  growth	  in	  Mexico,	  Brazil	  and	  the	  
Latin	  American	  Southern	  Cone	  (Gómez	  Galvarriato	  and	  Williamson	  2009).	  The	  spread	  of	  
industrialization	  across	  the	  developing	  world	  would	  become	  one	  of	  the	  main	  features	  of	  20th	  
century	  economic	  growth.	  
	  
3.	  Twentieth	  century	  growth:	  what	  happened?	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  briefly	  set	  out	  some	  of	  the	  major	  facts	  concerning	  aggregate	  growth	  in	  the	  
major	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
3.1.	  World	  growth	  and	  its	  decomposition	  	  
	  
Table	  7	  presents	  data	  on	  the	  level	  of	  per	  capita	  GDP	  between	  1870	  and	  2007,	  based	  on	  Bolt	  
and	  van	  Zanden’s	  (2013)	  updating	  of	  Maddison	  (2010).	  As	  before,	  we	  have	  preferred	  
Maddison’s	  original	  figures	  for	  Africa	  up	  to	  and	  including	  1913,	  and	  have	  revised	  the	  world	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figures	  accordingly.	  We	  follow	  Maddison	  in	  distinguishing	  Japan	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Asia	  (which	  
we	  will	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity	  refer	  to	  henceforth	  as	  ‘Asia’),	  since	  Japan	  was	  a	  precocious	  
industrialiser.9	  We	  also	  follow	  Maddison	  in	  grouping	  Western	  Europe,	  Japan,	  and	  the	  British	  
offshoots	  (the	  United	  States,	  Canada,	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand)	  together	  (the	  ‘West’),	  and	  
in	  considering	  separately	  the	  other	  four	  regions	  (the	  ‘Rest’),	  which	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  jointly	  as	  
the	  developing	  world.	  
	  
TABLE	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Table	  8	  gives	  per	  capita	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  in	  five	  successive	  periods;	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  
(1870-­‐1913);	  the	  turbulent	  years	  between	  1913	  and	  1950;	  the	  ‘Golden	  Age’	  which	  lasted	  
from	  1950	  to	  1973;	  the	  period	  following	  the	  first	  oil	  crisis,	  from	  1973	  to	  1990;	  and	  the	  period	  
since	  1990.10	  Whereas	  Maddison	  treated	  the	  entire	  period	  since	  1973	  as	  one,	  we	  have	  
preferred	  to	  split	  it	  into	  two,	  since	  the	  years	  after	  1990	  were	  marked	  by	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  
Soviet	  Union,	  the	  rapid	  spread	  of	  globalization,	  and	  a	  succession	  of	  international	  financial	  
crises.	  
	  
TABLE	  8	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
Table	  8	  shows	  that	  world	  economic	  growth	  was	  higher	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  (1913-­‐2007)	  than	  
in	  the	  late	  19th	  (1870-­‐1913),	  at	  1.7	  per	  cent	  per	  annum	  as	  opposed	  to	  1.3	  per	  cent.	  Latin	  
America	  is	  the	  only	  exception	  to	  the	  rule	  that	  20th	  century	  growth	  was	  faster,	  and	  even	  there	  
growth	  rates	  in	  the	  two	  periods	  were	  very	  similar.	  Growth	  was	  also	  very	  similar	  in	  the	  two	  
periods	  in	  the	  British	  offshoots,	  reflecting	  the	  relative	  constancy	  of	  the	  long	  run	  United	  
States	  growth	  rate	  (Jones	  1995).	  
	  
These	  aggregate	  20th	  century	  figures	  disguise	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  variation	  between	  
periods.	  The	  period	  between	  1913	  and	  1950,	  marked	  by	  two	  world	  wars	  and	  the	  Great	  
Depression,	  saw	  world	  growth	  fall	  to	  just	  0.9	  per	  cent.	  It	  declined	  everywhere	  with	  the	  
exception	  of	  Africa,	  although	  it	  fell	  by	  less	  in	  the	  British	  offshoots,	  which	  saw	  strong	  wartime	  
growth	  (helping	  to	  offset	  an	  especially	  severe	  Depression	  after	  1929),	  and	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  
and	  the	  former	  USSR,	  where	  Stalin	  embarked	  on	  a	  major	  industrialization	  drive	  during	  the	  
interwar	  period.	  The	  period	  between	  1950	  and	  1973	  clearly	  deserves	  the	  ‘Golden	  Age’	  label,	  
with	  world	  growth	  rates	  higher	  than	  at	  any	  other	  time	  in	  history.	  All	  regions	  saw	  their	  
highest	  ever	  growth	  rates	  during	  this	  quarter	  century,	  with	  just	  one	  exception:	  Asian	  growth	  
accelerated	  after	  1973,	  and	  again	  after	  1990.	  
	  
With	  the	  afore-­‐mentioned	  exception	  of	  Asia,	  growth	  rates	  declined	  everywhere	  after	  1973.	  
After	  1990,	  they	  continued	  to	  decline	  in	  the	  ‘West’,	  but	  they	  increased	  in	  all	  four	  developing	  
regions.	  The	  result	  was	  that,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1870,	  per	  capita	  growth	  rates	  after	  1990	  
were	  higher	  in	  the	  ‘Rest’	  than	  in	  the	  ‘West’.	  
	  
Table	  9	  presents	  data	  on	  regional	  shares	  of	  world	  GDP.	  This	  requires	  information	  on	  not	  only	  
per	  capita	  GDP	  levels,	  but	  population	  sizes,	  the	  latter	  being	  taken	  from	  Maddison	  (2010).	  As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  	  We	  use	  Maddison’s	  population	  data	  to	  derive	  the	  average	  figures	  for	  the	  West,	  the	  
Rest,	  Asia	  minus	  Japan,	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  former	  USSR.	  	  
10	  	  The	  figure	  for	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  former	  USSR	  is	  a	  population-­‐weighted	  
average	  of	  the	  growth	  rates	  of	  the	  two	  regions,	  where	  the	  latter	  growth	  rate	  is	  (in	  
the	  case	  of	  1870-­‐1913)	  calculated	  for	  the	  period	  1885-­‐1913	  only,	  since	  data	  for	  1870	  
are	  lacking.	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can	  be	  seen,	  the	  West’s	  share	  of	  world	  GDP	  peaked	  in	  1950,	  at	  almost	  60	  per	  cent,	  before	  
declining	  slowly	  before	  1990,	  and	  more	  rapidly	  thereafter:	  in	  2007	  it	  was	  just	  45	  per	  cent.	  
This	  overall	  trend	  masks	  considerable	  variation	  within	  the	  West.	  The	  share	  of	  the	  British	  
offshoots	  was	  slightly	  higher	  in	  2007	  than	  in	  1913,	  at	  22	  per	  cent,	  although	  it	  was	  over	  30	  
per	  cent	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  declining	  slowly	  thereafter.	  In	  contrast,	  
Western	  Europe’s	  share	  fell	  by	  almost	  a	  half,	  from	  33	  to	  17	  per	  cent;	  while	  Japan’s	  share	  
rose	  from	  2.6	  per	  cent	  in	  1913	  to	  8.6	  per	  cent	  in	  1990,	  before	  falling	  sharply	  afterwards.	  
Within	  the	  developing	  world	  Asia’s	  share	  fell	  substantially	  between	  1913	  and	  1950,	  had	  
recovered	  by	  1990,	  and	  increased	  rapidly	  since	  then.	  It	  was	  over	  a	  third	  in	  2007.	  The	  Latin	  
American	  share	  rose	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  and	  has	  held	  steady	  since	  1950,	  while	  Africa’s	  
share	  rose	  between	  1913	  and	  1950	  and	  has	  been	  stable	  since	  then.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  striking	  
features	  of	  the	  table	  is	  the	  share	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  former	  USSR,	  which	  was	  steady	  
until	  1973	  and	  then	  collapsed,	  falling	  not	  just	  during	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  of	  communism,	  
but	  after	  1990	  as	  well.	  The	  share	  was	  just	  6	  per	  cent	  in	  2007,	  less	  than	  half	  the	  1973	  level.	  
	  
TABLE	  9	  ABOUT	  HERE	  	  
	  
3.2.	  Catching	  up,	  forging	  ahead,	  and	  falling	  behind	  	  
	  
Since	  the	  publication	  of	  Moses	  Abramovitz’s	  (1986)	  presidential	  address	  to	  the	  Economic	  
History	  Association,	  it	  has	  become	  commonplace	  to	  distinguish	  between	  economic	  growth	  in	  
the	  leading	  economy	  or	  economies,	  at	  the	  frontier	  of	  technological	  knowledge,	  and	  in	  
follower	  countries	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  catching	  up	  on	  that	  frontier.	  Growth	  in	  the	  
leading	  economy	  is	  determined	  by	  those	  forces	  pushing	  back	  the	  frontier;	  growth	  in	  the	  
followers	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  can	  import	  technologies	  from	  the	  
leading	  economies,	  and	  embody	  them	  in	  their	  own	  capital	  stock.	  Abramovitz	  pointed	  out	  
that	  such	  catching	  up	  is	  inherently	  self-­‐limiting,	  an	  insight	  that	  has	  been	  subsequently	  
formalized	  by	  growth	  theorists	  such	  as	  Robert	  Lucas	  (2000,	  2009).	  His	  argument	  that	  
catching-­‐up	  was	  dependent	  on	  adequate	  “social	  capability”	  anticipated	  the	  enormous	  
literature	  on	  conditional	  convergence.	  Abramovitz	  also	  argued	  that,	  given	  social	  capability,	  
circumstances	  had	  to	  be	  conducive	  to	  the	  international	  diffusion	  of	  knowledge.	  Subsequent	  
research	  has	  followed	  Abramovitz’s	  lead,	  focusing	  both	  on	  the	  diffusion	  of	  technologies	  
(Comin	  et	  al.	  2006,	  Comin	  and	  Hobijn	  2010)	  and	  on	  the	  role	  of	  trade	  in	  stimulating	  or	  
hindering	  the	  process.	  While	  there	  are	  disagreements	  on	  many	  details	  of	  the	  international	  
growth	  process,	  the	  broad	  distinction	  between	  growth	  in	  the	  leaders	  and	  in	  the	  followers	  
tends	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  given.	  
	  
A	  common	  theme	  in	  economic	  history	  is	  the	  story	  of	  how	  economic	  leadership	  has	  passed	  
from	  nation	  to	  nation	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  millennium.	  How	  to	  explain	  this	  remains	  
unclear	  (for	  one	  attempt	  to	  do	  so,	  see	  Brezis	  et	  al.	  1993).	  Fortunately,	  for	  our	  purposes	  the	  
issue	  is	  moot,	  since	  it	  is	  commonly	  accepted	  that	  the	  economic	  leader	  throughout	  the	  20th	  
century	  was	  the	  United	  States,	  although	  it	  was	  not	  until	  after	  World	  War	  II	  that	  the	  US	  was	  
willing	  to	  translate	  its	  technological	  superiority	  into	  economic	  policy	  leadership.	  Figure	  1	  
shows	  the	  evolution	  of	  per	  capita	  GDP	  in	  the	  United	  States	  between	  1800	  and	  2007,	  
allowing	  the	  20th	  century	  performance	  to	  be	  compared	  with	  what	  came	  before.	  As	  is	  well	  
known	  (Jones	  1995),	  and	  has	  already	  been	  noted,	  per	  capita	  growth	  rates	  have	  been	  
remarkably	  stable	  in	  the	  United	  States	  over	  time.	  The	  heavy	  straight	  line	  is	  a	  linear	  
projection	  backwards	  and	  forwards	  in	  time	  of	  trend	  growth	  during	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  
(1870-­‐1913).	  The	  shaded	  areas	  represent	  the	  US	  Civil	  War	  (1861-­‐1865),	  World	  War	  I	  (1917-­‐
1918)	  and	  World	  War	  II	  (1941-­‐1945),	  while	  the	  dashed	  vertical	  lines	  represent	  the	  onset	  of	  
the	  Great	  Depression	  (1929)	  and	  the	  first	  oil	  crisis	  (1973).	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FIGURE	  1	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
As	  can	  be	  seen,	  per	  capita	  growth	  accelerated	  in	  the	  United	  States	  after	  1870.	  It	  averaged	  
1.8	  per	  cent	  per	  annum	  between	  1870	  and	  1913,	  as	  opposed	  to	  1.2	  per	  cent	  between	  1820	  
and	  1870.11	  As	  can	  also	  be	  seen,	  the	  long	  run	  trend	  was	  very	  similar	  in	  the	  20th	  century,	  
despite	  the	  remarkable	  collapse	  in	  incomes	  during	  the	  Depression,	  and	  the	  equally	  
remarkable	  increase	  in	  per	  capita	  output	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  Growth	  averaged	  2.1	  per	  cent	  
per	  annum	  between	  1913	  and	  2007,	  with	  a	  slight	  acceleration	  evident	  from	  the	  early	  1980s.	  
Consistent	  with	  Lucas	  (2000,	  2009),	  per	  capita	  growth	  in	  the	  frontier	  economy	  has	  been	  
around	  2	  per	  cent	  per	  annum	  for	  a	  very	  long	  time.	  
	  
For	  variety	  and	  drama,	  we	  need	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  followers.	  There,	  the	  20th	  century	  has	  thrown	  
up	  growth	  miracles,	  reversals	  of	  fortune,	  and	  sorry	  tales	  of	  steady	  decline	  (Pritchett	  2000).	  
Figure	  2	  plots	  per	  capita	  GDPs	  in	  the	  major	  economies	  and	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  as	  a	  
percentage	  of	  US	  GDP,	  thus	  indicating	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  countries	  were	  converging	  on	  
the	  technological	  frontier,	  keeping	  pace,	  or	  falling	  further	  behind.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity	  we	  
will	  henceforth	  refer	  to	  these	  percentages	  as	  countries’	  or	  regions’	  relative	  GDP,	  or	  relative	  
income.	  While	  our	  interest	  is	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  experience,	  we	  also	  provide	  the	  backstory	  
by	  plotting	  the	  trends	  beginning	  in	  1870.	  The	  figures	  are	  for	  the	  most	  part	  regional	  averages,	  
and	  therefore	  average	  out	  individual	  country	  experiences.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  2	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
The	  major	  point	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  data	  is	  that	  as	  US	  growth	  
accelerated	  after	  the	  Civil	  War,	  other	  regions,	  with	  three	  exceptions,	  saw	  their	  relative	  
incomes	  decline.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  Figure	  2	  we	  have	  dated	  the	  two	  world	  wars,	  in	  
Eurocentric	  fashion,	  to	  1914-­‐1918	  and	  1939-­‐1945.	  
	  
The	  first	  exception	  is	  Japan,	  which	  managed	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  United	  States	  after	  1870.	  
Like	  all	  regions	  it	  saw	  its	  relative	  GDP	  increase	  during	  the	  catastrophic	  interwar	  period,	  and	  
then	  decline	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  It	  then	  caught	  up	  on	  the	  technological	  frontier	  in	  
impressive	  fashion,	  experiencing	  per	  capita	  growth	  of	  8	  per	  cent	  per	  annum	  during	  the	  
Golden	  Age	  (Table	  8),	  and	  overtaking	  Western	  Europe	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  Its	  subsequent	  
relative	  decline	  has	  been	  quite	  astonishing:	  Japan’s	  relative	  GDP	  peaked	  at	  almost	  85	  per	  
cent	  in	  1991,	  but	  it	  was	  only	  around	  70	  per	  cent	  in	  2007,	  back	  to	  the	  level	  of	  1979.	  
	  
The	  second	  exception	  is	  Latin	  America,	  whose	  relative	  GDP,	  like	  that	  of	  Japan,	  remained	  
constant	  at	  just	  under	  30	  per	  cent	  between	  1870	  and	  1913.	  Unlike	  Japan,	  it	  stayed	  at	  this	  
level	  until	  1940,	  avoiding	  both	  the	  catch-­‐up	  of	  the	  Depression	  years	  and	  the	  collapse	  that	  
followed	  during	  World	  War	  II:	  one	  interpretation	  might	  be	  that	  the	  continent’s	  economies	  
were	  closely	  linked	  with	  that	  of	  the	  US	  during	  this	  period.	  Indeed,	  Latin	  America’s	  relative	  
income	  remained	  fairly	  constant	  during	  the	  next	  four	  decades,	  dipping	  to	  around	  25-­‐26	  per	  
cent	  during	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  and	  recovering	  its	  19th	  century	  level	  of	  29	  per	  cent	  in	  1980.	  
The	  next	  three	  decades	  saw	  Latin	  America’s	  relative	  income	  steadily	  decline,	  and	  it	  stood	  at	  
just	  20	  per	  cent	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  	  Here	  and	  elsewhere	  reported	  growth	  rates	  are	  based	  on	  regressions	  of	  the	  log	  of	  
per	  capita	  output	  on	  time.	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The	  East	  Asian	  Tigers	  (Hong	  Kong,	  South	  Korea,	  Singapore	  and	  Taiwan)	  are,	  with	  Japan,	  the	  
main	  success	  story	  emerging	  from	  Figure	  2.	  Their	  relative	  GDP	  fell	  from	  16	  per	  cent	  in	  1870	  
to	  around	  11	  per	  cent	  by	  1913,	  and	  there	  it	  stood	  until	  1950.	  It	  then	  started	  to	  rise,	  
accelerating	  dramatically	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  until	  by	  2007	  it	  stood	  at	  just	  under	  70	  per	  cent,	  
on	  a	  par	  with	  both	  Western	  Europe	  and	  Japan.	  
	  
The	  European	  growth	  miracle	  of	  the	  Golden	  Age	  was	  real	  enough,	  with	  growth	  rates	  of	  4	  per	  
cent	  per	  annum,	  but	  in	  a	  longer	  run	  perspective	  this	  quarter	  century	  episode	  stands	  out	  as	  
an	  exception	  to	  what	  was	  a	  generally	  disappointing	  performance.	  Like	  most	  other	  regions	  
Western	  Europe’s	  relative	  GDP	  fell	  between	  1870	  and	  1913,	  from	  82	  to	  66	  per	  cent,	  and	  it	  
collapsed	  during	  World	  War	  II	  to	  a	  low	  point	  of	  32	  per	  cent	  in	  1945.	  The	  Golden	  Age	  saw	  the	  
region’s	  relative	  GDP	  recover	  to	  its	  1913	  level,	  and	  even	  surpass	  it	  slightly,	  so	  that	  it	  stood	  at	  
around	  70	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐1970s.	  Since	  then	  there	  has	  been	  absolutely	  no	  
convergence	  on	  the	  technological	  frontier.	  
	  
The	  most	  dramatic	  experience,	  in	  this	  catching	  up	  perspective,	  was	  probably	  that	  of	  the	  
former	  USSR.	  This	  region	  was	  the	  third	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  United	  States	  during	  the	  late	  
19th	  century	  (although	  we	  only	  have	  data	  from	  1885),	  but	  its	  relative	  GDP	  was	  highly	  volatile	  
during	  the	  period.	  It	  then	  collapsed	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  recovered	  dramatically	  
during	  the	  interwar	  period	  to	  the	  point	  where	  it	  surpassed	  its	  previous	  peak,	  reaching	  35	  per	  
cent	  in	  1938.	  It	  collapsed	  again	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  and	  recovered	  in	  equally	  
dramatic	  fashion,	  peaking	  at	  38	  per	  cent	  in	  1975.	  There	  followed	  a	  spectacular	  decline,	  to	  a	  
nadir	  of	  14.5	  per	  cent	  in	  1998.	  It	  then	  rose	  sharply,	  reaching	  24	  per	  cent	  in	  2007.	  
	  
Given	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Soviet	  and	  Eastern	  European	  economies	  were	  connected	  after	  
1945,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  to	  see	  Eastern	  Europe’s	  relative	  GDP	  tracing	  out	  the	  same	  rise	  and	  
fall	  as	  its	  imperial	  master	  before	  and	  after	  1975.	  It	  arrested	  its	  decline	  earlier	  than	  the	  
former	  USSR,	  in	  1993,	  and	  has	  been	  richer	  ever	  since.	  More	  surprising	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  
Southwest	  Asia,	  which	  essentially	  comprises	  oil	  rich	  states	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  Gulf,	  
along	  with	  Israel,	  Lebanon	  and	  Turkey,	  followed	  a	  very	  similar	  trajectory	  as	  well,	  with	  its	  
post-­‐1976	  decline	  extending	  all	  the	  way	  to	  2001.	  
	  
Finally,	  Africa,	  China	  and	  India	  all	  saw	  their	  relative	  incomes	  decline	  steadily	  until	  the	  late	  
20th	  century.	  China’s	  relative	  GDP	  fell	  more	  sharply	  early	  on,	  and	  then	  stagnated	  at	  a	  very	  
low	  level	  from	  1950	  onwards,	  about	  5	  per	  cent,	  before	  starting	  a	  remarkable	  rise	  in	  the	  late	  
1970s.	  It	  stood	  at	  20	  per	  cent	  in	  2007.	  India’s	  relative	  decline	  was	  slower,	  and	  its	  catch-­‐up	  
began	  around	  a	  decade	  after	  China’s,	  again	  from	  a	  level	  of	  around	  5	  per	  cent.	  Africa’s	  
relative	  decline	  was	  the	  slowest	  of	  all,	  with	  its	  relative	  GDP	  only	  hitting	  5	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  mid-­‐
1990s.	  From	  2000	  onwards	  it	  started	  to	  recover,	  but	  only	  slowly,	  reaching	  6	  per	  cent	  in	  2007.	  
	  
4.	  The	  Proximate	  Sources	  of	  Growth	  
	  
This	  section	  explores	  the	  proximate	  sources	  of	  growth,	  as	  revealed	  by	  growth	  accounting	  
techniques.	  	  We	  provide	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  results	  relating	  to	  20th	  century	  economic	  
growth.	  	  We	  also	  review	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  use	  of	  these	  methods	  and,	  in	  
particular,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  results	  obtained	  by	  using	  them.	  	  Handled	  with	  care,	  we	  
believe	  that	  growth	  accounting	  can	  provide	  an	  important	  benchmarking	  or	  diagnostic	  tool	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4.1.	  Conventional	  Growth	  Accounting	  Results	  
	  
The	  conventional	  growth	  accounting	  approach	  assumes	  that	  GDP	  is	  given	  by:	  
	  
Y	  =	  AKαL1-­‐α	  
	  
where	  Y	  is	  output,	  K	  is	  capital,	  L	  is	  labour	  and	  A	  is	  TFP,	  while	  α	  and	  (1	  –	  α)	  are	  the	  elasticities	  
of	  output	  with	  respect	  to	  capital	  and	  labour,	  respectively.	  	  The	  level	  of	  TFP	  is	  usually	  
measured	  as	  a	  residual	  after	  the	  other	  items	  in	  the	  expression	  have	  been	  measured.	  
	  
This	  can	  be	  converted	  into	  the	  basic	  growth	  accounting	  formula	  
	  
Δln(Y/L)	  =	  αΔln(K/L)	  	  +	  ΔlnA	  
	  
which	  gives	  a	  decomposition	  of	  the	  percentage	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  labour	  productivity	  into	  a	  
contribution	  from	  the	  percentage	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  capital	  per	  unit	  of	  labour	  input	  (capital	  
deepening)	  and	  a	  term	  based	  on	  the	  percentage	  growth	  rate	  of	  TFP.	  	  For	  benchmarking	  
purposes,	  it	  is	  convenient	  to	  adopt	  a	  standardized	  value	  for	  α.12	  
	  
It	  is	  tempting	  but	  misleading	  to	  assume	  that	  residual	  TFP	  growth	  in	  this	  formula	  captures	  the	  
contribution	  of	  technological	  progress	  to	  labour	  productivity	  growth.	  	  Technological	  change	  
may	  be	  less	  than	  TFP	  growth	  if	  there	  are	  scale	  economies	  or	  improvements	  in	  the	  efficiency	  
with	  which	  factor	  inputs	  are	  used.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  technological	  progress	  is	  partly	  
embodied	  in	  new	  forms	  of	  capital	  (rather	  than	  ‘manna	  from	  heaven’)	  then	  some	  of	  its	  
contribution	  will	  seem	  to	  accrue	  to	  capital	  when	  this	  approach	  is	  used.	  	  	  
	  
A	  more	  general	  approach	  seeks	  to	  take	  account	  of	  human	  capital	  and	  modifies	  the	  
production	  function	  to	  be	  
	  
Y	  =	  AKα(L*(HK/L))1-­‐α	  
	  
where	  HK/L	  is	  the	  average	  educational	  quality	  of	  the	  labour	  force,	  typically	  approximated	  by	  
years	  of	  schooling.	  	  The	  growth-­‐accounting	  formula	  then	  becomes	  
	  
Δln(Y/L)	  =	  αΔln(K/L)	  	  +	  	  (1	  –	  α)Δln(HK/L)	  	  +	  ΔlnA	  
	  
so	  that	  the	  decomposition	  now	  includes	  a	  contribution	  from	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  the	  
quality	  of	  the	  labour	  force,	  which	  in	  practice	  is	  based	  on	  the	  additional	  earnings	  from	  years	  
of	  schooling.	  	  The	  estimates	  of	  the	  TFP	  growth	  contribution	  are	  less	  crude	  and,	  of	  course,	  
tend	  to	  be	  smaller	  once	  education	  is	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  
	  
Tables	  10	  and	  11	  report	  growth-­‐accounting	  estimates	  on	  this	  basis	  where	  the	  methods	  used	  
allow	  international	  comparisons	  to	  be	  made.	  	  Taken	  at	  face	  value,	  several	  interesting	  points	  
stand	  out	  from	  these	  estimates.	  	  First,	  even	  after	  allowing	  for	  education,	  TFP	  growth	  in	  the	  
advanced	  economies	  compares	  very	  favourably	  with	  the	  19th	  century	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  It	  is	  common	  to	  use	  α	  =	  0.35	  which	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  share	  of	  profits	  in	  GDP	  for	  
many	  countries.	  	  The	  profits	  share	  is	  potentially	  a	  misleading	  estimate	  of	  the	  output	  
elasticity	  of	  capital,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  significant	  externalities	  or	  market	  
power,	  but	  in	  practice	  it	  is	  probably	  acceptable	  (Aiyar	  and	  Dalgaard	  2005,	  Bosworth	  
and	  Collins	  2003).	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Golden	  Age	  in	  the	  1970s.	  	  Second,	  the	  rise	  of	  East	  Asian	  countries	  after	  1960	  is	  notable	  for	  a	  
very	  strong	  capital	  deepening	  contribution	  to	  labour	  productivity	  growth,	  which	  was	  much	  
greater	  than	  had	  been	  observed	  in	  the	  European	  transition	  to	  modern	  economic	  growth	  in	  
the	  19th	  century.	  	  Third,	  TFP	  growth	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  was	  disastrous	  in	  the	  last	  30	  years	  
of	  the	  20th	  century	  and	  most	  disappointing	  in	  Latin	  America	  post-­‐1980,	  and	  for	  both	  these	  
regions	  there	  was	  virtually	  no	  capital	  deepening	  contribution	  after	  1980.	  
	  
TABLES	  10	  AND	  11	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
Table	  12	  provides	  an	  account	  of	  productivity	  gaps	  based	  on	  an	  application	  of	  growth	  
accounting	  to	  levels	  pioneered	  in	  a	  classic	  article	  by	  Hall	  and	  Jones	  (1999).	  	  Its	  results	  are	  
quite	  similar	  to	  those	  given	  in	  that	  paper	  but	  are	  for	  a	  more	  recent	  year	  (2005).	  	  The	  results	  
are	  striking:	  by	  far	  the	  most	  important	  reason	  for	  differences	  in	  labour	  productivity	  (and	  
income	  per	  head)	  is	  differences	  across	  countries	  in	  levels	  of	  TFP.13	  	  This	  is	  a	  striking	  rejection	  
of	  the	  basic	  set-­‐up	  of	  the	  pure	  Solow	  growth	  model	  which	  assumes	  that	  technology	  is	  the	  
basis	  of	  TFP	  and	  is	  both	  exogenous	  and	  universal	  –	  an	  assumption	  which	  underpins	  the	  
neoclassical	  predictions	  of	  β-­‐	  and	  σ-­‐convergence.	  
	  
TABLE	  12	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
In	  principle,	  there	  are	  two	  reasons	  why	  TFP	  levels	  may	  differ,	  namely	  ‘technology’	  and	  
‘efficiency’.	  	  The	  most	  obvious	  reason	  why	  technology	  might	  differ	  is	  that	  technological	  
progress	  has	  been	  uneven	  and	  has	  improved	  the	  production	  function	  at	  some	  factor	  
intensities	  (high	  capital-­‐labour	  or	  human	  capital-­‐labour	  ratios)	  but	  not	  others.	  	  The	  evidence	  
suggests	  that	  this	  was	  the	  case	  during	  the	  20th	  century	  (Allen	  2012),	  as	  might	  be	  expected,	  in	  
a	  world	  of	  directed	  technical	  change	  where	  research	  and	  development	  is	  orientated	  
primarily	  to	  the	  incentives	  provided	  by	  the	  economic	  environment	  of	  advanced	  economies.	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  there	  could	  be	  an	  ‘inappropriate	  technology’	  explanation	  for	  the	  TFP	  gap.	  	  
An	  inefficiency	  explanation	  for	  TFP	  gaps	  might	  relate	  to	  differences	  in	  institutional	  quality	  
which	  impact	  on	  allocative	  and/or	  productive	  inefficiency.	  Again,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  
points	  in	  this	  direction,	  notably	  the	  finding	  by	  Hsieh	  and	  Klenow	  (2009)	  that	  if	  capital	  and	  
labour	  were	  used	  as	  efficiently	  in	  Chinese	  and	  Indian	  manufacturing	  as	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
TFP	  would	  increase	  by	  30-­‐50	  per	  cent	  and	  40-­‐60	  per	  cent,	  respectively.	  
	  
Table	  13	  reports	  results	  from	  one	  attempt	  to	  discriminate	  between	  these	  two	  hypotheses.	  	  
The	  overall	  conclusion	  in	  Jerzmanowski	  (2007)	  is	  that	  in	  1995	  (1960)	  factor	  inputs	  accounted	  
for	  31	  (45)	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  output	  per	  worker	  while	  of	  the	  69	  (55)	  per	  cent	  
attributable	  to	  TFP,	  43	  (28)	  per	  cent	  came	  from	  efficiency	  and	  26	  (27)	  per	  cent	  from	  
technology	  differences.	  	  These	  estimates	  imply	  that,	  while	  both	  efficiency	  and	  technology	  
are	  important	  in	  explaining	  TFP	  gaps,	  on	  average	  efficiency	  matters	  more	  and	  increasingly	  so	  
over	  time.	  	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  episodes	  of	  rapid	  catch-­‐up	  growth	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  
based	  on	  major	  improvements	  in	  both	  efficiency	  and	  technology.	  	  They	  also	  suggest	  that	  the	  
lengthy	  period	  of	  negative	  TFP	  growth	  in	  Africa	  reported	  in	  Table	  11	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  deteriorating	  
efficiency	  of	  factor	  use,	  rather	  than	  of	  technological	  retrogression.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  There	  are	  alternative	  ways	  to	  specify	  the	  ‘development	  accounting’	  equation	  and	  
also	  measurement	  issues,	  in	  particular	  with	  regard	  to	  human	  capital.	  	  Nevertheless,	  
there	  seems	  to	  be	  general	  agreement	  that	  residual	  TFP	  is	  the	  biggest	  part	  of	  the	  
story,	  accounting	  for	  50-­‐70	  per	  cent	  of	  cross-­‐country	  income	  differences	  (Hsieh	  and	  
Klenow	  2010).	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  13	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4.2	  Some	  Issues	  of	  Measurement	  and	  Interpretation14	  
	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  important	  issues	  that	  have	  to	  be	  addressed	  when	  trying	  to	  compare	  
growth	  accounting	  exercises	  for	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries	  with	  similar	  exercises	  
for	  the	  late	  20th	  century.	  For	  example,	  to	  obtain	  estimates	  of	  real	  GDP	  an	  accurate	  GDP	  price	  
deflator	  is	  required.	  	  Boskin	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  thought	  that,	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  inflation	  had	  
been	  overestimated	  (and	  thus	  real	  GDP	  growth	  and	  TFP	  growth	  had	  been	  underestimated	  by	  
a	  similar	  amount)	  in	  the	  national	  accounts	  during	  the	  period	  of	  the	  productivity	  slowdown	  in	  
the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  and	  that	  the	  correction	  required	  was	  of	  the	  order	  of	  0.6	  per	  cent	  per	  
year.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Boskin	  bias	  in	  inflation	  measurement	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  
generalize	  to	  other	  periods	  (Costa	  2001).	  
	  
Perhaps	  a	  more	  serious	  concern	  in	  many	  cases	  is	  a	  potential	  index	  number	  problem	  
regarding	  the	  measurement	  of	  capital	  inputs.	  	  The	  standard	  approach,	  used	  in	  virtually	  all	  
historical	  studies,	  relies	  on	  estimates	  of	  the	  perpetual	  inventory	  capital	  stock	  that	  are	  
weighted	  using	  asset	  prices.	  	  A	  theoretically	  more	  appropriate	  (but	  much	  more	  data	  
demanding)	  method	  is	  to	  estimate	  flows	  of	  capital	  services	  using	  rental	  prices	  as	  weights.	  	  
This	  requires	  estimates	  of	  the	  user	  cost	  of	  capital	  for	  different	  assets.	  	  The	  difference	  
between	  the	  two	  methods	  will	  be	  especially	  important	  when	  investment	  switches	  towards	  
short-­‐lived	  assets	  (like	  computers)	  and	  away	  from	  long-­‐lived	  assets	  (like	  structures),	  since	  
the	  user	  cost	  of	  the	  former	  is	  much	  higher	  relative	  to	  the	  asset	  price.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  this	  
issue	  has	  come	  to	  prominence	  since	  the	  ICT	  revolution.15	  	  Generally	  speaking,	  using	  the	  
capital	  services	  methodology	  raises	  the	  growth	  contribution	  of	  capital	  and	  lowers	  that	  of	  TFP.	  	  
However,	  this	  probably	  makes	  relatively	  little	  difference,	  even	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  before	  
the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  as	  Table	  14	  reports;	  it	  is,	  however,	  very	  important	  for	  
analyses	  of	  recent	  growth.16	  
	  
TABLE	  14	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
It	  has	  long	  been	  recognized	  that	  research	  and	  development	  is	  an	  intangible	  investment	  and	  
that	  the	  R	  &	  D	  knowledge	  stock	  could	  be	  introduced	  as	  an	  input	  in	  growth	  accounting	  
estimates.	  	  More	  recently,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  intangible	  investments	  generally	  
(including	  design	  and	  product	  development,	  investments	  in	  branding,	  firm-­‐specific	  human	  
and	  organizational	  capital	  formation	  including	  training	  and	  consultancy,	  and	  computerized	  
information,	  especially	  software)	  should	  be	  treated	  in	  this	  way.	  	  Expenditure	  on	  these	  items	  
has	  been	  growing	  rapidly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ‘knowledge	  economy’	  and	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  
the	  USA	  is	  of	  similar	  magnitude	  to	  investment	  in	  tangible	  capital.	  	  If	  these	  expenditures	  are	  
treated	  as	  final	  investment	  rather	  than	  intermediates	  in	  growth	  accounting	  exercises,	  this	  
will	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  more	  output,	  more	  inputs	  and	  revised	  factor-­‐share	  weights.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  	  This	  section	  draws	  in	  part	  on	  Crafts	  (2009a,	  2010).	  
15	  Estimates	  for	  the	  UK	  show	  that	  the	  volume	  of	  capital	  inputs	  for	  the	  period	  1950-­‐
2006	  grew	  by	  3.1	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  measured	  by	  the	  traditional	  capital	  stock	  data	  
but	  by	  3.5	  per	  cent	  when	  measured	  by	  the	  capital	  services	  method.	  	  The	  difference	  
relates	  entirely	  to	  the	  post-­‐1980	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  post-­‐1990	  period	  (Wallis	  
2009).	  
16	  The	  EUKLEMS	  database	  which	  covers	  recent	  decades	  and	  permits	  international	  
comparisons	  is	  constructed	  using	  a	  capital	  services	  methodology:	  see	  O’Mahony	  and	  
Timmer	  (2009).	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In	  principle,	  the	  impact	  of	  switching	  to	  accounting	  with	  intangibles	  on	  TFP	  growth	  is	  
ambiguous.	  In	  practice,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  ICT	  era,	  the	  impact	  is	  to	  increase	  estimated	  labour	  
productivity	  growth	  a	  bit,	  to	  raise	  the	  contribution	  of	  capital	  deepening	  considerably,	  and	  to	  
reduce	  measured	  TFP	  growth	  appreciably,	  as	  Table	  15	  reports.	  	  Growth	  accounting	  with	  
intangibles	  for	  earlier	  periods	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  attempted	  but	  the	  impact	  would	  surely	  be	  
much	  less	  dramatic	  since	  in	  the	  1950s	  intangible	  investment	  added	  only	  about	  4	  per	  cent	  to	  
U.S.	  GDP	  compared	  with	  about	  three	  times	  that	  amount	  50	  years	  later.	  
	  
TABLE	  15	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
Neoclassical	  growth	  accounting	  is	  normally	  carried	  out	  by	  imposing	  a	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  
production	  function.	  	  In	  some	  circumstances,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  a	  CES	  specification	  is	  more	  
appropriate	  with	  the	  elasticity	  of	  substitution	  between	  capital	  and	  labour,	  σ,	  being	  set	  to	  a	  
value	  less	  than	  one.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  especially	  when	  the	  capital	  to	  labour	  ratio	  is	  growing	  
rapidly	  and	  technical	  change	  exhibits	  capital-­‐using	  bias,	  TFP	  growth	  will	  be	  underestimated	  
by	  the	  conventional	  method.	  	  For	  example,	  taken	  at	  face	  value	  the	  estimates	  in	  Table	  14	  
(which	  assume	  that	  σ	  =	  1)	  invite	  the	  conclusion	  that	  technical	  change	  was	  insignificant	  in	  the	  
American	  economy	  for	  much	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  and	  only	  became	  significant	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  
the	  science-­‐based	  industries	  and	  R	  &	  D	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  second	  industrial	  revolution.	  	  This	  
runs	  counter	  to	  standard	  historical	  discussions,	  however,	  and	  is	  certainly	  not	  the	  
interpretation	  in	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  (2001).	  	  If,	  as	  they	  argue,	  the	  19th	  century	  US	  
economy	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  low	  elasticity	  of	  substitution	  between	  factors	  and	  capital-­‐
using	  technical	  change,	  then	  TFP	  growth	  was	  considerably	  stronger	  than	  shown	  in	  Table	  14.	  
If	  estimates	  are	  obtained	  assuming	  σ	  =	  0.3,	  as	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  believe	  is	  appropriate,	  
then	  TFP	  growth	  turns	  out	  to	  have	  been	  0.9	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  between	  1835	  and	  1890,	  much	  
higher	  than	  a	  crude	  estimate	  of	  0.24	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  assuming	  σ	  =	  1.17	  Other	  cases	  where	  a	  
similar	  issue	  arises,	  and	  which	  are	  discussed	  below,	  include	  the	  ‘East	  Asian	  Miracle’	  (Rodrik	  
1997)	  and	  the	  1970s’	  growth	  slowdown	  in	  the	  USSR	  (Allen	  2003).	  
	  
A	  further	  problem	  with	  conventional	  growth	  accounting	  that	  matters	  in	  some	  circumstances	  
is	  that	  it	  assumes	  no	  costs	  of	  adjustment,	  fixed	  factors	  of	  production	  or	  economies	  of	  scale.	  	  
Morrison	  (1993)	  proposed	  an	  econometric	  procedure	  to	  address	  these	  problems	  and	  her	  
results	  indicated	  that	  the	  1970s	  slowdown	  in	  TFP	  growth	  in	  American	  manufacturing	  was	  
very	  largely	  a	  weakening	  of	  economies	  of	  scale	  rather	  than	  of	  technological	  progress.	  	  Using	  
Morrison’s	  methodology,	  Crafts	  and	  Mills	  (2005)	  found	  that	  adjustment	  costs	  meant	  that	  
technological	  progress	  was	  about	  2	  percentage	  points	  faster	  than	  conventional	  TFP	  growth	  
in	  both	  British	  and	  German	  manufacturing	  during	  1950-­‐73	  but	  not	  much	  different	  thereafter.	  	  
Once	  again,	  as	  with	  the	  previous	  examples,	  the	  point	  is	  that	  inter-­‐temporal	  comparisons	  of	  
conventional	  TFP	  growth	  may	  be	  hazardous	  because	  the	  degree	  of	  measurement	  bias	  
appears	  to	  have	  varied	  considerably	  over	  time.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  This	  calculation	  applies	  the	  correction	  to	  TFP	  growth	  in	  Rodrik	  (1997).	  	  The	  
correction	  is	  given	  by	  0.5α((1	  -­‐	  σ)/σ)(1	  −	  α)(ΔK/K	  −	  ΔL/L)(ΔAL/AL	  −	  ΔAK/AK)	  where	  
the	  last	  term	  captures	  the	  degree	  of	  factor-­‐saving	  bias	  in	  technological	  progress	  
measured	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  rate	  of	  labour	  augmentation	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  
capital	  augmentation.	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Underpinning	  growth	  accounting	  in	  the	  neoclassical	  tradition	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  neoclassical	  
growth	  model.18	  	  The	  later	  development	  of	  endogenous	  growth	  models	  could	  potentially	  call	  
for	  alternative	  growth	  accounting	  formulae	  or	  a	  different	  interpretation	  of	  the	  standard	  
results	  (Barro	  1999).	  	  The	  most	  obvious	  implication	  might	  be	  to	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  
the	  embodiment	  of	  technical	  change	  in	  new	  varieties	  of	  capital,	  as	  in	  the	  voluminous	  
literature	  that	  has	  applied	  growth	  accounting	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  ICT	  (e.g.	  Oliner	  et	  al.	  2007).	  	  
The	  growth	  accounting	  formula	  that	  has	  been	  applied	  in	  the	  ICT	  literature	  is	  
	  
Δln(Y/L)	  	  =	  	  αKOΔln(KO/L)	  	  +	  	  αKICTΔln(KICT/L)	  	  +	  	  φΔlnAICT	  	  +	  	  ηΔlnAO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
where	  φ	  and	  η	  are	  gross	  output	  weights,	  KICT	  is	  capital	  used	  in	  ICT	  production,	  KO	  is	  the	  rest	  
of	  the	  capital	  stock,	  AICT	  is	  TFP	  in	  ICT	  production	  and	  AO	  is	  TFP	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  
The	  contribution	  of	  the	  new	  ICT	  technology	  to	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  
sum	  of	  the	  second	  and	  third	  terms.	  Given	  that	  φ	  and	  αKICT	  are	  very	  small	  initially,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  
see	  why	  a	  new	  GPT	  initially	  adds	  very	  little	  to	  overall	  labour	  productivity	  growth.	  	  By	  
including	  the	  ICT	  capital	  deepening	  term,	  however,	  the	  implication	  is	  that	  TFP	  growth	  under-­‐
estimates	  the	  contribution	  of	  technological	  progress	  to	  growth.	  
	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  approach	  seeks	  only	  to	  benchmark	  the	  direct	  ex-­‐post	  ICT	  
component	  of	  productivity	  growth.	  	  It	  does	  not	  answer	  the	  (much	  harder)	  question	  ‘how	  
much	  faster	  was	  productivity	  growth	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ICT?.’	  	  This	  hinges	  on	  the	  counterfactual	  
rate	  of	  growth	  of	  other	  capital	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  ICT,	  estimation	  of	  which	  would	  be	  a	  
complex	  modelling	  exercise	  taking	  account	  of	  both	  ‘crowding	  out’	  and	  ‘crowding	  in’	  effects.	  	  
Fogel	  (1964)	  took	  the	  view	  that	  no	  capital	  deepening	  component	  should	  be	  included	  
because	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  new	  technology	  similar	  returns	  would	  have	  been	  earned	  on	  
alternative	  investments.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  position	  that	  everyone	  would	  accept,	  
especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  GPTs.19	  
	  
This	  links	  to	  a	  deeper	  concern	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  growth	  accounting	  to	  identify	  the	  sources	  
of	  growth,	  which	  was	  very	  clearly	  articulated	  by	  Abramovitz	  (1993).	  	  The	  issue	  is	  two-­‐way	  
interdependence	  between	  the	  trajectories	  of	  technological	  change	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
physical	  and	  human	  capital	  formation	  on	  the	  other.	  	  While	  some	  endogenous	  growth	  models	  
stress	  the	  latter	  interdependence,	  it	  is	  actually	  the	  former	  which	  is	  highlighted	  by	  a	  
comparison	  of	  the	  American	  growth	  process	  in	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  centuries.20	  
	  
Three	  key	  points	  should	  be	  noted.	  	  First,	  using	  conventional	  growth	  accounting	  to	  estimate	  
TFP	  growth	  is	  not	  always	  a	  good	  guide	  to	  underlying	  technological	  change.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  As	  Griliches	  (1996)	  underlined,	  the	  big	  contribution	  of	  Solow	  (1957)	  was	  to	  put	  the	  
economics	  into	  growth	  accounting	  by	  making	  this	  connection.	  
19	  Fogel	  (1964)	  measured	  the	  contribution	  of	  railways	  to	  American	  economic	  growth	  
in	  terms	  of	  ‘social	  savings’,	  essentially	  a	  measure	  of	  user	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  
impact	  of	  technical	  change	  on	  the	  transport	  supply	  curve.	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  show	  that	  this	  
is	  equivalent	  to	  φΔlnAICT	  	  (Foreman-­‐Peck	  1991).	  	  
20	  Of	  course,	  in	  the	  neoclassical	  growth	  model	  an	  increase	  in	  exogenous	  TFP	  growth	  
raises	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  the	  capital	  stock;	  some	  implications	  of	  this	  point	  for	  growth	  
accounting	  are	  explored	  by	  Hulten	  (1979).	  	  However,	  Abramovitz	  has	  in	  mind	  a	  richer	  
story	  about	  19th-­‐century	  American	  growth	  in	  which,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  great	  expansion	  of	  
the	  domestic	  market	  resulting	  from	  technological	  change	  in	  transport	  leads	  to	  larger-­‐
scale	  and	  more	  capital-­‐intensive	  methods	  of	  production.	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TFP	  growth	  can	  be	  either	  an	  under-­‐	  or	  an	  over-­‐estimate	  of	  the	  contribution	  of	  technological	  
progress	  to	  economic	  growth.	  	  Second,	  the	  size	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  bias	  in	  neoclassical	  
growth	  accounting	  varies	  considerably	  in	  different	  periods	  or	  types	  of	  economy;	  this	  can	  
make	  historical	  comparisons	  quite	  difficult.	  	  Third,	  while	  growth	  accounting	  invites	  its	  users	  
to	  treat	  the	  growth	  of	  capital	  and	  technological	  change	  as	  independent	  and	  additive,	  this	  
assumption	  is	  potentially	  quite	  misleading	  and	  may	  detract	  from	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  
the	  sources	  of	  growth.	  
	  
4.3.	  Economic	  Miracles	  are	  not	  all	  the	  Same21	  
	  
All	  of	  that	  having	  been	  said,	  an	  interesting	  application	  of	  growth	  accounting	  is	  to	  compare	  
episodes	  of	  rapid	  catch-­‐up	  growth,	  which	  exhibit	  some	  striking	  differences	  when	  viewed	  
through	  this	  lens.22	  	  Table	  16	  reports	  estimates	  relating	  to	  the	  Golden	  Age	  of	  Western	  
European	  growth,	  the	  East	  Asian	  Miracle,	  the	  Celtic	  Tiger,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  BRICs	  and	  the	  
Soviet	  Union.	  This	  last	  case	  ended	  in	  failure	  but	  back	  in	  the	  1960s	  it	  was	  conventional	  
wisdom	  that	  the	  USSR	  was	  on	  track	  to	  overtake	  the	  United	  States	  before	  the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  21st	  century	  (Levy	  and	  Peart	  2011).	  
	  
TABLE	  16	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
The	  European	  Golden	  Age	  saw	  strong	  contributions	  to	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  from	  both	  
capital	  deepening	  and	  TFP	  growth,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  that	  was	  typically	  larger	  in	  the	  poorer	  
countries	  which	  exhibited	  the	  fastest	  growth.	  	  This	  was	  not	  based	  to	  any	  significant	  extent	  
on	  domestic	  R	  &	  D,	  but	  rather	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  technology	  transfer,	  structural	  shift	  away	  
from	  agriculture,	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  more	  efficient	  utilization	  of	  factors	  of	  production.	  	  
The	  transfer	  of	  ‘surplus	  labour’	  from	  small-­‐scale	  family	  farms	  was	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  
process	  (Crafts	  and	  Toniolo	  2008).	  	  External	  trade	  liberalization	  and	  the	  increased	  
integration	  of	  the	  European	  market	  were	  factors	  that	  speeded	  up	  technology	  transfer	  and	  
helped	  Europe	  to	  reduce	  the	  technology	  gap	  with	  the	  United	  States	  (Badinger	  2005,	  Madsen	  
2007).	  Nelson	  and	  Wright	  (1992)	  also	  stressed	  the	  increased	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  American	  
technology	  in	  Europe,	  the	  greater	  codification	  of	  technological	  knowledge,	  and	  increases	  in	  
European	  technological	  competence	  based	  on	  increased	  investments	  in	  human	  capital	  and	  R	  
&	  D.	  	  	  Overall,	  though,	  this	  is	  clearly	  a	  case	  where	  TFP	  growth	  involved	  much	  more	  than	  
technological	  progress.	  
	  
The	  East	  Asian	  Miracle	  was	  quite	  different.	  	  Table	  16	  shows	  that	  TFP	  growth	  contributed	  
relatively	  less,	  and	  capital	  deepening	  more,	  than	  in	  Golden	  Age	  Europe.	  	  Rapid	  growth	  of	  the	  
capital	  stock	  was	  underpinned	  by	  increasingly	  high	  investment	  rates	  which	  reached	  around	  
35	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  in	  Korea	  and	  Singapore,	  around	  10	  percentage	  points	  higher	  than	  the	  
average	  in	  1960s	  Europe.	  	  East	  Asian	  growth	  was	  also	  notable	  for	  a	  very	  strong	  growth	  of	  
labour	  inputs,	  underpinned	  by	  a	  ‘bonus’	  from	  the	  age	  structure	  effects	  of	  the	  demographic	  
transition	  which	  (unlike	  in	  Western	  Europe)	  coincided	  with	  the	  growth	  spurt.	  	  Although	  East	  
Asian	  countries	  were	  successful	  in	  importing	  technology,	  overall	  the	  developmental	  states	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  	  This	  section	  draws	  in	  part	  on	  Crafts	  and	  Toniolo	  (2008).	  
22	  	  Our	  examples	  are	  all	  taken	  from	  the	  late	  20th	  century,	  so	  hopefully	  the	  problems	  
of	  inter-­‐temporal	  comparability	  highlighted	  earlier	  will	  not	  be	  too	  severe.	  See	  
however	  the	  caveats	  in	  the	  succeeding	  two	  footnotes.	  
	   20	  
the	  region	  were	  better	  at	  mobilizing	  factor	  inputs	  than	  at	  achieving	  outstanding	  TFP	  growth	  
(Young	  1995,	  Crafts	  1999).23	  
	  
The	  Celtic	  Tiger	  was	  a	  very	  different	  animal	  from	  its	  Asian	  counterpart	  and	  also	  contrasts	  
quite	  strongly	  with	  Golden	  Age	  European	  growth	  (Crafts	  2009b).	  	  Ireland’s	  labour	  
productivity	  growth	  was	  a	  good	  deal	  lower,	  mainly	  because	  of	  a	  small	  capital	  deepening	  
component	  in	  an	  economy	  where	  investment	  was	  about	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP.	  	  TFP	  growth	  
was	  strong	  but	  relied	  on	  ICT	  production	  which	  accounted	  for	  nearly	  two	  thirds	  of	  TFP	  growth	  
during	  the	  1990s	  (Van	  Ark	  et	  al.	  2003).	  	  In	  turn,	  this	  was	  based	  on	  Ireland’s	  exceptional	  
ability	  to	  attract	  FDI,	  especially	  from	  the	  United	  States:	  domestic	  R	  &	  D	  was	  only	  about	  1.4	  
per	  cent	  of	  GNP.	  	  Apart	  from	  ICT	  production,	  as	  Table	  16	  reports,	  the	  other	  outstanding	  
feature	  of	  the	  Celtic	  Tiger	  was	  employment	  growth	  which	  far	  outstripped	  population	  growth	  
as	  unemployment	  fell,	  female	  participation	  rose,	  and	  emigration	  turned	  into	  immigration.	  
Irish	  growth	  thus	  benefited	  from	  a	  very	  elastic	  labour	  supply	  (Barry	  2002).	  
	  
The	  striking	  feature	  of	  catch-­‐up	  growth	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  that,	  if	  standard	  growth	  
accounting	  assumptions	  are	  adopted,	  it	  relied	  much	  more	  on	  'extensive	  growth'.	  	  While	  the	  
capital	  deepening	  contribution	  to	  growth	  in	  the	  Golden	  Age	  was	  similar	  to	  that	  in	  Western	  
Europe	  or	  a	  bit	  lower,	  TFP	  growth	  was	  decidedly	  inferior.	  Its	  contribution	  was	  very	  weak	  
compared	  with	  countries	  like	  Italy	  with	  similar	  catch-­‐up	  potential.24	  	  The	  problem	  with	  the	  
Soviet	  growth	  model	  is	  that	  it	  ran	  into	  a	  rapidly	  rising	  marginal	  capital	  to	  output	  ratio,	  
implying	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  capital	  stock	  growth	  delivered	  by	  a	  constant	  investment/GDP	  ratio	  
fell	  steadily	  over	  time.	  The	  problem	  became	  acute	  when	  TFP	  growth	  ceased	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  
further	  increases	  in	  the	  investment	  rate	  (which	  had	  doubled	  between	  1950	  and	  1970	  to	  30	  
per	  cent)	  became	  infeasible	  given	  the	  commitment	  to	  high	  defence	  spending.	  
	  
Finally,	  we	  consider	  the	  ‘growth	  miracles’	  in	  two	  of	  the	  BRICs	  with	  rather	  different	  growth	  
trajectories.	  	  China	  has	  experienced	  very	  rapid	  growth	  of	  real	  GDP	  per	  person	  since	  reforms	  
began	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s.	  This	  has	  been	  based	  on	  impressive	  contributions	  from	  both	  
capital	  deepening	  and	  TFP	  growth.	  The	  former	  has	  resulted	  from	  investment	  rates	  which	  are	  
massive	  by	  historical	  standards,	  reaching	  well	  over	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  by	  the	  early	  2000s.	  	  
The	  latter	  has	  two	  components,	  technology	  transfer	  linked	  closely	  to	  FDI	  (Whalley	  and	  Xin	  
2010),	  and	  increases	  in	  efficiency	  starting	  from	  the	  very	  low	  base	  of	  the	  Maoist	  economy.	  	  
Here,	  de-­‐collectivization	  of	  agriculture	  which	  led	  to	  a	  surge	  in	  TFP	  in	  the	  1980s	  (McMillan	  et	  
al.	  1989)	  played	  a	  big	  part	  initially.	  The	  rapid	  reduction	  in	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprise	  share	  
of	  GDP	  has	  also	  been	  a	  key	  component,	  and	  it	  is	  TFP	  growth	  in	  industry	  which	  has	  been	  most	  
impressive.	  	  India	  experienced	  a	  productivity	  surge	  after	  the	  disappointing	  period	  of	  the	  so-­‐
called	  ‘Hindu	  growth	  rate’	  (Rodrik	  and	  Subramanian	  2005).	  	  Even	  so,	  capital	  deepening	  and	  
investment	  rates	  have	  been	  well	  below	  those	  in	  China.	  So	  has	  TFP	  growth,	  although	  this	  
strengthened	  appreciably	  after	  the	  Indian	  reforms	  of	  the	  early	  1990s.	  	  The	  detailed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Rodrik	  (1997)	  argues	  that	  TFP	  growth	  may	  be	  underestimated	  by	  standard	  
techniques	  because	  σ	  was	  less	  than	  1,	  given	  biased	  technical	  change	  and	  strong	  
capital	  deepening.	  	  It	  is	  unclear	  how	  big	  this	  effect	  may	  have	  been.	  
24	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  this	  may	  be	  an	  artefact	  of	  the	  methodology	  and	  that	  
the	  USSR	  is	  better	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  production	  function	  with	  a	  very	  low	  
elasticity	  of	  substitution	  between	  capital	  and	  labour	  and	  thus	  severely	  diminishing	  
returns	  to	  capital	  (Weitzman	  1970).	  	  Allen	  (2003)	  provides	  a	  convincing	  rebuttal	  of	  
this	  claim,	  noting	  that	  the	  technological	  possibilities	  were	  similar	  in	  West	  and	  East	  
and	  that	  there	  is	  clear	  evidence	  of	  massive	  waste	  of	  capital	  in	  the	  Soviet	  system,	  
which	  implies	  that	  standard	  benchmarking	  is	  appropriate.	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comparisons	  in	  Bosworth	  and	  Collins	  (2008)	  show	  that	  TFP	  growth	  in	  the	  industrial	  sector	  in	  
India	  has	  been	  very	  disappointing	  (averaging	  0.6	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  over	  1978	  to	  2004	  
compared	  with	  4.3	  per	  cent	  in	  China),	  while	  TFP	  growth	  in	  services	  has	  been	  strong	  –	  in	  
1993-­‐2004	  averaging	  3.9	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  compared	  with	  0.9	  per	  cent	  in	  China.	  
	  
5.	  Growth	  in	  the	  Leader:	  	  the	  United	  States	  
	  
The	  United	  States	  overtook	  Britain	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  in	  terms	  of	  real	  GDP	  per	  
person	  and	  maintained	  its	  leading	  position	  throughout	  the	  ‘American	  century’.	  	  By	  mid-­‐
century,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  become	  the	  clear	  technological	  leader	  and	  had	  developed	  a	  
very	  different	  ‘national	  innovation	  system’	  from	  that	  which	  had	  prevailed	  in	  1900.	  	  Although	  
other	  OECD	  countries,	  notably	  Japan,	  reduced	  the	  gap	  from	  the	  1960s	  to	  the	  1980s,	  the	  
United	  States	  reasserted	  its	  leadership	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ICT	  revolution.	  	  This	  section	  
examines	  the	  foundations	  of	  this	  exceptional	  performance	  and	  considers	  American	  
technological	  prowess	  using	  an	  endogenous	  innovation	  lens.	  
	  
5.1.	  Technological	  Leadership	  
	  
During	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  in	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
most	  important	  new	  technologies	  including	  the	  internal	  combustion	  engine,	  electricity,	  
petrochemicals,	  aviation	  and	  ICT.	  	  In	  this	  era,	  technological	  progress	  increasingly	  became	  the	  
result	  of	  systematic	  research	  and	  development	  based	  on	  formal	  science	  and	  engineering,	  
and	  was	  associated	  much	  more	  with	  corporate	  research	  laboratories	  and	  public	  investment	  
than	  with	  independent	  invention.	  
	  
That	  said,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  difference	  between	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  eras	  (Mowery	  
and	  Rosenberg	  2000).	  In	  the	  former	  period,	  the	  United	  States	  developed	  a	  formidable	  record	  
in	  the	  commercial	  development	  of	  technologies	  which	  had	  typically	  originated	  from	  Europe.	  	  
Already	  by	  the	  interwar	  period,	  revealed	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  American	  exports	  was	  
strongly	  correlated	  with	  research	  intensity	  (Crafts	  1989).	  	  In	  the	  latter	  period,	  United	  States	  
science	  and	  invention	  played	  a	  much	  bigger	  role	  as	  American	  universities	  became	  world	  
leaders	  in	  academic	  research	  and	  federal	  funding	  for	  research	  soared	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Cold	  War.	  	  These	  points	  are	  epitomized	  by	  the	  automobile,	  where	  the	  American	  contribution	  
was	  the	  development	  of	  mass-­‐production,	  and	  the	  computer,	  where	  the	  transistor	  and	  
integrated	  circuit	  were	  American	  inventions.	  	  Federal	  funding	  accounted	  for	  less	  than	  20	  per	  
cent	  of	  R	  &	  D	  in	  the	  1930s	  but	  well	  over	  half	  on	  average	  from	  the	  1950s	  through	  the	  1970s.	  	  	  
Germany	  had	  41	  (44)	  Nobel	  Prize	  winners	  prior	  to	  1950	  (1950	  to	  present)	  compared	  with	  27	  
(229)	  for	  the	  United	  States	  (excluding	  Economics	  and	  Peace).	  
	  
American	  industrial	  research	  was	  built	  up	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  by	  
corporate	  investment	  in	  laboratories.	  	  Although	  independent	  inventors	  still	  accounted	  for	  50	  
per	  cent	  of	  patents	  in	  the	  late	  1920s,	  down	  from	  about	  80	  per	  cent	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  
century,	  their	  share	  had	  fallen	  to	  only	  25	  per	  cent	  by	  the	  1950s	  (Nicholas	  2010).	  	  About	  
three-­‐quarters	  of	  industry-­‐funded	  R	  &	  D	  was	  performed	  by	  firms	  with	  more	  than	  10,000	  
employees	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  when	  defence-­‐related	  expenditure	  still	  accounted	  for	  about	  a	  
quarter	  of	  all	  R	  &	  D.	  	  This	  picture	  had	  changed	  quite	  significantly	  by	  2001	  when	  the	  large	  
firms’	  share	  had	  fallen	  to	  just	  over	  a	  half,	  the	  defence-­‐related	  share	  was	  below	  15	  per	  cent	  
and	  R	  &	  D	  was	  increasingly	  outsourced	  to	  specialist,	  smaller	  firms	  resembling	  –	  to	  some	  
extent	  –	  an	  early	  20th	  century	  landscape	  rather	  than	  the	  classic	  post-­‐war	  American	  ‘national	  
innovation	  system’	  (Mowery	  2009).	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TABLE	  17	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
The	  transition	  to	  an	  economy	  with	  substantial	  investments	  in	  R	  &	  D	  and	  higher	  education	  is	  
reflected	  in	  Table	  17.	  	  This	  was	  clearly	  a	  very	  different	  technological	  leader	  than	  Industrial	  
Revolution	  Britain.	  	  The	  size	  of	  these	  investments	  also	  marks	  the	  United	  States	  out	  from	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  OECD,	  especially	  in	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  the	  century.	  	  Not	  only	  was	  R	  &	  D	  spending	  
relative	  to	  GDP	  higher	  than	  anywhere	  else,	  but	  its	  absolute	  size	  loomed	  very	  large:	  as	  late	  as	  
1969,	  US	  R	  &	  D	  expenditure	  was	  more	  than	  twice	  the	  combined	  total	  of	  France,	  Germany,	  
Japan	  and	  the	  UK	  (Nelson	  and	  Wright	  1992).	  	  Similarly,	  the	  educational	  attainment	  of	  the	  
American	  population	  far	  outstripped	  OECD	  rivals.	  In	  1970,	  the	  next	  highest	  country	  
(Denmark)	  had	  only	  about	  half	  the	  American	  tertiary	  education	  years	  per	  person.	  	  The	  
dominant	  role	  of	  American	  relative	  to	  all	  other	  countries’	  R	  &	  D	  as	  a	  source	  of	  productivity	  
growth	  across	  the	  OECD	  is	  clearly	  shown	  in	  Table	  18.	  
	  
TABLE	  18	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
5.2.	  Explaining	  Technological	  Progress	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  rich	  analytical	  narrative	  literature	  on	  the	  underpinnings	  of	  20th	  century	  American	  
technological	  progress,	  seeking	  to	  explain	  both	  its	  strength	  and	  its	  factor-­‐saving	  bias.	  	  It	  is	  
generally	  agreed	  that	  the	  geography	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  
domestic	  market,	  the	  distances	  between	  major	  population	  centres,	  and	  the	  natural	  resource	  
endowment,	  was	  an	  important	  influence,	  especially	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  century.	  	  These	  
features	  of	  American	  geography	  are	  seen	  as	  favourable	  to	  key	  technological	  clusters	  such	  as	  
those	  based	  on	  the	  internal	  combustion	  engine	  and	  the	  chemical	  industry	  (Mowery	  and	  
Rosenberg	  2000).	  	  The	  rise	  of	  mass	  production	  in	  the	  later	  railroad	  era	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  “the	  
confluence	  of	  two	  technological	  streams:	  the	  ongoing	  advance	  of	  mechanical	  and	  metal-­‐
working	  skills…focused	  on	  high-­‐volume	  production	  of	  standardized	  commodities”;	  and	  the	  
exploration	  and	  utilization	  of	  the	  mineral	  resource	  base	  (Nelson	  and	  Wright	  1992,	  p.	  1938).	  	  
Table	  19	  reports	  the	  concentration	  of	  world	  minerals	  output	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  1913.	  It	  
also	  implies	  that	  the	  country	  had	  been	  very	  efficient	  in	  discovering	  and	  developing	  minerals	  
relatively	  early	  on.	  	  A	  relatively	  low	  price	  of	  electricity	  (Table	  19)	  was	  conducive	  to	  the	  
electrification	  of	  factories,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  surge	  in	  manufacturing	  productivity	  growth	  in	  the	  
1920s	  (David	  and	  Wright	  1999).	  
	  
TABLE	  19	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
Over	  time,	  these	  influences	  became	  somewhat	  less	  important	  and	  the	  accumulation	  of	  
human	  capital	  mattered	  more.	  	  The	  United	  States	  led	  the	  way	  in	  the	  expansion	  both	  of	  
secondary	  and	  tertiary	  education.	  	  High	  school	  enrolment	  among	  14	  to	  17	  year	  olds	  rose	  
from	  10.6	  per	  cent	  in	  1900	  to	  51.1	  per	  cent	  in	  1930	  and	  86.9	  per	  cent	  in	  1960,	  a	  time	  when	  
only	  17.5	  per	  cent	  of	  British	  15-­‐18	  year	  olds	  were	  enrolled	  (Goldin	  and	  Katz	  2008).	  	  While	  
about	  5	  per	  cent	  of	  Americans	  born	  in	  1880	  went	  to	  college,	  nearly	  60	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  cohort	  
born	  in	  the	  1960s	  did	  so.	  	  Throughout	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  the	  century,	  average	  years	  of	  
college	  education	  in	  the	  American	  adult	  population	  were	  a	  long	  way	  ahead	  of	  leading	  
European	  countries	  (Barro	  and	  Lee	  2012).	  	  Even	  so,	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  to	  a	  year	  of	  college	  
education	  in	  1990	  was	  only	  slightly	  below	  what	  it	  had	  been	  in	  1915.	  	  This	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  
the	  change	  in	  factor-­‐using	  bias,	  from	  tangible-­‐capital	  to	  intangible-­‐capital	  using,	  between	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the	  19th	  and	  the	  20th	  centuries	  that	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  (2001)	  detected.25	  	  Notably	  also,	  
American	  leadership	  in	  electronics	  technology	  after	  World	  War	  II	  owed	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  the	  
abundance	  of	  scientific	  and	  engineering	  human	  capital	  and	  federal	  research	  funding,	  rather	  
than	  to	  the	  natural	  resource	  endowment.	  
	  
Before	  World	  War	  II,	  relatively	  rapid	  American	  technological	  progress	  primarily	  reflected	  the	  
capabilities	  of	  firms	  and	  thus	  the	  incentive	  structures	  that	  they	  faced.	  Endogenous	  
innovation	  models	  point	  to	  several	  features	  of	  the	  American	  economy	  which	  were	  more	  
favourable	  than	  in	  Europe	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  much	  more	  favourable	  than	  in	  Industrial	  
Revolution	  Britain.	  	  These	  include	  a	  better	  system	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (Nicholas	  
2010),	  a	  stricter	  anti-­‐trust	  policy	  (Mowery	  and	  Rosenberg	  2000),	  a	  larger	  market	  potential	  
(Liu	  and	  Meissner	  2013),	  and	  a	  significant	  fall	  in	  the	  costs	  of	  research	  as	  experimental	  
science	  improved	  and	  the	  supply	  of	  specialized	  human	  capital	  expanded	  rapidly	  (Abramovitz	  
and	  David	  2001).	  
	  
This	  may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  the	  acceleration	  in	  technological	  progress	  but	  there	  is	  more	  
to	  be	  said	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  direction.	  	  The	  experience	  of	  the	  American	  economy	  during	  the	  20th	  
century	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  ‘race’	  between	  education	  and	  technology	  (Goldin	  and	  Katz	  
2008).	  	  Goldin	  and	  Katz	  highlight	  the	  development	  of	  a	  complementarity	  between	  advances	  
in	  technology	  and	  the	  use	  of	  human	  capital	  that	  is	  visible	  from	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  	  The	  
outcome	  of	  the	  ‘race’	  between	  increased	  demand	  for	  human	  capital	  as	  technology	  evolved,	  
and	  increasing	  supply	  as	  the	  education	  system	  expanded,	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  
college	  wage	  premium	  (Table	  20).	  	  Over	  the	  long	  run	  the	  outcome	  was	  a	  photo-­‐finish,	  but	  
relative	  demand	  grew	  more	  strongly	  after	  1960	  and	  eventually	  outstripped	  supply	  after	  
1980.	  
	  
TABLE	  20	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
The	  ‘directed	  technical	  change’	  model	  proposed	  by	  Acemoglu	  (2002)	  might	  be	  a	  suitable	  
framework	  within	  which	  to	  analyse	  these	  trends.	  	  The	  key	  element	  of	  this	  model	  is	  its	  
incorporation	  of	  a	  market	  size	  effect	  as	  well	  as	  a	  relative	  price	  effect	  in	  the	  incentives	  that	  
inform	  innovative	  effort.	  	  If	  the	  market	  size	  effect	  dominates,	  technological	  progress	  will	  be	  
biased	  towards	  complementarity	  with	  a	  factor	  whose	  relative	  supply	  expands,	  rather	  than	  
the	  opposite	  as	  would	  be	  expected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  ceteris	  paribus	  fall	  in	  its	  relative	  price.	  	  
This	  induced	  innovation	  will	  in	  turn	  underpin	  the	  factor’s	  rate	  of	  return	  through	  outward	  
shifts	  in	  its	  demand	  curve.	  
	  
5.3.	  Lessons	  from	  the	  ICT	  Revolution26	  
	  
The	  Solow	  Productivity	  Paradox	  was	  announced	  in	  1987	  with	  the	  comment	  that	  "You	  can	  
see	  the	  computer	  age	  everywhere	  except	  in	  the	  productivity	  statistics".	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  effort	  
was	  subsequently	  devoted	  to	  explaining	  this	  (Triplett	  1999)	  and	  it	  was	  an	  important	  trigger	  
for	  the	  literature	  on	  General	  Purpose	  Technologies.	  This	  developed	  models	  that	  had	  
negligible	  or	  even	  negative	  impacts	  on	  productivity	  performance	  in	  their	  first	  phase	  but	  
substantial	  positive	  effects	  later	  on.	  	  Indeed,	  a	  GPT	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  "a	  technology	  that	  
initially	  has	  much	  scope	  for	  improvement	  and	  eventually	  comes	  to	  be	  widely	  used,	  to	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  use	  a	  composite	  notion	  of	  intangible	  capital	  which	  includes	  
both	  R	  &	  D	  and	  human	  capital;	  this	  is	  different	  from	  the	  definition	  in	  the	  recent	  
growth	  accounting	  with	  intangibles	  literature	  reviewed	  in	  section	  4.	  
26	  This	  section	  draws	  in	  part	  on	  Crafts	  (2013a).	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many	  uses	  and	  to	  have	  many	  Hicksian	  and	  technological	  complementarities"	  (Lipsey	  et	  al.,	  
1998,	  p.	  43).	  
	  
Table	  21	  compares	  ICT	  with	  the	  two	  other	  GPTs,	  electricity	  and	  steam,	  which	  are	  commonly	  
placed	  in	  the	  pantheon	  on	  account	  of	  their	  impact	  on	  productivity	  growth	  in	  the	  leading	  
economy	  of	  the	  time.	  	  The	  comparison	  reveals	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  ICT	  has	  been	  relatively	  big,	  
and	  also	  that	  it	  has	  come	  through	  very	  quickly.	  	  This	  new	  GPT	  is	  unprecedented	  in	  its	  rate	  of	  
technological	  progress,	  reflected	  in	  the	  speed	  and	  magnitude	  of	  the	  price	  falls	  in	  ICT	  
equipment	  reported	  in	  Table	  21.	  The	  impact	  of	  ICT	  on	  the	  rate	  of	  productivity	  growth	  
throughout	  1973-­‐2006	  exceeded	  that	  of	  steam	  in	  any	  period	  and	  was	  already	  close	  to	  twice	  
the	  maximum	  impact	  of	  steam	  by	  the	  late	  1980s.	  	  Indeed,	  these	  estimates	  suggest	  that	  the	  
cumulative	  impact	  of	  ICT	  on	  labour	  productivity	  by	  2006	  was	  about	  the	  same	  as	  that	  of	  
steam	  over	  the	  whole	  150-­‐year	  period,	  1760−1910.	  	  	  
	  
TABLE	  21	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
A	  plausible	  inference	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  society	  is	  getting	  better	  at	  exploiting	  the	  
opportunities	  presented	  by	  new	  GPTs.	  This	  may	  reflect	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  including	  more	  
investment	  in	  human	  capital,	  superior	  scientific	  knowledge,	  improved	  capital	  markets,	  and	  
greater	  support	  for	  R	  &	  D	  by	  public	  policy.	  	  Taking	  an	  historical	  perspective,	  the	  true	  paradox	  
is	  that	  Solow's	  ICT	  paradox	  was	  regarded	  as	  such,	  given	  that	  by	  earlier	  standards	  the	  
contribution	  of	  ICT	  to	  productivity	  performance	  in	  the	  American	  economy	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  
was	  already	  stunning.	  
	  
A	  very	  noticeable	  feature	  of	  the	  ICT	  revolution	  is	  that	  the	  United	  States	  exploited	  the	  
opportunities	  much	  better	  than	  did	  European	  countries,	  generally	  speaking	  (Oulton	  2012).	  	  
Table	  22	  shows	  that	  the	  ICT	  capital	  deepening	  contribution	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  about	  
twice	  that	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  between	  1995	  and	  2005.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  episode	  saw	  an	  
ending	  of	  the	  long	  period	  of	  productivity	  catch-­‐up	  achieved	  by	  Western	  Europe	  since	  the	  
early	  1950s.	  
	  
TABLE	  22	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
A	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  examine	  this	  experience	  is	  to	  think	  about	  ‘varieties	  of	  capitalism’	  
(Hall	  and	  Soskice	  2001).	  	  The	  core	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  based	  on	  a	  comparison	  between	  2	  ideal	  
types,	  the	  co-­‐ordinated	  market	  economy	  (CME)	  and	  the	  liberal	  market	  economy	  (LME),	  
which	  comprise	  different	  environments	  in	  which	  firms	  operate.	  	  The	  purest	  cases	  of	  the	  CME	  
and	  the	  LME	  are	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  respectively	  (Schneider	  and	  Paunescu	  
2012).	  	  Each	  of	  these	  economies	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  having	  a	  different	  set	  of	  
complementary	  institutions	  and,	  as	  a	  corollary	  of	  this,	  different	  comparative	  advantages	  in	  
production,	  trade,	  human	  capital	  formation,	  and	  crucially,	  innovation.	  	  The	  LME	  is	  
characterized	  by	  extensive	  equity	  markets	  and	  flexible	  labour	  markets,	  while	  the	  CME	  offers	  
high	  employment	  protection	  and	  corporate	  governance	  that	  is	  based	  on	  monitoring	  by	  
banks	  and	  an	  absence	  of	  hostile	  takeovers.	  	  LMEs	  place	  more	  emphasis	  on	  university	  
education	  and	  less	  on	  vocational	  training,	  and	  are	  also	  more	  lightly	  regulated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
standard	  indices	  calculated	  by	  the	  OECD.	  
	  
Hall	  and	  Soskice	  (2001,	  pp.	  38-­‐39)	  argued	  that	  CMEs	  would	  be	  relatively	  strong	  at	  
“incremental	  innovation,	  marked	  by	  continuous	  but	  small-­‐scale	  improvements	  to	  existing	  
product	  lines	  and	  production	  processes”,	  while	  LMEs	  would	  be	  more	  successful	  at	  “radical	  
innovation,	  which	  entails	  substantial	  shifts	  in	  product	  lines,	  the	  development	  of	  entirely	  new	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goods,	  or	  major	  changes	  to	  the	  production	  process”.	  	  Empirical	  testing	  of	  claims	  about	  
‘radical’	  and	  ‘incremental’	  innovation	  poses	  considerable	  problems	  but	  Akkermans	  et	  al.	  
(2009)	  developed	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  patent	  citations,	  basically	  taking	  radical	  innovations	  
to	  be	  those	  which	  are	  more	  highly	  cited.	  	  They	  found	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  indeed	  
strongly	  specialized	  in	  radical	  innovation.	  	  	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  ICT,	  CMEs	  and	  LMEs	  might	  also	  be	  expected	  to	  differ	  in	  their	  abilities	  to	  
exploit	  its	  opportunities	  since	  investment	  in	  ICT	  capital	  is	  much	  more	  profitable	  and	  has	  a	  
much	  bigger	  productivity	  payoff	  if	  it	  is	  accompanied	  by	  organizational	  change	  in	  working	  and	  
management	  practices	  and	  is	  therefore	  encouraged	  by	  low	  adjustment	  costs	  (Brynjolfsson	  
and	  Hitt	  2003).	  	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  that	  the	  diffusion	  of	  ICT	  has	  been	  aided	  by	  
complementary	  investments	  in	  intangible	  capital	  and	  high-­‐quality	  human	  capital,	  but	  
weakened	  by	  relatively	  strong	  regulation	  in	  terms	  of	  employment	  protection	  and	  regulations	  
that	  restrict	  competition,	  especially	  in	  the	  distribution	  sector	  (Conway	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  
	  	  
ICT	  is	  a	  technology	  that	  is	  very	  well-­‐suited	  both	  to	  management	  practices	  in	  American-­‐
owned	  companies	  (Bloom	  et	  al.	  2012)	  and	  the	  economic	  environment	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
Perhaps	  the	  more	  general	  message	  is	  that,	  when	  a	  disruptive	  GPT	  appears,	  American	  
institutions	  are	  at	  an	  advantage.	  
	  
6.	  The	  economic	  historian’s	  view	  of	  catch-­‐up	  	  
	  
In	  section	  3	  we	  saw	  that	  while	  some	  regions	  –	  notably	  Japan	  and	  the	  East	  Asian	  Tigers	  –	  
caught	  up	  on	  the	  world	  technological	  frontier	  in	  spectacular	  fashion	  after	  1945,	  others	  –	  
notably	  Latin	  America	  and	  Africa	  –	  did	  not.	  The	  growth	  miracles	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  including	  
not	  only	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Tiger	  experiences,	  but	  Western	  Europe	  during	  the	  Golden	  Age,	  
China	  from	  the	  late	  1970s	  onwards,	  or	  Ireland	  during	  the	  1990s,	  were	  above	  all	  convergence	  
miracles.	  Economic	  historians	  have	  known,	  since	  the	  work	  of	  Gerschenkron	  (1962)	  and	  even	  
before,	  that	  backwardness	  can	  sometimes	  lead	  to	  rapid	  growth.	  The	  further	  behind	  the	  
technological	  frontier	  a	  country	  is,	  the	  faster	  is	  its	  potential	  growth,	  since	  by	  importing	  the	  
latest	  technologies	  and	  machinery	  it	  can	  improve	  its	  total	  factor	  productivity	  much	  more	  
rapidly	  than	  an	  economy	  closer	  to	  the	  frontier.	  As	  Gerschenkron	  (1962,	  p.	  8)	  put	  it,	  
“Borrowed	  technology,	  so	  much	  and	  so	  rightly	  stressed	  by	  Veblen,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  
factors	  assuring	  a	  high	  speed	  of	  development	  in	  a	  backward	  country	  entering	  the	  stage	  of	  
industrialization.”	  And	  indeed,	  industrialization,	  or	  the	  modernization	  of	  existing	  industries,	  
was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  best-­‐known	  20th	  century	  growth	  miracles.	  
	  
The	  problem	  is	  that	  while	  being	  economically	  backward	  implied	  a	  potential	  for	  rapid	  catch-­‐
up	  growth,	  it	  also	  implied	  obstacles	  to	  realizing	  that	  growth	  –	  since	  otherwise	  the	  country	  or	  
region	  concerned	  would	  not	  have	  been	  backward	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Economic	  historians	  have	  
thus	  also	  always	  stressed	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  inevitable	  or	  automatic	  about	  catch-­‐up.	  This	  
section	  will	  present	  some	  general	  insights	  from	  economic	  history	  relating	  to	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  countries	  are	  able	  to	  exploit	  catch-­‐up	  opportunities	  or	  not.	  	  Sections	  7,	  8	  and	  9	  will	  
then	  go	  on	  to	  apply	  these	  insights	  to	  well-­‐known	  episodes	  of	  success	  followed	  by	  
disappointment,	  success	  up	  to	  now,	  and	  failure,	  respectively.	  
	  
6.1.	  Catch-­‐up	  is	  not	  automatic	  
	  
The	  logic	  that	  backwards	  countries	  should	  be	  able	  to	  grow	  more	  rapidly	  than	  the	  rich,	  by	  
importing	  best-­‐practice	  technologies,	  is	  powerful,	  but	  we	  know	  that	  in	  practice	  poor	  
countries	  do	  not	  always	  grow	  more	  rapidly	  than	  the	  rich.	  If	  they	  did,	  then	  we	  would	  not	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regard	  those	  instances	  where	  convergence	  has	  most	  visibly	  been	  at	  work	  as	  “growth	  
miracles”.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  some	  groups	  of	  countries	  have	  managed	  to	  converge	  on	  the	  
US	  technological	  frontier,	  while	  others	  have	  not.	  We	  have	  also	  seen	  that	  convergence	  was	  
widespread	  in	  some	  periods,	  particularly	  the	  1950-­‐1973	  Golden	  Age,	  while	  in	  other	  periods	  
there	  was	  little	  or	  no	  convergence.	  Indeed	  in	  some	  periods	  divergence	  was	  more	  the	  rule,	  
for	  example	  during	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  when	  the	  United	  States	  pulled	  further	  ahead	  of	  
most	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  Looking	  at	  variations	  in	  growth	  among	  those	  countries	  chasing	  
the	  United	  States	  frontier,	  there	  have	  been	  contrasting	  experiences	  of	  convergence	  and	  
divergence,	  depending	  on	  the	  groups	  of	  countries	  and	  time	  periods	  being	  considered.	  
Absolute	  convergence	  characterized	  the	  rich	  economies	  as	  a	  group	  in	  the	  four	  decades	  since	  
World	  War	  II,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  worldwide	  tendency	  during	  these	  years	  for	  poorer	  countries	  
to	  grow	  more	  rapidly	  than	  the	  rich	  (Abramovitz	  1986,	  De	  Long	  1988,	  Barro	  1991).	  	  
	  
Why	  does	  convergence	  happen	  sometimes	  but	  not	  always,	  and	  in	  some	  countries	  but	  not	  
others?	  And	  why	  does	  it	  sometimes	  cease	  altogether,	  after	  promising	  beginnings?	  The	  logic	  
of	  convergence	  suggests	  that	  it	  should	  be	  self-­‐limiting:	  as	  countries	  catch	  up	  on	  the	  
technological	  frontier,	  the	  scope	  for	  further	  catching	  up	  diminishes.	  As	  workers	  leave	  low-­‐
productivity	  agriculture	  for	  high-­‐productivity	  service	  and	  manufacturing	  jobs,	  the	  pool	  of	  
workers	  who	  can	  be	  similarly	  redeployed	  diminishes.	  One	  would	  thus	  expect	  converging	  
economies	  to	  continue	  catching	  up	  on	  the	  lead	  economy,	  but	  at	  a	  diminishing	  rate	  over	  time,	  
as	  in	  Lucas	  (2000,	  2009).	  Yet	  Western	  European	  convergence	  ceased	  after	  the	  first	  oil	  crisis,	  
at	  a	  relative	  GDP	  level	  of	  only	  70	  per	  cent,	  while	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  empire,	  and	  Southwest	  
Asia,	  convergence	  not	  only	  halted	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  but	  was	  replaced	  by	  two	  decades	  or	  
more	  of	  sharp	  divergence.	  Japan’s	  convergence	  was	  also	  succeeded	  by	  divergence,	  
beginning	  in	  the	  1990s.	  More	  generally,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  countries	  often	  experience	  
growth	  slowdowns	  after	  phases	  of	  rapid	  growth	  that	  are	  much	  sharper	  than	  would	  be	  
expected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  convergence	  logic	  alone.	  Eichengreen	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  find	  that	  the	  
probability	  of	  such	  rapid	  slowdowns	  peaks	  at	  per	  capita	  GDP	  levels	  of	  about	  $17,000	  in	  2005	  
international	  prices,	  and	  that	  the	  probability	  is	  higher	  after	  periods	  of	  rapid	  economic	  
growth.	  
	  
Many	  economic	  historians	  have	  written	  about	  why	  convergence	  may	  not	  take	  place,	  the	  
advantages	  of	  backwardness	  notwithstanding.	  Gerschenkron	  (1962,	  p.	  8),	  whose	  major	  focus	  
was	  Europe,	  argued	  that	  the	  major	  obstacles	  were	  “formidable	  institutional	  obstacles	  (such	  
as	  the	  serfdom	  of	  the	  peasantry	  or	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  absence	  of	  political	  unification”,	  as	  well	  
as	  (in	  some	  countries)	  a	  lack	  of	  natural	  resources.	  True,	  backward	  countries	  also	  lacked	  the	  
prerequisites	  for	  growth	  that	  had	  been	  built	  up	  in	  Britain	  over	  the	  course	  of	  many	  decades	  
and	  even	  centuries,	  but	  for	  Gerschenkron	  this	  handicap	  could	  be	  surmounted	  by	  means	  of	  
institutional	  substitutes	  such	  as	  universal	  banks	  or	  a	  developmental	  state.	  
	  
Gerschenkron	  was	  writing	  in	  the	  early	  1960s,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  allies	  
were	  still	  converging	  rapidly	  on	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  decolonization	  with	  its	  ensuing	  policy	  
experimentation	  was	  still	  in	  its	  infancy.	  By	  the	  1980s	  greater	  scepticism	  regarding	  the	  ability	  
of	  backward	  states	  to	  engineer	  convergence	  seemed	  in	  order.	  Abramovitz	  (1986,	  pp.	  387,	  
390,	  393,	  397)	  lists	  several	  reasons	  why	  convergence	  may	  not	  take	  place.	  Countries	  may	  lack	  
the	  “social	  capability”	  required	  to	  realize	  their	  catch-­‐up	  potential;	  the	  global	  economy	  may	  
not	  be	  operating	  in	  a	  way	  that	  facilitates	  technological	  transfer;	  there	  may	  be	  obstacles	  to	  
structural	  change	  within	  the	  backward	  economies;	  ‘short	  run’	  macroeconomic	  policies	  may	  
not	  encourage	  investment,	  with	  long-­‐run	  consequences;	  best-­‐practice	  technologies	  may	  not	  
be	  appropriate	  for	  developing	  economies’	  size	  or	  factor	  endowments;	  and	  major	  shocks	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such	  as	  wars	  may	  disrupt	  the	  convergence	  process.	  We	  briefly	  review	  each	  of	  these	  
arguments	  in	  subsequent	  sections.	  	  
	  
6.2.	  The	  consequences	  of	  directed	  technological	  change	  
	  
Technological	  change	  is	  not	  exogenous,	  but	  an	  endogenous	  response	  to	  economic	  
conditions.	  This	  can	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  countries	  to	  catch	  up	  on	  the	  technological	  frontier,	  
irrespective	  of	  whatever	  institutions	  they	  may	  have	  or	  which	  policies	  they	  adopt.	  Frontier	  
technologies	  may	  have	  been	  invented	  with	  conditions	  in	  the	  leading	  economy	  in	  mind,	  and	  
may	  therefore	  not	  be	  easy	  or	  profitable	  to	  adopt	  in	  poorer	  countries.	  
	  
This	  possibility	  been	  raised	  by	  growth	  economists	  such	  as	  Basu	  and	  Weil	  (1998)	  and	  
Acemoglu	  and	  Zilibotti	  (2001),	  in	  debates	  about	  “appropriate	  technology”,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  
long-­‐standing	  theme	  of	  economic	  historians.	  The	  argument	  that	  technologies	  are	  invented	  
so	  as	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  local	  factor	  endowments	  is	  most	  often	  associated	  with	  Habakkuk	  
(1962),	  who	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  high	  American	  wages,	  due	  to	  an	  extensive	  
land	  endowment,	  that	  explained	  the	  relatively	  labour-­‐saving	  nature	  of	  US	  mass	  production	  
technology.	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  since	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  improvements	  in	  the	  
production	  function	  have	  been	  concentrated	  at	  the	  capital	  to	  labour	  ratios	  at	  which	  rich	  
countries	  operate.	  	  For	  example,	  there	  was	  a	  big	  increase	  in	  output	  per	  worker	  at	  capital	  to	  
labour	  ratios	  between	  $15,000	  and	  $20,000	  (1985	  prices)	  between	  1939	  and	  1965,	  but	  no	  
further	  improvement	  in	  recent	  decades.	  	  Indeed,	  at	  very	  low	  capital	  to	  labour	  ratios,	  output	  
per	  worker	  in	  1990	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  no	  higher	  than	  in	  1820	  (Allen	  2012).	  	  This	  is	  
symptomatic	  of	  a	  pattern	  of	  directed	  technical	  change	  where	  advances	  are	  made	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  incentives	  provided	  by	  market	  conditions	  in	  rich	  countries,	  especially	  
the	  United	  States.	  
	  
The	  possibility	  then	  arises	  that	  relative	  factor	  prices	  in	  less	  developed	  economies	  made	  the	  
new	  technologies	  unprofitable.	  Gerschenkron	  (1962,	  pp.	  8-­‐9)	  raised	  the	  issue,	  noting	  that	  
“The	  industrialization	  prospects	  of	  an	  underdeveloped	  country	  are	  frequently…judged	  
aversely,	  in	  terms	  of	  cheapness	  of	  labor	  as	  against	  capital	  goods	  and	  of	  the	  resultant	  
difficulty	  in	  substituting	  scarce	  capital	  for	  abundant	  labor.”	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  this	  argument	  
flies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  opposite	  argument	  that	  low	  wages	  give	  developing	  countries	  a	  
powerful	  competitive	  advantage.	  But	  he	  went	  on	  to	  dismiss	  the	  argument	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
19th	  century	  Europe,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  “a	  stable,	  reliable	  and	  disciplined”	  labour	  force	  was	  
scarce,	  rather	  than	  abundant,	  in	  backward	  economies	  where	  people	  were	  still	  close	  to	  the	  
land.	  	  Indeed,	  he	  claimed	  that	  this	  fact	  gave	  entrepreneurs	  in	  countries	  like	  Russia	  an	  
incentive	  to	  import	  technologies	  that	  were	  as	  modern,	  efficient,	  and	  labour-­‐saving	  as	  
possible.	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  Allen	  (2009)	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  rational	  for	  other	  countries	  to	  
not	  immediately	  adopt	  the	  new	  technologies	  of	  the	  British	  Industrial	  Revolution,	  implying	  
that	  Britain	  initially	  forged	  ahead	  while	  others	  fell	  behind.	  It	  was	  only	  with	  time,	  as	  the	  new	  
technologies	  became	  more	  productive,	  that	  they	  became	  profitable	  to	  adopt	  elsewhere.	  By	  
the	  late	  19th	  century,	  however,	  Britain	  was	  no	  longer	  the	  leading	  innovator,	  and	  the	  question	  
was	  whether	  American	  inventions	  were	  suitable	  for	  British	  conditions	  or	  not.	  British	  
entrepreneurs	  have	  often	  been	  criticized	  for	  failing	  to	  adopt	  the	  latest	  technologies	  –	  for	  
example,	  cotton	  manufacturers	  were	  slow	  to	  adopt	  ring	  spinning,	  preferring	  to	  stick	  with	  
mule	  spinning,	  while	  soda	  manufacturers	  were	  slow	  to	  abandon	  the	  Leblanc	  process	  for	  the	  
superior	  Solvay	  process.	  Magee	  (2004)	  surveys	  an	  abundant	  literature	  that	  argues	  that	  
British	  entrepreneurs	  were	  in	  fact	  responding	  rationally,	  not	  only	  to	  British	  relative	  factor	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prices	  (skilled	  workmen	  were	  cheaper	  than	  in	  America,	  and	  natural	  resources	  were	  dearer),	  
but	  also	  to	  different	  (and	  in	  particular	  less	  homogenous)	  demand	  conditions.	  If	  Lancashire	  
cotton	  manufacturers	  used	  mules,	  this	  was	  because	  they	  produced	  more	  fine	  yarns,	  and	  
more	  yarn	  for	  export,	  than	  their	  American	  counterparts,	  and	  mule	  spinning	  was	  superior	  on	  
both	  counts	  (Leunig	  2001).	  More	  generally,	  fragmented	  demand	  and	  skilled	  labour	  made	  it	  
rational	  for	  British	  manufacturers	  to	  eschew	  resource-­‐intensive	  and	  labour-­‐saving	  mass	  
production	  techniques,	  and	  adopt	  “a	  more	  flexible	  form	  of	  production,	  based	  on	  general	  
purpose	  machinery,	  skilled	  labour	  and	  customized	  demand”	  (Magee	  2004,	  p.	  95).	  Similar	  
considerations	  can	  explain	  why	  British	  firms	  did	  not	  adopt	  Chandlerian	  organizational	  forms	  
during	  the	  same	  period	  (Harley	  1991).	  
	  
We	  will	  consider	  the	  British	  case	  in	  more	  detail	  below,	  merely	  noting	  that	  if	  frontier	  
technologies	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  developing	  countries,	  then	  those	  countries	  
may	  fall	  further	  behind	  the	  leaders	  for	  perfectly	  rational	  reasons,	  with	  no	  ‘failure’	  being	  
necessarily	  involved.	  What	  might	  reverse	  such	  a	  trend?	  Educational	  policies	  are	  one	  obvious	  
candidate.	  Another	  is	  late	  20th	  century	  globalization,	  which	  Wright	  (1990)	  argues	  was	  a	  
major	  turning	  point,	  in	  that	  it	  transformed	  mineral	  resources	  from	  being	  “endowments”	  to	  
“commodities”,	  available	  to	  all	  countries	  at	  roughly	  equal	  prices.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  
resource-­‐intensive	  American	  technologies	  now	  became	  potentially	  easier	  to	  implement	  
around	  the	  world.	  Similarly,	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  OECD	  to	  international	  trade	  
meant	  that	  American	  mass	  production	  techniques	  could	  more	  easily	  be	  adopted	  elsewhere,	  
and	  the	  process	  of	  convergence	  itself	  strengthened	  this	  tendency	  by	  further	  increasing	  the	  
size	  of	  overseas	  markets.	  Finally,	  postwar	  US	  technological	  strength	  in	  sectors	  like	  
semiconductors	  were	  based	  on	  the	  expansion	  of	  scientific	  education	  and	  research,	  and	  
research	  and	  development,	  which	  could	  be	  replicated	  abroad,	  especially	  given	  the	  inherently	  
international	  nature	  of	  scientific	  activity	  (Nelson	  and	  Wright	  1992,	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  
1996).	  As	  Alice	  Amsden	  (1989,	  p.	  7)	  put	  it,	  “Although	  technology	  remained…idiosyncratic	  
even	  in	  basic	  industries,	  higher	  scientific	  content	  increased	  its	  codifiedness	  or	  explicitness,	  
making	  it	  more	  of	  a	  commodity	  and	  hence	  more	  technically	  and	  commercially	  accessible	  and	  
diffusible	  from	  country	  to	  country.”	  Multinational	  corporations	  made	  technology	  even	  more	  
diffusible.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons	  US	  frontier	  technologies	  could	  now	  in	  principle	  be	  more	  
easily	  implemented	  abroad,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  relatively	  advanced	  economies	  of	  Europe	  and	  
Japan,	  than	  had	  been	  the	  case	  before.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  were	  actually	  implemented	  
presumably	  depended	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  factors,	  some	  of	  which	  will	  be	  considered	  below.	  
	  
6.3.	  Catch-­‐up	  and	  social	  capability	  
	  
According	  to	  Abramovitz	  (1986),	  “tenacious	  social	  characteristics”	  could	  inhibit	  countries	  
from	  importing	  best	  practice	  technology,	  and	  one	  would	  therefore	  only	  expect	  poorer	  
countries	  to	  grow	  more	  rapidly	  than	  richer	  ones	  if	  these	  social	  characteristics,	  which	  he	  
termed	  “social	  capability”,	  were	  roughly	  similar.	  Rapid	  growth	  was	  thus	  most	  likely	  when	  
countries	  were	  “technologically	  backward	  but	  socially	  advanced”	  (p.	  388).	  Abramovitz	  (1989,	  
pp.	  200-­‐201)	  considered	  both	  these	  conditions	  to	  have	  been	  present	  in	  Europe	  and	  Japan	  
after	  World	  War	  II.	  Both	  regions	  had	  generally	  well-­‐educated	  populations,	  and	  were	  well	  
endowed	  with	  scientists	  and	  engineers,	  who	  were	  increasingly	  influential	  within	  industry.	  
This	  helped	  in	  implementing	  new	  technologies	  invented	  abroad.	  Both	  firms	  and	  
governments	  promoted	  research	  and	  development.	  Large	  corporations	  were	  becoming	  
increasingly	  well	  managed.	  The	  resumption	  of	  international	  trade,	  air	  travel,	  the	  press,	  and	  
American	  cooperation	  facilitated	  the	  importation	  of	  technical	  knowledge.	  Such	  attributes	  of	  
backwardness	  as	  a	  large	  agricultural	  population	  could	  be	  turned	  into	  an	  advantage,	  since	  
agricultural	  productivity	  growth	  facilitated	  the	  release	  of	  labour	  to	  new	  and	  growing	  sectors	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of	  the	  economy.	  Other	  aspects	  of	  social	  capability	  included	  openness	  to	  change	  and	  
competition,	  which	  were	  necessary	  as	  rapid	  structural	  change	  was	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  
catch-­‐up	  process.	  Abramovitz	  cites	  Mancur	  Olson’s	  (1982)	  view	  that	  the	  war	  itself,	  by	  
sweeping	  aside	  existing	  vested	  interests,	  helped	  create	  a	  tabula	  rasa	  that	  facilitated	  such	  
change.	  
	  
Social	  capability	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  being	  equivalent	  to	  the	  parameter	  μm	  in	  
Schumpeterian	  growth	  theory	  (Aghion	  and	  Howitt	  2006).	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
countries’	  growth	  rates	  are	  boosted	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  distance	  from	  the	  technological	  
frontier.	  	  Abramovitz	  largely	  discusses	  education	  when	  referring	  to	  social	  capability,	  but	  he	  
also	  mentions	  institutions,	  and	  these	  have	  been	  a	  major	  focus	  of	  economic	  historians	  
seeking	  to	  understand	  different	  countries’	  growth	  experiences.	  A	  standard	  list	  of	  institutions	  
that	  might	  matter	  for	  growth	  includes	  “the	  security	  of	  property	  rights,	  prevalence	  of	  
corruption,	  structures	  of	  the	  financial	  sector,	  investment	  in	  public	  infrastructure	  and	  social	  
capital,	  and	  the	  inclination	  to	  work	  hard	  or	  be	  entrepreneurial”	  (Sokoloff	  and	  Engerman	  
2000,	  p.	  218).	  The	  degree	  and	  nature	  of	  unionization,	  attitudes	  towards	  cartels	  and	  
competition,	  social	  welfare	  and	  taxation	  systems,	  and	  the	  general	  nature	  of	  government	  
involvement	  in	  the	  economy,	  could	  also	  be	  added	  to	  this	  list.	  What	  matters	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  convergence	  is	  the	  incentive	  structures	  shaped	  by	  policy	  and	  institutions	  
which	  influence	  the	  diffusion	  and	  assimilation	  of	  new	  technology	  in	  follower	  countries	  by,	  
for	  example,	  determining	  the	  expected	  profitability	  of	  innovation,	  or	  by	  mitigating	  or	  
exacerbating	  agency	  problems	  in	  the	  firms	  which	  have	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  new	  technologies.	  
Economic	  historians	  emphasize	  that	  we	  do	  not	  inhabit	  a	  ‘one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all’	  world,	  and	  that	  
optimal	  institutional	  design	  may	  therefore	  vary	  according	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  backwardness,	  
the	  technological	  era,	  etc.27	  	  
	  
Gerschenkron	  believed	  that	  the	  institutional	  mix	  could	  adapt	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  
backward	  country	  seeking	  to	  catch	  up.	  Where	  capital	  markets	  were	  not	  as	  well	  functioning	  
as	  in	  the	  mature	  British	  economy,	  and	  where	  entrepreneurship	  was	  scarce,	  universal	  banks	  
mobilizing	  large	  amounts	  of	  saving	  and	  providing	  not	  only	  capital,	  but	  also	  entrepreneurial	  
guidance	  for	  heavy	  industries,	  could	  fill	  the	  void.	  Where	  the	  economy	  was	  so	  backward	  that	  
this	  was	  not	  an	  option,	  as	  in	  Russia,	  the	  state	  could	  step	  in	  instead.	  Gerschenkron	  believed	  
that	  in	  the	  boom	  years	  immediately	  prior	  to	  World	  War	  I,	  universal	  banks	  played	  a	  more	  
important	  role	  in	  Russia	  than	  they	  had	  done	  during	  the	  boom	  of	  the	  1890s,	  reflecting	  the	  
fact	  that	  Russia	  was	  no	  longer	  as	  backward	  as	  she	  had	  been	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  century	  earlier.28	  
If	  institutions	  can	  adapt	  in	  this	  manner,	  then	  although	  they	  may	  be	  crucial	  for	  economic	  
performance,	  they	  are	  also	  endogenous;	  and	  endogenous	  variables	  do	  not	  make	  convincing	  
explanatory	  variables.	  The	  view	  that	  historical	  institutions	  were	  efficient	  solutions	  to	  
economic	  problems	  characterized	  much	  early	  cliometric	  work	  on	  the	  subject,	  including	  that	  
of	  Douglass	  North	  (e.g.	  North	  and	  Thomas	  1973).	  However,	  institutions	  can	  arise	  for	  other	  
reasons	  as	  well:	  for	  example,	  they	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  accident,	  followed	  by	  path	  
dependence;	  or	  of	  cultural	  belief	  systems;	  or	  of	  distributional	  conflicts	  (Ogilvie	  2007).	  A	  
frequent	  theme	  in	  modern	  economic	  history	  is	  that	  particular	  institutions	  may	  have	  
originated	  as	  efficient	  solutions	  to	  context-­‐specific	  problems,	  but	  that	  they	  can	  also	  be	  
politically	  hard	  to	  reform	  and	  subject	  to	  path	  dependence	  (North	  1990).	  Thus,	  when	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  	  This	  is	  a	  key	  point	  made	  in	  Aghion	  and	  Howitt	  (2006).	  
28	  	  Gerschenkron’s	  account	  is	  controversial.	  Sylla	  (1991,	  pp.	  52-­‐53)	  reviews	  evidence	  
which	  suggests	  that	  banks	  played	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  the	  1890s	  industrialization	  than	  
Gerschenkron	  had	  allowed,	  while	  Gregory	  (1991)	  argues	  strongly	  that	  state	  
involvement	  was	  by	  no	  means	  as	  beneficial	  as	  Gerschenkron	  had	  believed	  it	  to	  be.	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context	  changed,	  the	  institutions	  stayed	  the	  same,	  and	  turned	  from	  being	  a	  help	  to	  a	  
hindrance.	  We	  will	  see	  examples	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  logic	  at	  work	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  below.	  	  
	  
Of	  particular	  interest	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  institutions	  which	  help	  countries	  catch	  up	  on	  the	  
technological	  frontier	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  appropriate	  once	  countries	  have	  converged.	  For	  
example,	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  (1943)	  argued	  that	  inter-­‐sectoral	  complementarities	  could	  mean	  
that	  modern	  industrialization	  might	  only	  get	  going	  if	  it	  happened	  across	  a	  broad	  front.	  For	  
Gerschenkron	  (1962,	  pp.	  10-­‐11)	  this	  was	  one	  explanation	  for	  why,	  in	  his	  view,	  the	  transition	  
to	  industrialization	  tended	  to	  happen	  in	  a	  dramatic	  and	  even	  discontinuous	  fashion	  (a	  claim	  
which	  subsequent	  quantitative	  research	  has	  however	  cast	  doubt	  on	  –	  see	  Sylla	  and	  Toniolo	  
1991).	  Such	  “big	  push”	  arguments	  naturally	  suggest	  a	  potentially	  important	  coordinating	  
role	  for	  the	  state	  (Murphy,	  Schleifer	  and	  Vishny	  1989)	  in	  the	  early	  phases	  of	  industrialization,	  
but	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  such	  state	  involvement	  would	  make	  sense	  when	  countries	  have	  
reached	  the	  frontier,	  and	  the	  question	  is	  no	  longer	  how	  to	  import	  and	  implement	  existing	  
technologies,	  but	  to	  develop	  new	  ones.	  More	  radically,	  Baldwin	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  modern	  
multinational-­‐led	  globalization	  and	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  “second	  unbundling”	  has	  
destroyed	  “big	  push”	  arguments	  for	  state-­‐led	  industrialization	  that	  were	  valid	  not	  so	  long	  
ago:	  small	  developing	  countries	  can	  now	  begin	  to	  industrialize	  by	  colonising	  individual	  niches	  
in	  global	  supply	  chains.	  Of	  course,	  this	  argument	  relies	  on	  globalization	  being	  sustained	  in	  
the	  future,	  which	  is	  something	  that	  can	  never	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  (Findlay	  and	  O’Rourke	  
2007).	  
	  
Such	  arguments	  suggest	  that	  institutional	  reform	  may	  be	  needed	  as	  countries	  progress	  
economically.	  Unfortunately,	  if	  institutions	  are	  path-­‐dependent	  then	  such	  reform	  may	  not	  
always	  proceed	  as	  smoothly	  as	  Gerschenkron	  believed	  had	  been	  the	  case	  in	  pre-­‐1914	  Russia.	  
	  
6.4.	  Geography	  	  
	  
It	  is	  striking	  that	  income	  levels	  around	  the	  world	  are	  highly	  spatially	  correlated.	  Since	  these	  
income	  levels	  are	  the	  result	  of	  long-­‐standing	  historical	  processes,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  
there	  was	  a	  degree	  of	  regional	  clustering	  in	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  shift	  to	  modern	  
industrialization.	  Signs	  of	  rapid	  industrialization	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  
America	  from	  the	  1870s	  onwards,	  and	  in	  parts	  of	  Asia	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  
(Bénétrix	  et	  al.	  2013).	  Why	  do	  we	  observe	  such	  geographical	  correlations	  in	  the	  data,	  and	  
what	  do	  they	  imply	  for	  convergence?	  
	  
One	  possibility	  is	  that	  countries	  with	  similar	  resource	  endowments	  tend	  to	  be	  located	  close	  
to	  each	  other,	  and	  thus	  end	  up	  with	  similar	  growth	  experiences	  and	  incomes	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  
This	  may	  be	  because	  geographical	  conditions	  and	  resource	  endowments	  matter	  directly	  for	  
growth	  (Sachs	  and	  Warner	  1997),	  or	  because	  they	  matter	  indirectly	  via	  their	  impact	  on	  
institutions	  (Easterly	  and	  Levine	  2003).	  Economic	  historians	  have	  long	  argued	  that	  
institutions	  may	  respond	  to	  endowments:	  for	  example,	  Domar	  (1970)	  argued	  that	  forced	  
labour	  systems	  such	  as	  serfdom	  and	  slavery	  were	  a	  predictable	  outcome	  in	  labour-­‐scarce	  
and	  land-­‐abundant	  societies,	  since	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  exploitation	  the	  return	  to	  owning	  
land	  was	  zero,	  which	  was	  not	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  would-­‐be	  aristocrats.	  Domar	  is	  cited	  by	  
Engerman	  and	  Sokoloff	  (1997),	  who	  argue	  that	  institutional	  differences	  based	  on	  underlying	  
differences	  in	  geography,	  rather	  than	  superior	  culture,	  were	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  the	  United	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States	  and	  Canada	  eventually	  became	  so	  much	  richer	  than	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  Americas.29	  
Brazil	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  were	  ideally	  suited	  to	  producing	  crops	  such	  as	  sugar,	  and	  thus	  
developed	  slave-­‐based	  economies,	  societies,	  and	  political	  institutions,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  
European	  powers	  colonized	  them.	  British,	  French,	  Dutch,	  Portuguese	  and	  Scandinavian	  sugar	  
colonies	  all	  developed	  highly	  unequal,	  slave-­‐based	  societies,	  and	  remained	  highly	  unequal	  
even	  after	  the	  suppression	  of	  slavery.	  Spanish	  American	  colonies	  developed	  by	  exploiting	  
Native	  American	  workforces	  in	  both	  agriculture	  and	  mining,	  and	  were	  also	  highly	  unequal.	  
The	  result	  was	  political	  institutions	  and	  economic	  policies	  designed	  to	  maintain	  elite	  
privileges:	  restricted	  franchise,	  barriers	  to	  European	  immigration,	  limited	  investment	  in	  
education,	  conservative	  taxation	  systems,	  and	  expensive	  access	  to	  patent	  protection,	  to	  
name	  but	  a	  few	  (Sokoloff	  and	  Engerman	  2000,	  Sokoloff	  and	  Zolt	  2007).	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  romanticize	  the	  US	  or	  Canadian	  experiences,	  to	  ignore	  the	  treatment	  
meted	  out	  to	  their	  own	  native	  American	  populations,	  or	  to	  forget	  that	  universal	  suffrage	  was	  
only	  attained	  in	  the	  United	  States	  as	  late	  as	  the	  1960s.	  This	  last	  fact	  is	  a	  shocking	  reminder	  of	  
the	  corrosive	  effect	  of	  inequality	  and	  racial	  segregation	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  political	  institutions.	  
But	  inequality	  was	  relative	  low	  among	  US	  and	  Canadian	  whites,	  and	  because	  whites	  made	  
up	  a	  relatively	  large	  share	  of	  those	  two	  countries’	  populations	  (since	  sugar	  was	  not	  an	  
important	  crop	  even	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  since	  native	  Americans	  were	  so	  few	  in	  number	  by	  the	  
19th	  century),	  the	  net	  result	  was	  societies	  that	  were	  relatively	  egalitarian	  in	  the	  aggregate.	  
This	  in	  turn	  encouraged	  not	  only	  inclusive	  institutions	  for	  whites,	  but	  directly	  stimulated	  
economic	  growth	  by	  encouraging	  commercial	  activity	  and	  the	  development	  of	  mass	  
marketing.	  Canada	  and	  the	  US	  also	  invested	  heavily	  in	  public	  education,	  funded	  out	  of	  local	  
taxes	  on	  income	  and	  wealth,	  made	  the	  patent	  system	  cheaply	  accessible	  to	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  
people,	  and	  promoted	  economic	  growth	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  ways.	  Engerman	  and	  Sokoloff	  
(1997)	  sketch	  a	  story	  in	  which	  a	  rapidly	  growing	  and	  relatively	  equal	  population	  boosted	  19th	  
century	  US	  growth,	  by	  promoting	  a	  Smithian	  process	  of	  division	  of	  labour	  and	  exploitation	  of	  
scale	  economies,	  and	  by	  encouraging	  market-­‐oriented	  innovation.	  This	  route	  to	  prosperity	  
was	  barred	  to	  Latin	  American	  economies	  whose	  institutions	  perpetuated	  historical	  patterns	  
of	  inequality.	  
	  
Such	  arguments	  explain	  geographical	  correlations	  in	  GDP	  by	  pointing	  to	  geographical	  
correlations	  in	  resource	  endowments.	  They	  would	  work	  even	  if	  each	  country	  were	  isolated	  
from	  its	  neighbours.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  geographical	  correlations	  in	  economic	  
outcomes	  are	  shaped	  by	  interactions	  between	  countries	  located	  closer	  or	  further	  together.	  
One	  possibility,	  emphasized	  by	  the	  new	  economic	  geography,	  is	  that	  market	  access	  matters	  
for	  income	  levels	  and,	  in	  particular,	  for	  the	  location	  of	  industry	  across	  the	  world	  (Krugman	  
and	  Venables,	  1995).	  Redding	  and	  Venables	  (2004)	  find	  that	  GDP	  per	  capita	  is	  strongly	  
related	  to	  market	  access	  and	  proximity	  to	  suppliers,	  and	  argue	  that	  this	  can	  retard	  
convergence	  in	  per	  capita	  incomes	  and	  wages.	  	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  diffusion	  of	  
technology	  itself	  is	  a	  decreasing	  function	  of	  distance	  (Comin	  et	  al.	  2013).	  Economic	  
historians	  have	  increasingly	  been	  adopting	  such	  a	  geographical	  perspective	  in	  recent	  years	  
(Crafts	  and	  Venables	  2003).	  
	  
6.5.	  Events,	  dear	  boy	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  suggest	  an	  alternative	  mechanism	  through	  which	  
geography	  may	  have	  influenced	  development	  via	  its	  impact	  on	  institutions.	  For	  a	  
discussion,	  see	  Albouy	  (2012).	  
	   32	  
Easterly	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  show	  that	  shocks	  are	  as	  important	  as	  fundamentals	  in	  explaining	  
countries’	  decadal	  growth	  performances.	  Nor	  can	  we	  ignore	  the	  impact	  of	  shocks	  over	  the	  
longer	  run,	  as	  the	  disastrous	  performance	  of	  the	  interwar	  period	  shows.	  	  
	  
Economic	  theorists	  such	  as	  Lucas	  (2009)	  understandably	  tend	  to	  construct	  models	  in	  which	  
certain	  patterns—such	  as	  the	  gradual	  diffusion	  of	  economic	  growth	  across	  the	  globe	  –	  can	  
be	  expected	  to	  apply	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  “non-­‐economic”	  forces	  as	  “wars,	  breakdowns	  of	  
internal	  order,	  and	  misguided	  ventures	  into	  centralized	  economic	  planning”	  (p.	  23).	  
Economic	  history,	  by	  contrast,	  focuses	  heavily	  on	  such	  events,	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  First,	  
while	  economic	  historians	  seek	  general	  explanations,	  like	  other	  economists,	  they	  also	  want	  
to	  understand	  what	  happened	  in	  specific	  countries	  and	  at	  specific	  times,	  like	  other	  historians.	  
For	  example,	  while	  the	  relative	  decline	  of	  the	  Caribbean	  may	  have	  been	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  
institutional	  legacies	  mentioned	  above,	  it	  was	  also	  surely	  due	  to	  the	  British-­‐led	  suppression	  
of	  slavery	  and	  the	  development	  of	  beet	  sugar	  production	  in	  Europe.	  This	  tension	  between	  
the	  specific	  and	  the	  general	  is	  one	  of	  the	  defining	  features	  of	  the	  field.	  Second,	  economic	  
historians	  are	  trained	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  path	  dependence	  (David	  1985),	  and	  sufficiently	  
major	  crises	  can	  have	  very	  long	  term	  effects,	  for	  example	  because	  of	  their	  impact	  on	  
subsequent	  policy	  choices	  (Buera	  et	  al.	  2011).	  Third,	  economic	  history	  is	  an	  inherently	  inter-­‐
disciplinary	  subject:	  as	  Hicks	  (1969,	  p.	  2)	  put	  it,	  “A	  major	  function	  of	  economic	  history…is	  to	  
be	  a	  forum	  where	  economists	  and	  political	  scientists,	  lawyers,	  sociologists,	  and	  historians	  –	  
historians	  of	  events	  and	  of	  ideas	  and	  of	  technologies	  –	  can	  meet	  and	  talk	  to	  one	  another.”	  
As	  such,	  economic	  historians	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  other	  economists	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  
causes	  of	  non-­‐economic	  ‘shocks’,	  and	  to	  integrate	  them	  into	  their	  analyses.	  
	  
Although	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  chapter	  such	  as	  this,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  tell	  a	  
convincing	  story	  of	  20th	  century	  growth	  without	  describing	  the	  major	  shocks	  that	  defined	  the	  
century,	  and	  tracing	  out	  their	  consequences.	  The	  two	  world	  wars,	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  
decolonization,	  the	  oil	  shocks	  of	  the	  1970s,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  its	  ending,	  all	  had	  major	  
effects	  on	  regional	  growth	  patterns	  during	  our	  period.	  This	  is	  evident	  from	  Figure	  2,	  which	  
shows	  major	  breaks	  in	  regional	  performance	  relative	  to	  the	  United	  States	  coinciding	  with	  the	  
world	  wars,	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Depression	  in	  1929,	  and	  the	  first	  oil	  crisis	  of	  1973.	  
	  
World	  War	  I	  not	  only	  brought	  to	  an	  end	  the	  period	  of	  globalization	  that	  preceded	  it,	  but	  
changed	  the	  economic	  and	  geopolitical	  landscape	  in	  ways	  that	  defined	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  20th	  
century.	  It	  led	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  German,	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  and	  Russian	  empires,	  
spawning	  a	  host	  of	  new	  nation	  states	  in	  Europe;	  it	  led	  to	  the	  Russian	  revolution	  of	  1917,	  
which	  had	  an	  enormous	  impact	  on	  the	  economies	  of	  not	  only	  the	  USSR,	  but	  (after	  1945)	  of	  
Eastern	  Europe	  and	  China	  as	  well;	  it	  permanently	  weakened	  the	  British	  economy,	  leaving	  the	  
interwar	  world	  without	  a	  hegemon	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  provide	  global	  public	  goods	  
(Kindleberger	  1973);	  it	  led	  to	  major	  imbalances	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  international	  trade,	  and	  to	  
war	  debts	  and	  reparations,	  which	  would	  cast	  a	  dark	  shadow	  over	  the	  interwar	  period’s	  
flawed	  attempt	  to	  recreate	  a	  globalized	  world	  based	  on	  the	  gold	  standard.	  Most	  accounts	  of	  
the	  Great	  Depression	  begin	  with	  these	  and	  other	  legacies	  of	  the	  conflict	  (Eichengreen	  1992),	  
while	  the	  Depression	  and	  German	  post-­‐war	  resentments	  combined	  to	  produce	  the	  election	  
of	  Hitler,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  	  
	  
That	  conflict	  in	  turn	  cemented	  the	  relative	  decline	  of	  Europe,	  and	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  both	  
the	  Soviet-­‐US	  duopoly	  which	  lasted	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  and	  decolonization	  
throughout	  Asia	  and	  Africa.	  The	  historical	  association	  between	  globalization	  and	  European	  
imperialism,	  the	  distrust	  of	  markets	  which	  naturally	  flowed	  from	  the	  disastrous	  experience	  
of	  the	  interwar	  period,	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  communism,	  all	  predisposed	  the	  leaders	  of	  newly	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independent	  countries	  to	  pursue	  state-­‐led	  growth	  policies,	  often	  based	  on	  import-­‐
substituting	  industrialization.	  Western	  Europe	  and	  North	  America	  developed	  a	  variety	  of	  
more	  or	  less	  social	  democratic	  economies	  and	  societies,	  by	  and	  large	  (but	  by	  no	  means	  
exclusively)	  using	  markets	  to	  generate	  wealth,	  and	  using	  the	  state	  to	  redistribute	  it,	  provide	  
safety	  nets,	  and	  correct	  market	  failures.	  Elsewhere,	  the	  reaction	  against	  markets	  was	  far	  
more	  severe.	  It	  was	  only	  reversed	  after	  the	  poor	  economic	  performance	  of	  the	  1970s,	  which	  
in	  turn	  had	  at	  least	  something	  to	  do	  with	  the	  oil	  shock	  which	  followed	  the	  Yom	  Kippur	  War	  
of	  1973	  –	  yet	  another	  event	  with	  important	  long	  term	  consequences.	  The	  policy	  transition	  
accelerated	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  is	  still	  on-­‐going.	  As	  historians	  we	  
would	  not	  want	  to	  bet	  that	  there	  will	  not	  be	  another	  policy	  reversal	  in	  the	  future,	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  further	  unexpected	  shocks	  to	  the	  system.	  	  
	  
The	  reason	  for	  dwelling	  on	  such	  major	  events	  and	  their	  consequences	  is	  to	  make	  the	  point	  
that	  economic	  historians	  do	  not	  just	  focus	  on	  deep	  historical	  legacies	  and	  institutional	  path	  
dependence.	  If	  these	  were	  all	  that	  mattered,	  then	  one	  would	  not	  expect	  to	  see	  more	  or	  less	  
simultaneous	  reversals	  in	  both	  economic	  policy	  regimes	  and	  growth	  experiences	  across	  
countries	  with	  very	  different	  histories	  and	  institutional	  legacies.	  The	  interwar	  growth	  
experience	  was	  bad	  across	  all	  major	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  while	  the	  Golden	  Age	  was	  good.	  
This	  had	  a	  lot	  to	  do	  with	  the	  specific	  historical	  circumstances	  at	  work	  in	  both	  periods,	  and	  
circumstances	  change.	  Change	  as	  well	  as	  continuity	  has	  always	  concerned	  historians,	  since	  
both	  matter	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  	  
	  
6.6.	  	  Openness	  and	  other	  economic	  policies	  
	  
Previous	  sub-­‐sections	  have	  looked	  at	  some	  of	  the	  difficulties	  that	  countries	  can	  face	  in	  their	  
attempts	  to	  join	  the	  convergence	  club	  –	  difficulties	  which	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  overcome,	  since	  
individual	  countries	  cannot	  easily	  change	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  foreign	  technology,	  or	  their	  
geography,	  or	  the	  international	  geopolitical	  environment,	  or	  even	  (perhaps)	  their	  own	  
institutions.	  However,	  countries	  can	  change	  their	  economic	  policies	  for	  better	  or	  worse.	  The	  
question	  is	  whether	  such	  policy	  transitions	  can	  produce	  better	  growth	  performances,	  and	  if	  
so,	  which	  policies	  are	  good	  for	  growth.	  
	  
Most	  attention	  in	  the	  literature	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  market-­‐friendly	  economic	  
policies	  in	  general,	  and	  trade	  policy	  in	  particular.	  A	  key	  reference	  is	  Sachs	  and	  Warner	  (1995),	  
who	  produce	  an	  index	  of	  trade	  openness	  (subsequently	  updated	  in	  Wacziarg	  and	  Welch	  
2008).	  Sachs	  and	  Warner	  used	  this	  index	  to	  study	  the	  impact	  of	  trade	  policy	  between	  1970	  
and	  1989.	  They	  found	  that	  openness	  was	  associated	  with	  higher	  growth,	  and	  that	  
unconditional	  convergence	  characterized	  the	  experience	  of	  open	  economies	  but	  not	  of	  
closed	  economies.	  Following	  discussion	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  index	  was	  constructed	  (e.g.	  
Rodríguez	  and	  Rodrik	  2001),	  several	  subsequent	  researchers	  (e.g.	  Buera	  et	  al.	  2011)	  have	  
preferred	  to	  interpret	  this	  index	  as	  indicating	  whether	  a	  country	  has	  adopted	  generally	  
market-­‐friendly	  policies	  or	  not.	  
	  
This	  is	  how	  the	  index	  is	  used	  by	  Hausman	  et	  al.	  (2005),	  who	  study	  the	  characteristics	  and	  
determinants	  of	  growth	  accelerations	  from	  the	  1950s	  to	  the	  1990s.	  They	  find	  that	  while	  
market-­‐friendly	  economic	  reforms	  are	  a	  statistically	  significant	  predictor	  of	  sustained	  growth	  
accelerations,	  they	  are	  not	  a	  quantitatively	  reliable	  predictor.	  Most	  pro-­‐market	  reforms	  do	  
not	  lead	  to	  such	  accelerations,	  and	  most	  accelerations	  are	  not	  preceded	  by	  such	  reforms.	  
While	  their	  study	  finds	  that	  growth	  accelerations	  are	  difficult	  to	  predict,	  it	  also	  finds	  that	  
they	  tend	  to	  have	  certain	  characteristics	  in	  common.	  In	  particular,	  growth	  accelerations	  are	  
associated	  with	  higher	  investment	  rates,	  increases	  in	  trade,	  and	  real	  exchange	  rate	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depreciations.	  We	  will	  see	  examples	  of	  this	  below.	  We	  also	  note	  that	  the	  two	  growth	  
accelerations	  that	  have	  mattered	  most	  for	  human	  welfare	  in	  recent	  decades	  –	  those	  in	  China	  
and	  India	  –	  clearly	  seem	  to	  be	  related	  to	  market-­‐friendly	  policy	  reforms.	  	  
	  
There	  has	  been	  a	  vigorous	  debate	  about	  whether	  openness	  to	  trade	  is	  associated	  with	  faster	  
growth	  or	  not,	  with	  Rodriguez	  and	  Rodrik	  (2001)	  among	  others	  strongly	  questioning	  the	  
Sachs	  and	  Warner	  result.	  A	  recent	  contribution	  (Estevadeordal	  and	  Taylor,	  forthcoming)	  
finds	  that	  lower	  tariffs	  on	  imported	  capital	  goods	  were	  associated	  with	  higher	  growth	  
between	  1975	  and	  2004,	  and	  it	  is	  probably	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  most	  economists	  assume	  that	  
openness	  and	  growth	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  today.	  Economic	  historians,	  however,	  tend	  to	  
emphasize	  that	  the	  ‘right’	  policies	  may	  be	  context-­‐specific,	  and	  may	  have	  varied	  over	  time.	  
Clemens	  and	  Williamson	  (2004)	  find	  that	  tariffs	  were	  positively	  correlated	  with	  economic	  
growth	  during	  the	  interwar	  period:	  perhaps	  the	  benefits	  to	  individual	  countries	  of	  
maintaining	  open	  trade	  policies	  were	  lower	  in	  an	  environment	  where	  demand	  was	  
depressed,	  and	  other	  countries	  had	  closed	  their	  own	  markets.	  Policies	  that	  were	  collectively	  
costly	  may	  have	  been	  individually	  rational	  in	  such	  a	  context.	  	  
	  
O’Rourke	  (2000)	  finds	  that	  tariffs	  and	  growth	  were	  positively	  correlated	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  
century	  as	  well,	  controlling	  for	  country	  fixed	  effects,	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  ten	  relatively	  well-­‐
developed	  economies.	  A	  lack	  of	  aggregate	  demand	  was	  not	  a	  problem	  in	  this	  period,	  so	  
unless	  the	  correlation	  is	  spurious	  we	  need	  another	  explanation.	  The	  growth-­‐promoting	  
externalities	  associated	  with	  industry	  would	  seem	  to	  offer	  one	  such	  explanation:	  as	  is	  well	  
known,	  the	  United	  States	  industrialized	  behind	  very	  high	  tariff	  barriers	  during	  this	  period,	  
and	  Germany	  and	  other	  continental	  European	  countries	  similarly	  protected	  their	  heavy	  
industry.	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  industrial	  tariffs	  that	  were	  associated	  with	  high	  growth,	  rather	  
than	  agricultural	  tariffs,	  adds	  weight	  to	  this	  interpretation	  (Lehmann	  and	  O’Rourke	  2011).	  
But	  even	  if	  the	  argument	  is	  correct,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  such	  policies	  would	  have	  worked	  
in	  even	  less	  developed	  countries	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  or	  in	  the	  same	  countries	  in	  later	  periods.	  
There	  is	  thus	  an	  important	  potential	  role	  for	  country	  histories	  in	  elucidating	  the	  impact	  of	  
economic	  policies	  on	  growth,	  since	  panel	  growth	  regressions	  which	  estimate	  effects	  that	  are	  
consistent	  across	  countries	  or	  over	  time	  may	  be	  seriously	  misleading.	  
	  
7.	  Case	  Studies	  I:	  Initial	  Success,	  Subsequent	  Disappointment	  
	  
In	  the	  following	  three	  sections	  we	  explore	  several	  case	  studies	  that	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  
themes	  of	  this	  chapter	  in	  slightly	  greater	  depth.	  We	  begin	  by	  looking	  at	  two	  cases	  where	  
initial	  growth	  successes	  were	  succeeded	  by	  disappointment.	  The	  first	  is	  Western	  Europe,	  
which	  converged	  strongly	  on	  the	  US	  during	  the	  Golden	  Age.	  Since	  the	  1970s,	  however,	  
convergence	  in	  GDP	  per	  capita	  has	  come	  to	  a	  halt.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  which	  
pioneered	  the	  transition	  to	  modern	  economic	  growth,	  but	  whose	  20th	  century	  performance	  
was	  much	  more	  disappointing,	  especially	  during	  the	  Golden	  Age.	  	  
	  
7.1.	  The	  European	  Golden	  Age	  and	  the	  Subsequent	  Slowdown30	  
	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  Western	  Europe	  achieved	  its	  highest	  ever	  growth	  rates,	  roughly	  4	  per	  
cent	  per	  annum,	  during	  the	  Golden	  Age	  which	  lasted	  from	  1950	  to	  1973.	  The	  period	  
between	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  the	  first	  oil	  crisis	  has	  subsequently	  passed	  into	  folk	  
memory	  as	  the	  Trente	  Glorieuses	  or	  the	  Wirtschaftswunder.	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  former	  
USSR	  also	  grew	  rapidly,	  although	  somewhat	  so	  less	  than	  Western	  Europe,	  when	  in	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  	  This	  section	  draws	  in	  part	  on	  Crafts	  (2013a).	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convergence	  perspective	  they	  should	  have	  grown	  more	  quickly.	  Relative	  to	  other	  miracles,	  
for	  example	  in	  East	  Asia,	  a	  relatively	  large	  share	  of	  Western	  Europe’s	  growth	  was	  due	  to	  TFP	  
improvements,	  suggesting	  a	  large	  role	  for	  technological	  catch-­‐up	  and	  structural	  change	  
(Crafts	  and	  Toniolo	  2008).	  What	  explains	  the	  European	  growth	  miracle	  and	  the	  subsequent	  
slowdown?	  	  
	  
Western	  Europe’s	  per	  capita	  GDP	  stood	  at	  just	  31	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  American	  level	  in	  1945.	  
Austria’s	  GDP	  had	  regressed	  to	  its	  1886	  level,	  France’s	  to	  its	  1891	  level	  and	  Germany’s	  to	  its	  
1908	  level	  (Crafts	  and	  Toniolo	  1996,	  p.	  4).	  Rapid	  growth	  as	  a	  result	  of	  post-­‐war	  
reconstruction	  is	  hardly	  surprising.	  However,	  pre-­‐war	  levels	  of	  GDP	  were	  restored	  by	  1951	  at	  
the	  latest.	  Strikingly,	  in	  that	  year	  Western	  Europe’s	  relative	  GDP	  stood	  at	  only	  47	  per	  cent.	  	  
	  
The	  potential	  for	  catch-­‐up	  growth	  seems	  obvious,	  and	  it	  seems	  even	  more	  obvious	  when	  a	  
number	  of	  supplementary	  factors	  are	  taken	  into	  account.	  First,	  American	  technology	  and	  
European	  conditions	  were	  more	  “technologically	  congruent”	  than	  they	  had	  been	  in	  earlier	  
decades,	  as	  natural	  resources	  and	  larger	  markets	  became	  more	  easily	  available	  to	  European	  
firms	  (Abramovitz	  and	  David	  1996).	  European	  economic	  integration	  would	  make	  both	  even	  
more	  easily	  available	  as	  the	  1950s	  progressed.	  Second,	  Western	  Europe	  possessed	  a	  high	  
level	  of	  social	  capability:	  a	  generally	  well-­‐educated	  population,	  and	  a	  history	  of	  well-­‐
functioning	  political	  and	  market	  institutions.	  According	  to	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  the	  war	  
further	  strengthened	  Western	  Europe’s	  social	  capability,	  by	  sweeping	  aside	  lingering	  Ancien	  
Regime	  attitudes	  towards	  such	  things	  as	  mass	  education,	  mass	  production,	  industry	  and	  
economic	  growth.	  Finally,	  the	  disastrous	  experience	  of	  Depression	  and	  war	  gave	  a	  powerful	  
impetus	  to	  European	  integration,	  and	  thus	  to	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  protectionist	  policies	  of	  the	  
interwar	  period.	  
	  
High	  levels	  of	  social	  capability	  in	  an	  economically	  backward	  society	  –	  impoverished	  
sophistication,	  in	  Sandberg’s	  (1979)	  memorable	  phrase	  –	  should	  be	  optimal	  for	  achieving	  
economic	  growth,	  especially	  if	  that	  society	  is	  engaged	  in	  a	  process	  of	  economically	  
integrating	  disparate	  national	  economies	  into	  a	  continental	  common	  market.	  A	  further	  
factor	  emphasized	  by	  many	  economic	  historians	  (Kindleberger	  1967,	  Broadberry	  1997,	  
Temin	  2002)	  is	  the	  large	  agricultural	  workforces	  in	  most	  European	  countries	  that	  could	  be	  
redeployed	  to	  higher	  productivity	  non-­‐agricultural	  occupations.	  Such	  structural	  change	  
accounted	  for	  a	  large	  share	  of	  Golden	  Age	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  (Crafts	  and	  Toniolo	  
2008).	  And	  so	  the	  European	  growth	  miracle	  can	  be	  comparatively	  easily	  explained	  in	  terms	  
of	  the	  convergence	  framework	  outlined	  earlier	  –	  which	  is	  hardly	  surprising,	  since	  it	  was	  this	  
European	  experience	  that	  largely	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  convergence	  paradigm	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
Not	  only	  did	  Western	  Europe	  as	  a	  whole	  grow	  more	  rapidly	  than	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  there	  
was	  strong	  unconditional	  income	  convergence	  within	  Western	  Europe	  as	  well.	  And	  yet	  there	  
is	  more	  to	  be	  said	  about	  this	  episode,	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  economic	  growth	  in	  
some	  countries	  was	  a	  lot	  faster	  than	  would	  be	  expected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  post-­‐war	  
reconstruction	  and	  convergence	  alone	  (Crafts	  1992a,	  Table	  6,	  p.	  401).	  Second,	  some	  
countries	  did	  a	  lot	  better	  during	  the	  Golden	  Age	  than	  others,	  even	  once	  their	  initial	  incomes	  
have	  been	  taken	  into	  account.	  
	  
Eichengreen	  (1996)	  shows	  that	  growth	  was	  positively	  correlated	  across	  Western	  European	  
countries	  with	  both	  investment	  and	  export	  growth,	  consistent	  with	  Hausman	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  
According	  to	  Eichengreen,	  who	  further	  develops	  his	  argument	  in	  Eichengreen	  (2007),	  high	  
levels	  of	  investment	  and	  trade	  were	  sustained	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  
institutions.	  Domestic	  institutions,	  which	  can	  be	  collectively	  described	  as	  corporatist,	  
ensured	  that	  workers	  moderated	  their	  wage	  demands	  so	  that	  profits	  were	  high,	  and	  as	  a	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quid	  pro	  quo	  ensured	  that	  profits	  were	  reinvested	  rather	  than	  being	  paid	  out	  as	  dividends,	  
thus	  ensuring	  higher	  wage	  growth	  in	  the	  future.	  Worker	  representation	  on	  firm’s	  boards	  
helped	  ensure	  that	  employers	  did	  not	  defect	  from	  this	  mutually	  beneficial	  equilibrium;	  
centralized	  wage	  bargaining	  overseen	  by	  government,	  which	  had	  both	  sticks	  and	  carrots	  at	  
its	  disposal,	  ensured	  that	  workers	  did	  not	  defect.	  The	  welfare	  state	  was	  one	  way	  in	  which	  
workers	  were	  compensated	  for	  wage	  moderation	  in	  the	  short	  run.	  The	  result	  was	  high	  
investment,	  capital	  deepening,	  high	  rates	  of	  TFP	  growth,	  and	  an	  economic	  miracle.	  
	  
The	  international	  institutions	  that	  mattered	  were	  those	  associated	  with	  European	  
integration:	  the	  European	  Payments	  Union,	  the	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community,	  the	  
European	  Economic	  Community,	  and	  EFTA.	  These	  facilitated	  the	  resumption	  of	  multilateral	  
trade	  in	  Europe,	  which	  was	  necessary	  both	  for	  standard	  efficiency	  reasons,	  and	  so	  that	  firms	  
could	  be	  ensured	  of	  foreign	  markets	  when	  making	  their	  investment	  decisions.	  European	  
international	  integration	  was	  one	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  US	  government,	  which	  used	  
Marshall	  Aid	  as	  a	  lever	  to	  obtain	  this	  and	  other	  market-­‐friendly	  structural	  reforms	  (De	  Long	  
and	  Eichengreen	  1993).	  Crafts	  and	  Toniolo	  (2008)	  portray	  the	  Golden	  Age	  as	  a	  period	  in	  
which	  there	  was	  scope	  for	  growth	  simply	  by	  undoing	  the	  policy	  mistakes	  of	  the	  interwar	  
period.	  
	  
If	  Eichengreen	  is	  right	  then	  investment,	  trade	  and	  growth	  should	  have	  been	  higher	  in	  
countries	  which	  adopted	  appropriate	  domestic	  institutions,	  and	  liberalized	  their	  trade	  earlier.	  
Ireland	  is	  one	  example	  of	  a	  country	  which	  only	  liberalized	  its	  trade	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	  and	  
early	  1960s,	  and	  which,	  like	  the	  UK,	  had	  a	  more	  fragmented	  and	  less	  corporatist	  trade	  union	  
structure.	  Both	  countries	  performed	  relatively	  disappointingly	  during	  the	  Golden	  Age.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  Belgium,	  West	  Germany,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Scandinavia	  all	  had	  relatively	  
corporatist	  systems	  of	  industrial	  relations,	  and	  liberalized	  their	  trade	  policy	  relatively	  early.	  
The	  Eichengreen	  argument	  is	  thus	  a	  priori	  plausible,	  although	  econometric	  testing	  of	  the	  
hypothesis	  is	  difficult	  (Crafts	  1992b).	  
	  
What	  explains	  the	  post-­‐1973	  growth	  slowdown?	  The	  arguments	  outlined	  above	  suggest	  that	  
to	  a	  large	  extent	  this	  was	  inevitable,	  as	  Europe	  caught	  up	  to	  the	  technological	  frontier,	  and	  
the	  pool	  of	  agricultural	  workers	  who	  could	  be	  redeployed	  gradually	  vanished.	  While	  this	  is	  
surely	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  story,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  whole	  story,	  for	  several	  reasons	  (Crafts	  and	  
Toniolo	  2008).	  First,	  while	  GDP	  per	  capita	  convergence	  on	  the	  US	  ceased	  in	  the	  1970s,	  
labour	  productivity	  convergence	  continued	  until	  some	  point	  in	  the	  1990s.	  The	  difference	  is	  
due	  to	  diverging	  trends	  in	  hours	  worked	  in	  the	  two	  continents:	  how	  to	  interpret	  this	  remains	  
unclear	  (Blanchard	  2004,	  Prescott	  2004,	  Alesina	  et	  al.	  2006).	  Second,	  the	  distributional	  
conflicts	  associated	  with	  the	  oil	  crises	  of	  the	  1970s	  may	  have	  undermined	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  
cooperative	  political	  institutions	  which	  Eichengreen	  believed	  had	  promoted	  growth	  during	  
the	  Golden	  Age.	  Third,	  even	  if	  these	  institutions	  had	  remained	  as	  viable	  as	  they	  had	  been	  
before,	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  they	  were	  well	  adapted	  to	  a	  new	  era	  in	  which	  growth	  based	  on	  
importing	  best	  practice	  technology	  from	  abroad	  was	  no	  longer	  as	  easy	  as	  it	  had	  been	  when	  
Europe	  had	  been	  more	  backward	  (Eichengreen	  2007,	  Aghion	  and	  Howitt	  2006).	  Rather	  than	  
mobilizing	  large	  amounts	  of	  capital	  to	  mass	  produce	  well-­‐understood	  technologies	  that	  had	  
been	  developed	  elsewhere,	  the	  problem	  was	  now	  how	  to	  innovate:	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  this	  
required	  more	  competitive	  product	  markets,	  different	  methods	  of	  finance,	  and	  alternative	  
training	  systems.	  	  
	  
The	  growth	  rate	  of	  real	  GDP	  per	  hour	  worked	  increased	  in	  the	  United	  States	  between	  1973-­‐
1995	  and	  1995-­‐2007	  from	  1.28	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  to	  2.05	  per	  cent	  per	  year.	  	  In	  contrast,	  in	  
the	  EU15	  it	  fell	  from	  2.69	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  to	  1.17	  per	  cent	  per	  year.	  	  The	  rate	  of	  labour	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productivity	  growth	  fell	  in	  most	  European	  countries:	  in	  Italy	  and	  Spain	  it	  was	  below	  1	  per	  
cent	  per	  year	  after	  1995.	  	  By	  contrast,	  Sweden	  saw	  a	  productivity	  revival	  while	  for	  part	  of	  
the	  period	  Ireland	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  Celtic	  Tiger,	  and	  both	  countries	  exceeded	  the	  American	  
productivity	  growth	  rate.	  	  So	  while	  there	  was	  falling	  behind	  in	  productivity	  performance	  on	  
average,	  there	  was	  also	  considerable	  diversity	  in	  European	  performance.	  
	  
The	  acceleration	  in	  American	  productivity	  growth	  was	  underpinned	  by	  ICT.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  
historical	  comparisons	  reveal	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  ICT	  has	  been	  relatively	  large	  and	  that	  it	  has	  
come	  through	  very	  quickly.	  	  The	  main	  impact	  of	  ICT	  on	  economic	  growth	  comes	  through	  its	  
diffusion	  as	  a	  new	  form	  of	  capital	  equipment	  rather	  than	  through	  TFP	  growth	  in	  the	  
production	  of	  ICT	  equipment.	  	  This	  is	  because	  users	  get	  the	  benefit	  of	  technological	  progress	  
through	  lower	  prices,	  and	  as	  prices	  fall	  more	  of	  this	  type	  of	  capital	  is	  installed.31	  	  The	  
implication	  is	  that	  ICT	  has	  offered	  Europe	  a	  great	  opportunity	  to	  increase	  its	  productivity	  
growth.	  	  However,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  Table	  22,	  European	  countries	  have	  been	  less	  successful	  than	  
the	  United	  States	  in	  seizing	  this	  opportunity.	  	  	  
	  
The	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  that	  the	  diffusion	  of	  ICT	  has	  been	  aided	  by	  complementary	  
investments	  in	  intangible	  capital	  and	  high-­‐quality	  human	  capital,	  but	  weakened	  by	  relatively	  
strong	  regulation	  in	  terms	  of	  employment	  protection	  and	  restrictions	  to	  competition,	  
especially	  in	  the	  distribution	  sector	  (Conway	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  Since	  these	  forms	  of	  regulation	  
have	  weakened	  over	  time,	  the	  story	  is	  not	  that	  European	  regulation	  has	  become	  more	  
stringent,	  but	  rather	  that	  existing	  regulation	  became	  more	  costly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  new	  
technological	  era.	  	  Of	  course,	  European	  countries	  have	  varied	  considerably	  in	  these	  respects;	  
for	  example,	  the	  UK	  and	  Sweden	  have	  been	  better	  placed	  than	  Italy	  and	  Spain.	  
	  
The	  example	  of	  ICT	  prompts	  some	  more	  general	  comments	  on	  European	  supply-­‐side	  policies	  
in	  the	  decades	  before	  the	  crisis.	  	  In	  some	  respects,	  these	  provided	  conditions	  more	  
favourable	  to	  growth.	  European	  countries	  became	  more	  open	  to	  trade,	  with	  positive	  effects	  
on	  productivity,	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  European	  single	  market.	  	  Years	  of	  schooling	  were	  
steadily	  increased	  and	  product	  market	  regulation	  inhibiting	  competition	  was	  reduced.	  	  
Corporate	  tax	  rates	  have	  fallen	  since	  the	  early	  1980s.	  	  Nevertheless,	  supply-­‐side	  policies	  are	  
in	  need	  of	  further	  reform	  if	  the	  issue	  of	  disappointing	  growth	  performance	  is	  to	  be	  
adequately	  addressed	  and	  catch-­‐up	  resumed.	  	  Aghion	  and	  Howitt	  (2006)	  stress	  that	  as	  
countries	  get	  closer	  to	  the	  frontier	  it	  becomes	  more	  important	  to	  have	  high-­‐quality	  
education	  and	  strong	  competition	  in	  product	  markets.	  	  These	  are	  areas	  where	  European	  
countries	  generally	  have	  room	  for	  significant	  improvement.	  
	  
There	  have	  been	  serious	  question	  marks	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  schooling	  in	  many	  European	  
countries,	  which	  recent	  research	  suggests	  exacts	  a	  growth	  penalty.	  	  A	  measure	  of	  cognitive	  
skills,	  based	  on	  test	  scores,	  correlates	  strongly	  with	  growth	  performance	  (Hanushek	  and	  
Wössmann	  2012)	  and	  it	  is	  striking	  that	  even	  the	  top	  European	  countries	  such	  as	  Finland	  have	  
fallen	  behind	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea,	  with	  some	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany	  and,	  especially,	  
Italy	  deteriorating.	  	  These	  authors	  estimate	  that,	  if	  cognitive	  skills	  in	  Italy	  were	  at	  the	  
standard	  of	  South	  Korea,	  its	  long-­‐run	  growth	  would	  be	  raised	  by	  about	  0.75	  percentage	  
points	  per	  year.	  Wössmann	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  show	  that	  the	  variance	  in	  outcomes	  in	  terms	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  In	  a	  country	  with	  no	  ICT	  production,	  a	  neoclassical	  growth	  model	  whose	  Cobb-­‐
Douglas	  production	  function	  has	  two	  types	  of	  capital	  (ICT	  and	  other)	  shows	  that	  the	  
steady	  state	  rate	  of	  growth	  will	  be	  TFP	  growth	  plus	  a	  term	  denoting	  the	  rate	  of	  real	  
price	  decline	  for	  ICT	  capital	  multiplied	  by	  the	  share	  of	  ICT	  capital	  in	  national	  income,	  
all	  divided	  by	  labour’s	  share	  of	  national	  income	  (Oulton	  2012).	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cognitive	  skills	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  way	  the	  schooling	  system	  is	  organized	  rather	  than	  by	  
educational	  spending.	  
	  
Competition	  and	  competition	  policy	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  weaker	  than	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  This	  
has	  raised	  mark-­‐ups	  and	  lowered	  competitive	  pressure	  on	  managers	  to	  invest	  and	  to	  
innovate	  with	  adverse	  effects	  on	  TFP	  growth	  (Buccirossi	  et	  al.	  2013,	  Griffith	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  
Productivity	  growth	  in	  market	  services	  has	  been	  very	  disappointing	  in	  many	  European	  
countries	  (Timmer	  et	  al.	  2010).	  One	  reason	  is	  continued	  weakness	  of	  competition	  reflected	  
in	  high	  price-­‐cost	  mark-­‐ups	  which	  have	  survived	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Single	  Market	  (Høj	  
et	  al.	  2007).	  	  Addressing	  these	  issues	  by	  reducing	  the	  barriers	  to	  entry	  maintained	  by	  
member	  states	  would	  have	  raised	  productivity	  performance	  significantly	  but	  governments	  
still	  have	  considerable	  discretion	  to	  maintain	  these	  barriers	  notwithstanding	  the	  Services	  
Directive	  (Badinger	  and	  Maydell	  2009).	  	  	  
	  
Western	  Europe	  remains	  a	  tremendously	  rich	  and	  successful	  economy,	  despite	  the	  
slowdown	  in	  its	  relative	  growth	  rate.	  The	  major	  problems	  facing	  it	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  
have	  to	  do	  with	  its	  broken	  banking	  system	  and	  dysfunctional	  monetary	  union,	  a	  reminder	  
that	  growth	  experiences	  even	  over	  quite	  lengthy	  periods	  of	  time	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  what	  
are	  often	  thought	  of	  as	  ‘short	  run’	  monetary	  factors.	  Once	  these	  issues	  have	  been	  sorted	  out,	  
one	  way	  or	  another,	  a	  longer	  run	  issue	  will	  remain,	  however:	  how	  to	  reshape	  European	  
economies	  so	  as	  to	  make	  them	  more	  dynamic	  without	  abandoning	  those	  elements	  of	  the	  
postwar	  settlement	  that	  are	  most	  valued	  by	  Europe’s	  citizens.	  
	  
7.2	  The	  UK	  in	  the	  Golden	  Age	  and	  After32	  
	  
After	  being	  the	  undisputed	  economic	  leader	  for	  much	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  Britain	  entered	  a	  
prolonged	  phase	  of	  relative	  economic	  decline.	  This	  became	  so	  pronounced	  during	  the	  
Golden	  Age	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period	  Britain	  had	  been	  overtaken	  by	  seven	  other	  
European	  countries	  in	  terms	  of	  real	  GDP	  per	  person,	  and	  by	  nine	  others	  in	  terms	  of	  labour	  
productivity.	  Growth	  was	  at	  least	  0.7	  percentage	  points	  per	  year	  slower	  in	  the	  UK	  than	  in	  
any	  other	  country,	  including	  those	  which	  started	  the	  period	  with	  similar	  or	  higher	  income	  
levels.	  The	  proximate	  reasons	  for	  relatively	  slow	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  was	  weak	  
growth	  in	  capital	  per	  worker	  and	  TFP	  compared	  with	  more	  successful	  economies	  like	  West	  
Germany.	  	  Although	  slower	  growth	  was	  partly	  due	  to	  convergence	  forces,	  being	  overtaken	  is	  
a	  clear	  indicator	  of	  failure.	  	  	  
	  
What	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  about	  this	  episode	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  longstanding	  
institutions	  interacted	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  environment	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
not	  only	  rendered	  them	  toxic,	  but	  also	  precluded	  reform	  for	  several	  decades.	  	  The	  key	  
changes	  in	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  environment	  were	  a	  serious	  erosion	  of	  competition	  in	  
product	  markets,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  very	  low	  levels	  of	  unemployment	  in	  order	  for	  
governments	  to	  be	  re-­‐elected.	  	  There	  were	  two	  distinctive	  institutional	  legacies	  that	  turned	  
out	  to	  be	  costly	  when	  the	  Golden	  Age	  opportunity	  for	  rapid	  growth	  came	  along.	  	  First,	  
corporate	  governance	  exhibited	  an	  unusual	  degree	  of	  separation	  of	  ownership	  and	  control	  
in	  large	  companies	  without	  dominant	  shareholders	  (Foreman-­‐Peck	  and	  Hannah	  2012).	  	  
Given	  that	  the	  market	  for	  corporate	  control	  through	  takeovers	  did	  not	  work	  effectively	  as	  a	  
constraint	  (Cosh	  et	  al.	  2008),	  weak	  competition	  allowed	  considerable	  scope	  for	  managerial	  
underperformance.	  	  Second,	  the	  system	  of	  industrial	  relations	  was	  characterized	  by	  craft	  
control,	  multi-­‐unionism	  and	  legal	  immunities	  for	  industrial	  action	  (Crouch	  1993).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  	  This	  section	  draws	  in	  part	  on	  Crafts	  (2012,	  2013b).	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Britain	  did	  not	  achieve	  the	  transformation	  of	  industrial	  relations	  –	  Eichengreen’s	  cooperative	  
equilibrium	  –	  that	  happened	  elsewhere	  in	  Europe	  and	  this	  implied	  a	  considerable	  growth	  
penalty	  (Gilmore	  2009).33	  	  When	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  write	  binding	  contracts,	  either	  the	  
absence	  of	  unions	  or	  strong	  corporatist	  trade	  unionism	  would	  have	  been	  preferable	  to	  the	  
idiosyncratic	  British	  system.	  In	  Britain	  it	  was	  generally	  not	  possible	  to	  make	  corporatist	  deals	  
to	  underpin	  investment	  and	  innovation,	  because	  bargaining	  took	  place	  with	  multiple	  unions	  
or	  with	  shop	  stewards	  representing	  subsets	  of	  a	  firm’s	  work	  force.	  These	  unions	  had	  
considerable	  bargaining	  power	  as	  a	  result	  of	  full	  employment	  and	  weak	  competition,	  but	  no	  
incentive	  to	  internalize	  the	  benefits	  of	  wage	  restraint.	  This	  exposed	  sunk	  cost	  investments	  to	  
a	  ‘hold-­‐up’	  problem,	  with	  knock-­‐on	  implications	  for	  investment	  and	  growth.	  34	  
	  
Failure	  successfully	  to	  reform	  industrial	  relations	  was	  a	  major	  shortcoming	  of	  British	  
governments	  from	  the	  1950s	  through	  the	  1970s.	  	  However,	  throughout	  this	  period	  there	  
were	  continual	  efforts	  to	  persuade	  organized	  labour	  to	  accept	  wage	  moderation,	  not	  only	  to	  
encourage	  investment,	  but	  even	  more	  to	  allow	  low	  levels	  of	  unemployment	  without	  
inflation	  at	  a	  time	  when	  politicians	  believed	  that	  this	  was	  crucial	  to	  electoral	  success	  after	  
the	  interwar	  trauma.	  	  At	  worst	  this	  was	  tantamount	  to	  allowing	  a	  de	  facto	  trade	  union	  ‘veto’	  
on	  economic	  reforms.	  	  In	  any	  event,	  British	  supply-­‐side	  policy,	  which	  was	  shaped	  by	  the	  
postwar	  settlement,	  was	  unhelpful	  towards	  growth	  in	  several	  respects.	  	  Problems	  included	  a	  
tax	  system	  characterized	  by	  very	  high	  marginal	  rates,	  described	  by	  Tanzi	  (1969)	  as	  the	  least	  
conducive	  to	  growth	  of	  any	  of	  the	  OECD	  countries	  in	  his	  study;	  missing	  out	  on	  benefits	  from	  
trade	  liberalization	  by	  retaining	  1930s	  protectionism	  into	  the	  1960s	  (Oulton	  1976);	  a	  
misdirected	  technology	  policy	  that	  focused	  on	  invention	  rather	  than	  diffusion	  (Ergas	  1987);	  
and	  an	  industrial	  policy	  that	  ineffectively	  subsidized	  physical	  investment	  (Sumner	  1999)	  and	  
slowed	  down	  structural	  change	  by	  protecting	  ailing	  industries	  through	  subsidies	  (Wren	  1996).	  	  
	  
A	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  Golden	  Age	  British	  economy	  was	  the	  weakness	  of	  competition	  in	  
product	  markets	  that	  had	  developed	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  intensified	  subsequently.	  	  
Competition	  policy	  was	  largely	  ineffective	  while	  market	  power	  was	  substantial	  and	  
entrenched	  politically	  (Crafts	  2012).	  	  The	  lack	  of	  competition	  had	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  British	  
productivity	  performance	  during	  the	  Golden	  Age	  working	  at	  least	  partly	  through	  industrial	  
relations	  and	  managerial	  failure.	  	  Broadberry	  and	  Crafts	  (1996)	  found	  that	  cartelization	  was	  
strongly	  negatively	  related	  to	  productivity	  growth	  in	  a	  cross	  section	  of	  manufacturing	  
industries	  for	  1954-­‐63,	  a	  result	  which	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  difference-­‐in-­‐differences	  analysis	  
in	  Symeonidis	  (2008).	  	  In	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  greater	  competition	  increased	  innovation	  
(Blundell	  et	  al.	  1999)	  and	  raised	  productivity	  growth	  significantly	  in	  companies	  where	  there	  
was	  no	  dominant	  external	  shareholder	  (Nickell	  et	  al.	  1997).	  	  Both	  these	  results	  underline	  the	  
role	  of	  weak	  competition	  in	  permitting	  agency	  cost	  problems	  to	  undermine	  productivity	  
performance.	  
	  
Case	  studies	  strongly	  implicate	  bad	  management,	  and	  restrictive	  labour	  practices	  resulting	  
from	  bargaining	  with	  unions,	  in	  poor	  productivity	  outcomes.	  	  Pratten	  and	  Atkinson	  (1976)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Gilmore	  (2009)	  finds	  that	  coordinated	  wage	  bargaining	  was	  positive	  for	  
investment	  and	  growth	  prior	  to	  1975	  but	  not	  subsequently.	  	  This	  fits	  with	  the	  
suggestion	  in	  Cameron	  and	  Wallace	  (2002)	  that	  the	  key	  to	  the	  Eichengreen	  
equilibrium	  is	  that	  both	  sides	  be	  patient,	  and	  that	  this	  was	  no	  longer	  the	  case	  when	  
the	  macroeconomic	  turbulence	  of	  the	  1970s	  erupted.	  	  	  
34	  This	  can	  readily	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Eichengreen	  (1996)	  model	  or	  an	  
extension	  of	  it	  to	  incorporate	  endogenous	  innovation.	  	  	  	  
	   40	  
reviewed	  25	  such	  studies	  and	  found	  evidence	  of	  either	  or	  both	  of	  these	  problems	  in	  23	  of	  
them.	  Prais	  (1982)	  reported	  similar	  findings	  in	  8	  out	  of	  10	  industry	  case	  studies	  and	  in	  each	  
case	  noted	  that	  competition	  was	  significantly	  impaired.	  	  Multiple	  unionism,	  unenforceable	  
contracts	  and	  plant	  bargaining	  with	  shop	  stewards	  created	  an	  environment	  in	  which,	  unlike	  
West	  Germany,	  workers	  and	  firms	  could	  not	  commit	  to	  ‘good	  behaviour’.	  This	  weakened	  
incentives	  to	  invest	  and	  innovate	  (Bean	  and	  Crafts	  1996,	  Denny	  and	  Nickell	  1992).	  
	  
The	  competitive	  environment	  that	  had	  largely	  precluded	  failure	  in	  the	  pre-­‐1914	  period	  had	  
disappeared.	  	  This	  allowed	  the	  problems	  of	  poor	  management	  and	  dysfunctional	  industrial	  
relations,	  often	  seen	  as	  the	  Achilles	  Heel	  of	  the	  British	  economy	  in	  the	  Golden	  Age,	  to	  persist.	  	  
The	  politics	  of	  economic	  policy	  operated	  to	  prevent	  supply-­‐side	  reforms	  that	  could	  have	  
prevented	  relative	  economic	  decline	  by	  enhancing	  social	  capability.	  	  This	  period	  only	  ended	  
with	  the	  election	  of	  a	  maverick	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  1979.	  
	  
The	  post-­‐Golden	  Age	  period	  is	  helpful	  as	  a	  test	  of	  this	  interpretation,	  since	  government	  
policy	  moved	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  increasing	  competition	  in	  product	  markets.	  	  In	  particular,	  
protectionism	  was	  discarded.	  	  Trade	  liberalization	  in	  its	  various	  guises	  reduced	  price-­‐cost	  
margins	  (Hitiris	  1978,	  Griffith	  2001).	  	  The	  average	  effective	  rate	  of	  protection	  fell	  from	  9.3	  
per	  cent	  in	  1968	  to	  4.7	  per	  cent	  in	  1979,	  and	  1.2	  per	  cent	  in	  1986	  (Ennew	  et	  al.	  1990).	  
Industrial	  policy	  was	  downsized	  as	  subsidies	  were	  cut,	  and	  privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  
businesses	  was	  embraced	  while	  de-­‐regulation	  was	  promoted.	  	  In	  addition,	  legal	  reforms	  of	  
industrial	  relations	  reduced	  trade	  union	  bargaining	  power,	  which	  had	  initially	  been	  
undermined	  by	  rising	  unemployment.	  	  Reforms	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  were	  made	  including	  the	  re-­‐
structuring	  of	  taxation	  by	  increasing	  VAT	  while	  reducing	  income	  tax	  rates.	  	  The	  Thatcher	  
government	  saw	  itself	  as	  ending	  the	  trade	  unions’	  veto	  on	  economic	  policy	  reform.	  	  Many	  of	  
the	  changes	  of	  the	  1980s	  would	  have	  been	  regarded	  as	  inconceivable	  by	  informed	  opinion	  in	  
the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  	  	  
	  
European	  productivity	  growth	  slowed	  down	  markedly	  after	  the	  Golden	  Age,	  but	  less	  so	  in	  
the	  UK	  than	  in	  most	  other	  countries.	  	  Increased	  competition	  and	  openness	  in	  the	  later	  20th	  
century	  was	  associated	  with	  better	  productivity	  performance.	  Proudman	  and	  Redding	  (1998),	  
exploring	  differing	  experiences	  across	  British	  industry	  between	  1970	  and	  1990,	  found	  that	  
openness	  raised	  the	  rate	  of	  productivity	  convergence	  with	  the	  technological	  leader.	  In	  a	  
study	  looking	  at	  catch-­‐up	  across	  European	  industries,	  Nicoletti	  and	  Scarpetta	  (2003)	  found	  
that	  TFP	  growth	  was	  inversely	  related	  to	  product	  market	  regulation	  (PMR).	  	  The	  implication	  
of	  a	  lower	  PMR	  score	  as	  compared	  with	  France	  and	  Germany	  was	  a	  TFP	  growth	  advantage	  
for	  the	  UK	  of	  about	  0.5	  percentage	  points	  per	  year	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  At	  the	  sectoral	  level,	  when	  
concentration	  ratios	  fell	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  1980s,	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  positive	  impact	  on	  labour	  
productivity	  growth	  (Haskel	  1991).	  Entry	  and	  exit	  accounted	  for	  an	  increasing	  proportion	  of	  
manufacturing	  productivity	  growth,	  rising	  from	  25	  per	  cent	  in	  1980-­‐5	  to	  40	  per	  cent	  in	  1995-­‐
2000	  (Criscuolo	  et	  al.	  2004).	  
	  
The	  impact	  was	  felt	  at	  least	  partly	  through	  greater	  pressure	  on	  management	  to	  perform	  and	  
through	  firm-­‐worker	  bargains	  that	  raised	  effort	  and	  improved	  working	  practices.	  	  Increases	  
in	  competition	  resulting	  from	  the	  European	  Single	  Market	  raised	  both	  the	  level	  and	  growth	  
rate	  of	  TFP	  in	  plants	  which	  were	  part	  of	  multi-­‐plant	  firms,	  and	  thus	  most	  prone	  to	  agency	  
problems	  (Griffith	  2001).	  	  Liberalization	  of	  capital	  market	  rules	  allowed	  more	  effective	  
challenges	  to	  incumbent	  management.	  A	  notable	  feature	  of	  the	  period	  after	  1980	  was	  
divestment	  and	  restructuring	  in	  large	  firms	  and,	  in	  particular,	  management	  buyouts	  (often	  
financed	  by	  private	  equity)	  which	  typically	  generated	  large	  increases	  in	  TFP	  levels	  in	  the	  
1988-­‐98	  period	  (Harris	  et	  al.	  2005).	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The	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  saw	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  conduct	  and	  structure	  of	  British	  industrial	  
relations.	  	  Trade	  union	  membership	  and	  bargaining	  power	  were	  seriously	  eroded.	  This	  was	  
prompted	  partly	  by	  high	  unemployment	  and	  anti-­‐union	  legislation	  in	  the	  1980s	  but	  also	  
owed	  a	  good	  deal	  to	  increased	  competition	  (Brown	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  Increased	  competition	  may	  
have	  been	  the	  more	  important	  factor	  in	  boosting	  British	  performance,	  since	  the	  1980s	  saw	  a	  
surge	  in	  organizational	  change	  in	  those	  unionized	  firms	  exposed	  to	  increased	  competition	  
(Machin	  and	  Wadhwani	  1991).	  De-­‐recognition	  of	  unions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  increases	  in	  
foreign	  competition	  had	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  productivity	  growth	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  (Gregg	  et	  al.	  
1993).	  	  The	  negative	  impact	  of	  multi-­‐unionism	  on	  TFP	  growth,	  apparent	  from	  the	  1950s	  
through	  the	  1970s,	  evaporated	  after	  1979	  (Bean	  and	  Crafts	  1996).	  	  The	  productivity	  payoff	  
was	  boosted	  by	  the	  interaction	  between	  reforms	  to	  industrial	  relations	  and	  product	  market	  
competition.	  
	  
8.	  Case	  Studies	  II:	  Success,	  At	  Least	  for	  Now	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  briefly	  examine	  three	  more	  postwar	  growth	  miracles,	  in	  East	  Asia,	  China	  
and	  Ireland.	  While	  the	  East	  Asian	  miracle	  was	  called	  into	  question	  after	  the	  crisis	  of	  1997,	  
growth	  there	  soon	  resumed.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  Irish	  growth	  will	  go	  the	  way	  of	  
Japan	  in	  the	  1990s,	  but	  income	  levels	  there	  are	  massively	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  1980s;	  the	  same	  
is	  true	  of	  China,	  despite	  concerns	  about	  the	  future	  of	  economic	  growth	  in	  that	  country.	  
	  
8.1.	  The	  East	  Asian	  miracle	  	  
	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  four	  East	  Asian	  Tiger	  economies	  enjoyed	  one	  of	  the	  most	  impressive	  
growth	  experiences	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  although	  they	  had	  to	  wait	  until	  the	  end	  of	  World	  
War	  II	  for	  it	  to	  begin.	  The	  four	  countries	  concerned	  differed	  in	  terms	  of	  size,	  history,	  and	  
political	  system.	  In	  1950	  South	  Korea	  had	  the	  largest	  population,	  some	  20	  million,	  while	  the	  
Taiwanese	  population	  was	  almost	  7.5	  million.	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Singapore	  were	  both	  city	  
states,	  with	  populations	  of	  just	  2	  million	  and	  one	  million	  respectively.	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  had	  
both	  been	  Japanese	  colonies,	  and	  were	  on	  the	  front	  line	  of	  the	  struggle	  between	  
communism	  and	  the	  West.	  Singapore	  and	  Hong	  Kong	  were	  both	  British	  colonies,	  but	  
whereas	  Singapore	  sought	  and	  eventually	  obtained	  independence,	  first	  as	  part	  of	  Malaysia	  
in	  1963,	  and	  then	  as	  an	  independent	  state	  in	  1965,	  Hong	  Kong	  remained	  British	  until	  the	  
handover	  to	  China	  in	  1997.	  GDP	  per	  capita	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  was	  around	  $900	  in	  
1990	  international	  prices,	  at	  or	  below	  the	  level	  of	  several	  countries	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa;	  it	  
was	  slightly	  over	  $2000	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Singapore.	  Korea,	  Singapore	  and	  Taiwan	  all	  
developed	  more	  or	  less	  authoritarian	  systems	  of	  government,	  while	  Hong	  Kong	  was	  ruled	  as	  
a	  Crown	  Colony	  until	  1997.	  And	  yet	  all	  four	  countries	  achieved	  spectacular	  growth,	  with	  the	  
result	  that	  per	  capita	  GDP	  in	  2007	  was	  as	  high	  in	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  as	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  
and	  substantially	  higher	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Singapore.	  This	  is	  a	  sufficiently	  impressive	  
performance	  that	  it	  deserves	  the	  label	  miraculous,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  relative	  contributions	  
of	  factor	  accumulation	  and	  TFP	  growth	  in	  producing	  it.	  
	  
Several	  features	  of	  this	  growth	  experience	  fit	  neatly	  into	  the	  general	  convergence	  
framework	  outlined	  above.	  The	  four	  countries	  were	  relatively	  poor	  in	  1950,	  and	  had	  high	  
levels	  of	  social	  capability.	  The	  famous	  index	  of	  Adelman	  and	  Morris	  (1967)	  showed	  both	  
Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  having	  extremely	  high	  levels	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  
late	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s,	  and	  Temple	  and	  Johnson	  (1998)	  have	  found	  that	  this	  indicator	  
was	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  subsequent	  growth.	  As	  elsewhere,	  growth	  in	  the	  Tiger	  
economies	  was	  characterized	  by	  high	  rates	  of	  investment	  –	  in	  human	  as	  well	  as	  physical	  
	   42	  
capital	  –	  and	  rapidly	  growing	  trade.	  Investment	  stood	  at	  around	  30	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  in	  both	  
Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  in	  1980	  (Rodrik	  1995,	  p.	  59).	  Technology	  transfer	  was	  actively	  encouraged	  
via	  licensing,	  technical	  assistance,	  inward	  investment	  by	  multinationals,	  and	  joint	  ventures	  
(with	  the	  mix	  differing	  between	  countries:	  for	  example,	  Korea	  discouraged	  inward	  direct	  
investment,	  while	  Singapore	  actively	  encouraged	  it).	  Another	  feature	  of	  East	  Asian	  growth	  
was	  that	  it	  was	  based	  on	  industrialization,	  with	  countries	  specializing	  first	  in	  textiles,	  then	  in	  
heavy	  industry,	  and	  then	  in	  electronics	  and	  high-­‐tech	  industries.	  This	  pattern	  of	  switching	  
over	  time	  from	  labour-­‐intensive,	  to	  capital-­‐intensive,	  and	  finally	  to	  technology-­‐intensive	  
industries,	  promoted	  spillover	  effects	  on	  neighbouring	  countries	  in	  Southeast	  Asia,	  as	  later	  
industrialisers	  started	  manufacturing	  goods	  which	  earlier	  industrialisers	  were	  no	  longer	  
producing:	  the	  so-­‐called	  flying	  geese	  phenomenon	  (Ito	  2001).	  
	  
A	  substantial	  literature	  emerged	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  which	  argued	  that	  these	  
economies	  had	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  institutions	  and	  policies	  which	  differed	  greatly	  
from	  the	  hands-­‐off	  prescriptions	  of	  the	  Washington	  Consensus,	  involving	  among	  other	  
things	  public	  enterprise,	  active	  industrial	  policy,	  export	  promotion,	  and	  protectionism.	  For	  
Amsden	  (1989,	  p.	  6),	  the	  institutions	  that	  mattered	  in	  Korea	  were	  “an	  interventionist	  state,	  
large	  diversified	  business	  groups,	  an	  abundant	  supply	  of	  competent	  salaried	  managers,	  and	  
an	  abundant	  supply	  of	  low-­‐cost,	  well-­‐educated	  labor.”	  The	  key	  policies	  were	  to	  provide	  
subsidies	  to	  firms	  that,	  crucially,	  were	  conditional	  on	  better	  performance	  and	  export	  market	  
share;	  and	  to	  establish	  what	  were	  effectively	  multiple	  prices	  for	  capital	  and	  foreign	  exchange,	  
via	  subsidies	  or	  other	  policies.	  According	  to	  Amsden,	  these	  multiple	  prices	  were	  needed	  in	  
order	  to	  accommodate	  conflicting	  objectives,	  for	  example	  to	  encourage	  savings	  while	  
keeping	  the	  cost	  of	  capital	  to	  firms	  low;	  or	  to	  encourage	  exports	  while	  keeping	  the	  cost	  of	  
imports	  low.	  For	  Wade	  (1990)	  activist	  East	  Asian	  governments	  not	  only	  influenced	  the	  
growth	  rate,	  but	  the	  sectoral	  composition	  of	  output,	  with	  beneficial	  consequences.	  Some	  of	  
these	  conclusions,	  but	  not	  all,	  were	  taken	  on	  board	  in	  a	  1993	  World	  Bank	  study	  (World	  Bank	  
1993),	  before	  the	  TFP	  literature	  reviewed	  above	  stimulated	  a	  debate	  about	  whether	  the	  East	  
Asian	  miracle	  was	  really	  as	  impressive	  as	  all	  that:	  if	  TFP	  growth	  was	  low,	  after	  all,	  then	  
interventionist	  arguments	  based	  on	  learning	  by	  doing	  or	  other	  growth-­‐promoting	  
externalities	  seemed	  less	  convincing	  (Krugman	  1994,	  p.78).	  
	  
While	  Amsden	  and	  Wade	  emphasized	  export	  performance,	  subsequent	  work	  has	  
downplayed	  the	  role	  of	  exports.	  Rodrik	  (1995)	  argues	  that	  exports	  cannot	  have	  been	  a	  prime	  
mover	  of	  industrialization,	  since	  if	  they	  had	  been,	  this	  would	  have	  been	  manifested	  in	  a	  
rising	  relative	  price	  of	  exports	  as	  world	  demand	  rose.	  Since	  there	  was	  no	  such	  price	  rise,	  the	  
ultimate	  sources	  of	  growth	  must	  have	  been	  internal,	  with	  exports	  arising	  as	  a	  consequence.	  
For	  Rodrik	  the	  key	  to	  growth	  was	  investment,	  consistent	  with	  the	  growth	  accounting	  
evidence.	  State	  intervention	  was	  required,	  not	  just	  to	  boost	  savings	  and	  investment	  rates	  via	  
subsidies,	  public	  investment	  and	  other	  measures,	  but	  to	  coordinate	  investment	  across	  a	  
range	  of	  complementary	  sectors	  for	  ‘big	  push’	  reasons.	  Rodrik	  shows	  a	  striking	  positive	  
correlation	  over	  time	  in	  both	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  between	  investment	  and	  imports,	  which	  can	  
be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  investment	  required	  large	  imports	  of	  machinery	  and	  other	  
capital	  equipment.	  Exports	  were	  needed	  to	  pay	  for	  these	  imports,	  and	  were	  thus	  necessary	  
for	  the	  investment	  drive,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  the	  ultimate	  cause	  of	  rapid	  growth.	  This	  does	  
not	  mean	  that	  exports	  were	  not	  essential:	  they	  were,	  both	  to	  finance	  required	  imports	  of	  
capital	  goods,	  and	  to	  sell	  the	  output	  that	  the	  high	  investment	  rates	  were	  designed	  to	  
produce.	  An	  implication	  is	  that	  while	  countries	  like	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  were	  not	  liberal	  free	  
traders	  themselves,	  they	  did	  benefit	  from	  the	  generally	  open	  international	  trade	  policies	  of	  
the	  major	  Western	  economies	  during	  this	  period.	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Some	  of	  the	  same	  features	  which	  had	  been	  seen	  as	  aiding	  rapid	  East	  Asian	  convergence	  on	  
the	  frontier	  –	  in	  particular,	  close	  relationships	  between	  the	  state	  and	  big	  business,	  and	  
heavy	  reliance	  on	  bank	  finance	  –	  were	  blamed	  for	  the	  East	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  which	  
erupted	  in	  1997.	  Given	  the	  debate	  that	  had	  recently	  taken	  place	  about	  East	  Asian	  TFP,	  it	  is	  
not	  surprising	  that	  the	  crisis	  emboldened	  some	  to	  argue	  that	  these	  institutional	  features	  of	  
East	  Asian	  growth	  had	  been	  a	  hindrance	  rather	  than	  a	  help	  all	  along.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  
one	  could	  establish	  such	  counterfactual	  claims	  convincingly.	  For	  example,	  studies	  failing	  to	  
find	  correlations	  across	  sectors	  between	  subsidies	  or	  other	  policy	  interventions,	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	  and	  productivity	  or	  other	  outcomes	  on	  the	  other,	  would	  presumably	  not	  convince	  an	  
advocate	  of	  big	  push	  policies,	  which	  are	  based	  on	  inter-­‐sectoral	  complementarities.	  The	  
argument	  that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  proves	  anything	  about	  the	  sources	  of	  rapid	  East	  Asian	  
growth	  from	  the	  1960s	  to	  the	  1990s	  seems	  somewhat	  dated	  today,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  global	  
financial	  crisis	  of	  2007-­‐8.	  This	  hit	  some	  of	  the	  richest	  countries	  in	  the	  world,	  with	  very	  
different	  institutional	  structures	  than	  those	  found	  in,	  say,	  Korea.	  The	  experience	  of	  the	  
Eurozone	  periphery	  shows	  the	  dangers	  of	  being	  exposed	  to	  capital	  inflows	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
a	  currency	  peg;	  unlike	  Korea	  or	  Thailand	  these	  countries	  do	  not	  have	  the	  option	  of	  
devaluation,	  and	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  (2013)	  have	  not	  yet	  recovered.	  In	  sharp	  contrast,	  East	  
Asian	  growth	  resumed	  rapidly	  in	  1999.	  We	  thus	  agree	  with	  Ito	  (2001),	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  
debate	  about	  which	  institutions	  and	  policies	  mattered	  for	  East	  Asian	  growth	  during	  the	  
growth	  miracle	  needs	  to	  be	  sharply	  distinguished	  from	  the	  debate	  about	  how	  to	  regulate	  
banks	  and	  international	  capital	  flows.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  at	  some	  stage	  East	  
Asia	  may	  not	  have	  to	  re-­‐think	  its	  institutional	  mix	  as	  it	  moves	  even	  closer	  to	  the	  international	  




While	  Chinese	  economic	  statistics	  are	  unreliable,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  China’s	  growth	  since	  the	  
start	  of	  economic	  reforms	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  has	  been	  extraordinary.35	  Even	  if	  Maddison	  and	  
Wu’s	  (2008)	  data	  are	  accepted,	  GDP	  growth	  averaged	  7.85	  per	  cent	  per	  annum	  between	  
1978	  and	  2003,	  as	  compared	  with	  an	  official	  growth	  rate	  almost	  two	  percentage	  points	  
higher.	  As	  in	  the	  Western	  European	  and	  East	  Asian	  cases,	  very	  high	  levels	  of	  investment,	  the	  
importation	  of	  technology,	  and	  increasing	  links	  with	  the	  outside	  world	  played	  key	  roles	  in	  
China’s	  growth	  acceleration.	  As	  in	  East	  Asia,	  Chinese	  industry	  went	  through	  successive	  
phases,	  from	  exporting	  labour-­‐intensive	  toys,	  clothes	  and	  footwear	  to	  producing	  more	  
capital-­‐intensive,	  and	  ultimately	  high-­‐tech,	  goods.	  The	  Chinese	  savings	  rate	  averaged	  an	  
extraordinary	  37	  per	  cent	  between	  1978	  and	  1995	  according	  to	  Kraay	  (2000),	  although	  
Heston	  and	  Sicular	  (2008)	  favour	  a	  lower	  (but	  still	  large)	  figure	  somewhere	  in	  the	  20-­‐30	  per	  
cent	  range.	  This	  has	  allowed	  an	  equally	  high	  investment	  rate	  to	  be	  internally	  financed	  (Lee	  et	  
al.	  2012).	  	  	  
	  
What	  makes	  the	  Chinese	  experience	  unique	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  gradualist	  reform	  program	  
has	  seen	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  economic	  life	  being	  steadily	  diminished	  over	  time,	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  as	  that	  state	  has	  maintained	  a	  highly	  authoritarian	  political	  system.	  China	  is	  no	  
poster	  child	  for	  the	  Washington	  Consensus.	  It	  still	  maintains	  exchange	  controls,	  state	  owned	  
enterprises	  remain	  an	  important	  drag	  on	  the	  economy	  (Brandt,	  Hsieh	  and	  Zhu	  2008),	  and	  
the	  government	  intervenes	  in	  the	  economy	  in	  myriad	  other	  ways.	  But	  the	  facts	  that	  the	  
direction	  of	  change	  since	  1979	  has	  so	  clearly	  been	  in	  a	  market-­‐friendly	  direction,	  and	  that	  
China’s	  economic	  situation	  has	  improved	  so	  much	  since	  then,	  mean	  that	  the	  literature	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  	  Our	  account	  draws	  heavily	  on	  the	  collection	  of	  essays	  in	  Brandt	  and	  Rawski	  
(2008a),	  the	  standard	  reference	  on	  the	  subject.	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China’s	  economic	  miracle	  has	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  how	  gradual	  liberalization	  improved	  
performance,	  rather	  than	  (as	  in	  the	  East	  Asian	  Tiger	  case)	  on	  whether	  some	  government	  
interventions	  helped	  speed	  China’s	  convergence	  on	  the	  technological	  frontier.	  
	  
China’s	  reforms	  came	  in	  two	  stages	  (Brandt	  and	  Rawski	  2008b),	  which	  according	  to	  
Naughton	  (2008)	  corresponded	  to	  different	  configurations	  of	  political	  power.	  In	  the	  first	  
stage,	  which	  lasted	  from	  1979	  to	  1992,	  political	  power	  was	  fragmented,	  and	  reforms	  were	  
incremental,	  and	  concerned	  with	  not	  creating	  losers.	  Agricultural	  households	  were	  
permitted	  to	  engage	  in	  cultivation.	  A	  growing	  number	  of	  firms,	  notably	  township	  and	  village	  
enterprises	  (TVEs),	  were	  allowed	  to	  enter	  an	  increasing	  range	  of	  sectors.	  Once	  firms	  had	  
satisfied	  their	  plan	  targets,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  sell	  additional	  output	  at	  what	  evolved	  into	  
market	  prices.	  Four	  special	  economic	  zones	  were	  set	  up	  in	  the	  southern	  coastal	  provinces,	  in	  
which	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Taiwanese	  firms	  produced	  labour-­‐intensive	  goods	  for	  export.	  
Fourteen	  additional	  zones	  were	  created	  in	  1984,	  and	  regulations	  regarding	  foreign	  direct	  
investment	  were	  further	  relaxed	  in	  1986	  (Branstetter	  and	  Lardy	  2008,	  pp.	  640-­‐1).	  	  
	  
In	  the	  second	  stage,	  from	  1993	  onwards,	  power	  was	  consolidated	  as	  the	  first	  generation	  of	  
Communist	  leaders	  left	  the	  political	  stage.	  Reforms	  became	  more	  decisive,	  and	  capable	  of	  
producing	  losers	  as	  well	  as	  winners.	  The	  plan	  component	  of	  the	  dual	  pricing	  system	  was	  
abandoned;	  restrictions	  on	  mobility	  between	  town	  and	  countryside	  were	  relaxed,	  setting	  
the	  stage	  for	  a	  mass	  migration	  of	  rural	  workers	  to	  industrial	  cities;	  TVEs	  were	  privatized;	  
state	  owned	  enterprises	  (SOEs)	  were	  subjected	  to	  more	  market	  discipline,	  and	  were	  
downsized	  and	  occasionally	  closed.	  	  The	  number	  of	  workers	  in	  SOEs	  fell	  from	  76	  million	  in	  
1992-­‐3	  to	  28	  million	  in	  2004	  (Naughton	  2008,	  p.	  121):	  Brandt,	  Hsieh	  and	  Zhu	  (2008)	  estimate	  
that	  the	  resulting	  reallocation	  of	  workers	  towards	  more	  productive	  firms	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  
economy	  made	  an	  even	  more	  important	  contribution	  to	  GDP	  growth	  than	  rural	  to	  urban	  
migration.	  For	  Hsieh	  and	  Klenow	  (2009)	  the	  reallocation	  added	  two	  percentage	  points	  to	  
China’s	  TFP	  growth	  rate	  between	  1998	  and	  2005,	  while	  for	  Song	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  it	  not	  only	  
helps	  explain	  China’s	  growth	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  but	  its	  growing	  external	  surpluses	  as	  well	  
(since	  the	  growing	  private	  sector	  relies	  more	  on	  internal	  financing	  for	  its	  investment	  needs	  
than	  the	  SOEs).	  The	  growing	  liberalization	  of	  Chinese	  trade	  policy	  culminated	  with	  China’s	  
accession	  to	  the	  WTO	  in	  2001.	  Even	  prior	  to	  that,	  foreign	  companies	  had	  been	  enabled	  to	  
operate	  in	  China	  subject	  to	  many	  fewer	  restrictions	  and	  less	  interference,	  leaving	  China	  well	  
positioned	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  boom	  of	  the	  last	  few	  years	  of	  the	  Great	  Moderation	  
(Branstetter	  and	  Lardy	  2008,	  p.	  645).	  Despite	  the	  clear	  acceleration	  in	  the	  pace	  of	  reforms,	  
Chinese	  reforms	  remained	  gradual	  compared	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  
former	  Soviet	  Union	  (Svejnar	  2008).	  
	  
Given	  that	  corruption	  is	  a	  severe	  problem	  in	  China,	  and	  that	  other	  aspects	  of	  its	  institutional	  
structure	  remain	  deeply	  problematic,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  that	  much	  analysis	  has	  
focused	  on	  the	  dismantling	  of	  Communist	  economic	  controls	  as	  being	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  China’s	  
economic	  success:	  merely	  getting	  rid	  of	  obstacles	  can	  lead	  to	  significant	  growth	  if	  these	  
were	  costly	  enough	  (Brandt	  and	  Rawski	  2008b,	  p.	  9).	  And	  yet	  government	  intervention	  may	  
have	  helped	  growth	  as	  well	  as	  hindered	  it.	  The	  size	  of	  the	  Chinese	  market	  has	  allowed	  
national	  and	  regional	  officials	  to	  extract	  concessions	  from	  foreign	  multinationals,	  notably	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  technology	  and	  research	  and	  development	  activities,	  that	  
could	  in	  principle	  have	  accelerated	  China’s	  catching	  up	  relative	  to	  that	  of	  other	  poor	  
economies	  (Brandt,	  Rawski	  and	  Sutton	  2008,	  p.	  623).	  The	  fact	  that	  China’s	  real	  exchange	  
rate	  depreciated	  by	  70	  per	  cent	  vis	  à	  vis	  the	  dollar	  between	  1980	  and	  1995	  presumably	  
increased	  the	  attraction	  of	  China	  as	  a	  manufacturing	  location.	  This	  in	  turn	  helped	  make	  
China’s	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  more	  politically	  sustainable,	  by	  creating	  overseas	  political	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constituencies	  favourable	  to	  it	  (Branstetter	  and	  Lardy	  2008,	  pp.	  639,	  675-­‐6).	  And	  underlying	  
everything	  else	  has	  been	  competition	  between	  regional	  officials,	  whose	  promotion	  
prospects	  depend	  on	  their	  region’s	  economic	  performance.	  This	  “regionally	  decentralized	  
authoritarianism”	  (Xu	  2011)	  has	  been	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  China’s	  economic	  success.	  
	  
There	  were	  clear	  signs	  in	  2013,	  as	  we	  were	  writing	  this	  chapter,	  that	  the	  Chinese	  financial	  
sector	  might	  be	  heading	  for	  a	  major	  crisis	  with	  unpredictable	  consequences	  for	  the	  Chinese	  
economy	  and	  political	  system.	  Even	  aside	  from	  this	  risk,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  the	  policies	  and	  
institutional	  structures	  which	  have	  underpinned	  China’s	  economic	  growth	  since	  1978	  are	  
beginning	  to	  outlive	  their	  usefulness	  and	  will	  have	  to	  be	  changed.	  Relative	  prices	  skewed	  in	  
favour	  of	  exports	  may	  be	  distorting	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  (Branstetter	  and	  Lardy	  2008,	  p.	  
676),	  and	  are	  in	  any	  rate	  leaving	  the	  economy	  vulnerable	  to	  overseas	  shocks.	  Many	  
commentators	  argue	  that	  an	  investment	  rate	  approaching	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  may	  no	  longer	  
be	  sustainable,	  and	  that	  an	  increasing	  focus	  on	  consumption	  is	  now	  required.	  For	  some	  
China	  is	  now	  approaching	  its	  “Lewis	  (1954)	  moment”,	  as	  rural	  to	  urban	  migration	  slows	  and	  
wages	  start	  to	  rise.	  Elastic	  supplies	  of	  labour	  from	  agriculture	  (and,	  if	  Song	  et	  al.	  2011	  are	  
right,	  from	  SOEs	  as	  well)	  made	  high	  Chinese	  investment	  rates	  consistent	  with	  high	  returns	  
on	  capital;	  as	  both	  pools	  of	  labour	  shrink,	  diminishing	  returns	  to	  capital	  will	  set	  in	  (Das	  and	  
N’Diaye	  2013,	  Krugman	  2013).	  	  
	  
If	  extensive	  growth	  at	  current	  rates	  becomes	  more	  difficult,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  intensive	  
growth	  thus	  increases,	  deeper	  institutional	  changes	  may	  be	  needed.	  Perhaps,	  as	  Naughton	  
(2008,	  p.	  127)	  speculates,	  as	  China	  moves	  closer	  to	  the	  technological	  frontier	  its	  economy	  
will	  need	  “transparency	  and	  recourse	  to	  impartial	  independent	  regulatory	  authority	  that	  the	  
current	  system	  is	  not	  yet	  able	  to	  provide”.	  It	  is	  not	  yet	  clear	  that	  China	  will	  be	  able	  to	  escape	  
the	  middle	  income	  trap.	  Eichengreen	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  find	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  growth	  
slowdown	  (defined	  as	  a	  decline	  in	  growth	  rates	  of	  2	  percentage	  points	  or	  more)	  increases	  
not	  only	  at	  income	  levels	  which	  China	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  attain	  in	  the	  next	  few	  years,	  but	  in	  
countries	  which	  have	  maintained	  undervalued	  exchange	  rates,	  have	  low	  consumption	  shares	  
of	  GDP,	  and	  ageing	  populations.	  On	  all	  fronts	  China	  appears	  vulnerable,	  implying	  that	  the	  
probability	  of	  a	  growth	  slowdown	  is	  high	  there,	  and	  that	  is	  even	  before	  taking	  the	  country’s	  
financial	  problems	  into	  account.	  Whether	  such	  a	  slowdown	  will	  occur,	  and	  how	  the	  
country’s	  economy,	  society	  and	  political	  system	  would	  respond,	  are	  among	  the	  major	  
uncertainties	  facing	  the	  world	  economy	  in	  the	  early	  21st	  century.	  	  
	  
	  
8.3.	  Ireland:	  the	  Celtic	  Tiger	  
	  
The	  spectacular	  growth	  of	  the	  Celtic	  Tiger	  period	  when	  a	  small	  economy	  rode	  the	  
globalization	  wave	  with	  massive	  success	  attracted	  enormous	  attention.	  Its	  proximate	  
sources	  in	  export	  platform	  FDI	  and	  ICT	  production	  are	  apparent.	  	  Less	  well	  understood	  is	  the	  
fact	  that	  up	  through	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  Ireland	  had	  been	  a	  failure	  (Ó	  Gráda	  and	  O’Rourke	  1996).	  
We	  saw	  earlier	  that	  affluent	  Western	  economies	  experienced	  unconditional	  convergence	  
after	  1950,	  with	  poorer	  countries	  growing	  more	  rapidly	  than	  richer	  ones.	  Seen	  in	  this	  
perspective,	  Ireland	  was	  the	  great	  underperformer	  prior	  to	  1987,	  as	  Figure	  3	  shows,	  with	  
growth	  rates	  well	  below	  those	  that	  would	  have	  been	  expected	  given	  its	  relative	  poverty	  in	  
1950.	  Ireland’s	  average	  growth	  rate	  between	  1950	  and	  1987,	  2.8	  per	  cent	  per	  annum,	  was	  
approximately	  the	  same	  as	  that	  in	  the	  Benelux	  countries,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  1950	  per	  
capita	  income	  lay	  between	  those	  of	  Austria	  and	  Italy.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Golden	  Age,	  this	  
was	  a	  spectacular	  economic	  failure.	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FIGURE	  3	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
The	  reasons	  for	  this	  failure	  are	  related	  to	  the	  reasons	  for	  success	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Western	  
Europe	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  The	  1950s	  were	  particularly	  unimpressive	  in	  Ireland,	  with	  per	  
capita	  growth	  rates	  of	  only	  1.7	  per	  cent.	  Education	  remained	  under-­‐funded	  and	  under-­‐
provided.	  Instead	  of	  corporatist	  labour	  market	  institutions	  as	  in	  continental	  Europe,	  Ireland	  
had	  a	  fragmented	  British-­‐style	  trade	  union	  system	  incapable	  of	  delivering	  wage	  moderation	  
in	  return	  for	  high	  investment.	  Even	  if	  such	  wage	  moderation	  had	  been	  delivered,	  Irish	  firms	  
were	  small,	  unproductive,	  and	  focused	  on	  the	  home	  market,	  while	  foreign	  firms	  were	  
discouraged	  from	  investing	  in	  the	  country.	  This	  was	  the	  legacy	  of	  1930s	  protectionism,	  
which	  might	  have	  been	  the	  correct	  response	  to	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  but	  should	  have	  been	  
abandoned	  much	  earlier	  than	  it	  actually	  was.	  Such	  investment	  as	  there	  was	  too	  often	  went	  
to	  relatively	  unproductive	  purposes,	  with	  Irish	  savings	  being	  invested	  in	  low-­‐yielding	  projects	  
for	  political	  reasons.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  Irish	  TFP	  was	  very	  low	  by	  European	  standards	  in	  1960	  
(Crafts	  2009b).	  
	  
Gradually	  these	  impediments	  to	  growth	  were	  done	  away	  with.	  The	  late	  1950s	  and	  early	  
1960s	  saw	  the	  introduction	  of	  export	  tax	  relief,	  and	  measures	  to	  attract	  foreign	  direct	  
investment,	  which	  was	  to	  become	  the	  key	  to	  Ireland’s	  convergence	  on	  the	  technological	  
frontier.	  Trade	  was	  gradually	  liberalized:	  Ireland	  entered	  an	  Anglo-­‐Irish	  free	  trade	  area	  in	  
1965,	  and	  the	  EEC	  in	  1973.	  The	  late	  1960s	  saw	  belated	  educational	  reforms	  that	  made	  
secondary	  schooling	  available	  to	  everyone.	  Growth	  was	  twice	  as	  high	  in	  the	  1960s	  as	  in	  the	  
1950s,	  but	  was	  slightly	  less	  than	  the	  Western	  European	  average:	  Ireland	  was	  still	  not	  
converging,	  and	  in	  1973	  was	  poorer	  than	  Greece,	  Portugal	  and	  Spain.	  EEC	  membership	  
helped	  to	  modernize	  the	  economy	  in	  many	  ways,	  but	  the	  oil	  crisis	  that	  coincided	  with	  entry	  
ushered	  in	  a	  period	  of	  low	  growth,	  large	  government	  budget	  deficits,	  and	  a	  subsequent	  fiscal	  
crisis,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  second	  post-­‐war	  lost	  decade	  during	  the	  1980s.	  
	  
After	  1987,	  Ireland’s	  economic	  performance	  was	  transformed	  out	  of	  all	  recognition.	  
Between	  1987	  and	  2000	  its	  per	  capita	  growth	  rate	  averaged	  5.7	  per	  cent	  per	  annum,	  with	  
the	  result	  that	  by	  2000	  Ireland	  lay	  on	  the	  advanced	  economy	  “convergence	  line”	  (Figure	  4).	  
So	  how	  was	  Ireland	  turned	  around?	  Figures	  3	  and	  4	  suggest	  a	  straightforward	  explanation:	  
that	  the	  Irish	  miracle	  was	  simply	  a	  delayed	  version	  of	  the	  Western	  European	  growth	  miracle	  
of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  (Ó	  Gráda	  and	  O’Rourke	  2000,	  Honohan	  and	  Walsh	  2002).	  What	  
changed	  was	  that	  many	  of	  the	  structural	  impediments	  to	  convergence	  had	  been	  eliminated	  
over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  leaving	  Ireland	  well	  positioned	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  
deeper	  European	  integration	  and	  a	  buoyant	  international	  economy	  in	  the	  1990s.	  The	  
catastrophe	  of	  the	  1980s	  meant	  that	  trade	  unions	  were	  willing	  to	  enter	  into	  corporatist	  
social	  partnership	  agreements,	  trading	  wage	  restraint	  against	  the	  promise	  of	  growth	  and	  
employment.	  Irish	  workers	  were	  now	  far	  better	  educated	  than	  they	  had	  been	  during	  the	  
1960s.	  Devaluations	  in	  1987	  and	  1993	  helped	  to	  boost	  Irish	  competitiveness.	  A	  healthier	  
labour	  market	  now	  interacted	  with	  Ireland’s	  long-­‐standing	  low	  corporate	  taxes	  and	  
produced	  a	  surge	  of	  inward	  investment,	  rising	  TFP	  levels,	  and	  increases	  in	  employment.	  
	  
FIGURE	  4	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
Imports	  of	  technology,	  corporatist	  labour	  bargains	  leading	  to	  investment	  and	  a	  reliance	  on	  
exports	  are	  all	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  Western	  European	  miracle	  of	  three	  or	  four	  decades	  
previously.	  The	  differences	  were	  also	  noteworthy,	  and	  reflected	  the	  period.	  Much	  of	  the	  
investment	  occurred	  via	  FDI,	  rather	  than	  being	  financed	  via	  retained	  profits	  by	  domestic	  
firms.	  Workers’	  wage	  restraint	  was	  compensated	  more	  with	  tax	  cuts	  than	  with	  an	  expansion	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of	  the	  welfare	  state.	  And	  Ireland	  did	  not	  go	  through	  all	  the	  stages	  of	  industrialization	  to	  the	  
same	  extent	  as	  other	  countries,	  specializing	  far	  more	  in	  ICT	  and	  other	  high-­‐tech	  sectors	  than	  
the	  typical	  fast	  grower	  of	  the	  1950s	  or	  1960s.	  This	  specialization	  did	  not	  just	  reflect	  the	  
invisible	  hand	  of	  the	  market,	  but	  active	  Irish	  government	  attempts	  to	  develop	  clusters	  of	  
activity	  in	  ICT,	  pharmaceuticals	  and	  similar	  sectors	  (Barry	  2002).	  
	  
The	  Celtic	  Tiger	  period	  ended	  in	  2000	  or	  2001,	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  the	  Celtic	  Bubble	  of	  
2001-­‐2007,	  financed	  by	  cross-­‐border	  capital	  flows	  which	  boomed	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  
Ireland’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Euro.	  Not	  only	  the	  bubble,	  but	  also	  the	  crash	  which	  followed,	  was	  
reminiscent	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  crisis	  of	  1997,	  but	  with	  the	  important	  difference	  that	  Ireland	  
was	  not	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  crisis	  by	  adjusting	  its	  exchange	  rate.	  Foreign	  observers	  have	  
not	  subjected	  the	  ‘Irish	  model’	  to	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  scrutiny	  that	  the	  ‘East	  Asian	  model’	  faced	  
after	  1997,	  which	  is	  perhaps	  ironic	  since	  the	  Irish	  economy	  had	  still	  not	  started	  to	  recover	  by	  
2013,	  in	  stark	  contrast	  with	  the	  rapid	  and	  durable	  post-­‐crisis	  recovery	  in	  East	  Asia.	  The	  net	  
result	  is	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  it	  seemed	  that	  Ireland	  risked	  facing	  a	  third	  post-­‐war	  “lost	  
decade”,	  after	  those	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1980s.	  It	  is	  too	  soon	  to	  say	  whether	  and	  when	  growth	  
will	  resume,	  in	  Ireland	  or	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  periphery.	  Nonetheless	  the	  Celtic	  Tiger	  
was	  no	  mirage:	  Ireland	  is	  now	  one	  of	  the	  richest	  countries	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  not	  one	  of	  the	  
poorest.	  
	  
9.	  Case	  Studies	  III:	  Failures	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  look	  briefly	  at	  two	  cases	  which	  can	  fairly	  be	  considered	  failures,	  the	  USSR	  
and	  Africa.	  
	  
9.1.	  Failed	  Catch-­‐Up	  in	  USSR36	  
	  
The	  USSR	  was	  always	  a	  long	  way	  below	  the	  United	  States	  in	  terms	  of	  real	  GDP	  per	  person	  −	  
about	  30	  per	  cent	  in	  1950	  and	  36	  per	  cent	  in	  1973	  −	  and,	  despite	  a	  promising	  start,	  only	  
reduced	  the	  gap	  very	  slowly.	  	  A	  growth	  rate	  of	  3.37	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  in	  the	  Golden	  Age	  
compares	  quite	  unfavourably	  with	  the	  achievements	  of	  Western	  European	  countries	  like	  
Italy	  or	  Spain	  which	  also	  started	  out	  with	  relatively	  low	  income	  levels.	  	  Growth	  regression	  
evidence	  confirms	  that	  communist	  countries	  under-­‐performed	  in	  the	  Golden	  Age:	  allowing	  
for	  initial	  income	  levels,	  their	  growth	  rate	  was	  about	  1.3	  percentage	  points	  lower	  than	  that	  
of	  their	  Western	  European	  counterparts	  (Crafts	  and	  Toniolo	  2008).	  	  
	  
Worrying	  signs	  of	  a	  serious	  slowdown	  in	  productivity	  growth	  did	  not	  appear	  until	  the	  1970s.	  	  
Golden	  Age	  Soviet	  growth	  was	  'extensive’,	  in	  that	  the	  investment/GDP	  ratio	  roughly	  doubled	  
between	  1950	  and	  the	  early	  1970s	  to	  about	  30	  per	  cent.	  The	  capital	  stock	  grew	  at	  about	  8.5	  
per	  cent	  per	  year	  in	  this	  period	  (Ofer	  1987).	  	  However,	  diminishing	  returns	  to	  capital	  
accumulation	  exacerbated	  by	  slow	  TFP	  growth	  implied	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  capital	  stock	  growth	  
delivered	  by	  a	  given	  investment	  rate	  was	  falling	  over	  time:	  the	  capital-­‐stock	  growth	  rate	  fell	  
from	  7.4	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  in	  the	  1960s	  to	  3.4	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  in	  the	  1980s.	  	  Negative	  TFP	  
growth	  post-­‐1970	  (Table	  16)	  was	  driven	  by	  “waste	  of	  capital	  on	  a	  grand	  scale”	  (Allen	  2003,	  p.	  
191)	  as	  old	  factories	  were	  re-­‐equipped	  and	  expansion	  of	  natural	  resource	  industries	  in	  
Siberia	  was	  pursued.	  
	  
Relatively	  low	  TFP	  growth	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  inadequate	  volumes	  of	  R	  &	  D,	  which	  by	  the	  
1970s	  were	  very	  high	  by	  world	  standards	  at	  around	  3	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP.	  	  Rather	  the	  problem	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  	  This	  section	  draws	  in	  part	  on	  Crafts	  and	  Toniolo	  (2008).	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lay	  in	  the	  incentive	  structures	  that	  informed	  innovation	  at	  the	  firm	  level.	  	  This	  was	  a	  classic	  
case	  of	  a	  'social	  capability'	  failure.	  	  The	  planning	  system	  rewarded	  managers	  who	  achieved	  
production	  targets	  in	  the	  short	  term	  rather	  than	  those	  who	  found	  ways	  to	  reduce	  costs	  or	  
improve	  the	  quality	  of	  output	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  	  The	  balance	  of	  risk	  and	  reward	  was	  
inimical	  to	  organizational	  and	  technological	  change,	  and	  the	  'kicking	  foot'	  of	  competition	  
was	  absent	  (Berliner	  1976).	  	  	  
	  
The	  incentive	  structures	  used	  by	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  to	  motivate	  managers	  and	  workers	  
were	  a	  complex	  mixture	  of	  rewards,	  punishments	  and	  monitoring.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  became	  
increasingly	  expensive	  over	  time,	  implying	  that	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  system	  was	  threatened.	  	  
Product	  innovation	  drove	  up	  monitoring	  costs,	  and	  this	  inhibited	  moves	  from	  mass	  to	  
flexible	  production.	  	  A	  more	  educated	  population	  meant	  that	  punishment	  (incarceration)	  
was	  more	  costly	  in	  terms	  of	  loss	  of	  human	  capital,	  and	  that	  rewards	  needed	  to	  be	  higher.	  	  
The	  slowdown	  in	  productivity	  growth	  led	  to	  a	  search	  for	  reforms	  that	  might	  improve	  
economic	  performance	  and	  lower	  monitoring	  costs,	  but	  these	  ended	  up	  undermining	  the	  
regime’s	  reputation	  for	  brutality,	  which	  could	  help	  sustain	  high	  effort	  in	  circumstances	  when	  
punishment	  costs	  became	  particularly	  high.	  	  The	  interesting	  feature	  of	  this	  system	  is	  that	  it	  
could	  be	  tipped	  from	  a	  high	  coercion,	  high	  effort	  equilibrium	  to	  a	  low	  coercion,	  shirk	  and	  
steal	  equilibrium	  if	  rewards	  and	  punishments	  were	  no	  longer	  credible	  and	  workers	  
understood	  this.	  Harrison	  (2002)	  argues	  that	  such	  a	  shift	  accounts	  for	  the	  sudden	  collapse	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s.	  
	  
9.2.	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  average	  growth	  performance	  in	  this	  region	  was	  dismal	  between	  the	  mid-­‐
1970s	  and	  the	  late	  1990s.	  	  There	  was	  stagnation	  in	  real	  GDP	  per	  person	  (Table	  8),	  TFP	  
growth	  was	  actually	  negative	  (Table	  11),	  and	  it	  became	  commonplace	  to	  talk	  about	  a	  chronic	  
growth	  failure	  (Collier	  and	  Gunning	  1999).	  However,	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  saw	  
a	  revival	  in	  growth	  performance.	  	  Taking	  a	  long	  view	  of	  African	  growth,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  
accurate	  to	  see	  a	  picture	  of	  growth	  accelerations	  followed	  by	  growth	  reversals,	  with	  the	  
former	  typically	  triggered	  by	  strong	  commodity	  prices,	  as	  in	  the	  recent	  growth	  spurt	  (Jerven	  
2010).	  	  Unfortunately,	  econometric	  analysis	  shows	  that	  while	  commodity	  price	  booms	  have	  
raised	  income	  levels	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  their	  long	  run	  effect	  is	  to	  lower	  them	  somewhat	  
(Collier	  and	  Goderis	  2012).	  
	  
Very	  low	  institutional	  quality	  is	  the	  most	  obvious	  explanation	  for	  disappointing	  growth	  and	  
low	  income	  levels	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  On	  average,	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  countries	  
score	  badly	  on	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  Governance	  Matters	  and	  Doing	  Business	  indicators	  and	  do	  
so	  persistently.	  	  Thus,	  ever	  since	  1996,	  when	  it	  was	  first	  compiled,	  the	  average	  score	  on	  the	  
‘rule-­‐of-­‐law’	  indicator	  has	  been	  about	  -­‐0.7	  (on	  a	  scale	  of	  -­‐2.5	  to	  +2.5)	  compared	  with	  an	  
average	  for	  Western	  Europe	  of	  around	  +	  1.6.	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  norm	  across	  the	  region	  is	  a	  
closed	  access	  society	  (Kishtainy	  2011).	  	  If	  the	  fundamental	  reason	  for	  poverty	  is	  insecure	  
property	  rights	  (Acemoglu	  and	  Johnson	  2005)	  then	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  is	  a	  prime	  exhibit.	  	  
Indeed,	  this	  is	  now	  often	  taken	  as	  a	  stylized	  fact,	  with	  “absolutist	  weak	  states”	  having	  ‘little	  
ability	  or	  interest	  in	  providing	  public	  goods”	  and	  operating	  on	  a	  “neopatrimonial”	  basis	  
(Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  2010,	  pp.	  23,	  40).	  	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  exceptions	  to	  this	  dismal	  
picture,	  such	  as	  Botswana	  and	  Mauritius,	  but	  they	  are	  the	  exceptions	  that	  prove	  the	  rule,	  
and	  also	  score	  relatively	  well	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  governance	  indicators.	  	  This	  is	  an	  account	  
that	  is	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  the	  New	  Institutional	  Economic	  History	  tradition.	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However,	  the	  intriguing	  question	  remaining	  is	  what	  part	  geography	  may	  have	  played	  in	  
explaining	  African	  failure.	  	  On	  a	  range	  of	  indicators,	  including	  climate,	  coastal	  access,	  disease	  
environment	  and	  population	  density,	  Africa	  scores	  much	  less	  well	  than	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  
developing	  world	  (Sachs	  et	  al.	  2004).	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  this	  carries	  a	  
growth	  penalty	  in	  terms	  of	  adverse	  impacts	  on	  investment	  and	  productivity.	  	  ‘Naive’	  growth	  
regressions	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  and	  accord	  geographic	  factors	  nearly	  as	  much	  
weight	  as	  institutions	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  differential	  between	  African	  and	  East	  Asian	  
growth	  performance	  in	  the	  late	  20th	  century	  (Bleaney	  and	  Nishiyama	  2002).	  	  If	  the	  focus	  is	  
switched	  to	  ‘second-­‐nature’	  geography,	  then	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  scores	  very	  badly	  compared	  
with	  almost	  all	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  potential,	  which	  is	  strongly	  
correlated	  with	  income	  even	  after	  controlling	  for	  institutional	  quality	  (Redding	  and	  Venables	  
2004).	  	  	  
	  
Table	  23	  offers	  a	  simple	  but	  powerful	  summary	  of	  growth	  performance	  classified	  by	  
geographic	  type.	  The	  table	  shows	  (in	  parentheses)	  the	  percentages	  of	  the	  population	  in	  both	  
Africa	  and	  other	  developing	  regions	  in	  each	  of	  three	  categories:	  resource-­‐scarce	  and	  coastal;	  
resource-­‐scarce	  and	  landlocked;	  and	  resource-­‐rich.	  It	  also	  shows	  the	  average	  growth	  rates	  
between	  1960	  and	  2000	  in	  each	  of	  these	  six	  regions.	  As	  can	  be	  seen,	  being	  both	  landlocked	  
and	  resource-­‐scarce	  is	  a	  particularly	  bad	  combination	  for	  growth,	  and	  this	  is	  unfortunate	  for	  
Africa	  since	  it	  has	  a	  relatively	  high	  percentage	  of	  its	  population	  in	  this	  category.	  It	  also	  has	  a	  
relatively	  low	  proportion	  of	  its	  population	  in	  resource-­‐scarce	  and	  coastal	  regions,	  which	  saw	  
higher	  growth	  rates	  both	  in	  Africa	  and	  elsewhere.	  Geography	  does	  not	  favour	  Africa,	  
therefore,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  the	  whole	  story	  since	  the	  table	  also	  shows	  that	  in	  each	  geographic	  
category	  Africa	  has	  seriously	  underperformed	  relative	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  developing	  world.	  
	  
TABLE	  23	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
	  
A	  more	  satisfactory	  way	  to	  explain	  post-­‐colonial	  African	  growth	  failure	  may	  be	  to	  consider	  
interactions	  between	  institutions	  and	  geography.	  	  One	  aspect	  of	  such	  interactions	  is	  the	  
possibility,	  noted	  earlier,	  that	  first-­‐nature	  geography	  may	  have	  its	  strongest	  effects	  through	  
its	  impact	  on	  institutions	  (Easterly	  and	  Levine	  2003).	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognize	  
that,	  “on	  top	  of	  its	  physical	  geography	  and	  remoteness,	  Africa	  has	  been	  held	  back	  by	  the	  
fragmentation	  of	  its	  political	  and	  economic	  geography”	  (Venables	  2010,	  p.	  481)	  –	  the	  
median	  country	  has	  a	  population	  of	  only	  8	  million	  people.	  	  This	  fragmentation	  implies	  a	  
number	  of	  serious	  disadvantages	  with	  regard	  to	  small	  city	  size,	  weak	  competition	  in	  product	  
markets,	  reduced	  supply	  of	  public	  goods,	  greater	  difficulty	  in	  escaping	  from	  bad	  policies,	  etc.	  
(Venables	  2010).	  	  Payoffs	  to	  better	  policies	  are	  often	  highly	  dependent	  on	  the	  reform	  efforts	  
of	  neighbours,	  which	  further	  hinders	  economic	  progress.	  
	  
A	  final	  perspective	  on	  sub-­‐Saharan	  failure	  is	  both	  more	  historical	  and,	  perhaps,	  more	  
optimistic.	  Bates	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  point	  out	  that	  economic	  performance	  was	  also	  very	  
disappointing	  in	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  first	  fifty	  years	  following	  independence	  in	  the	  1820s,	  
and	  that	  it	  was	  only	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  that	  sustained	  economic	  growth	  began.	  
Furthermore,	  this	  growth	  was	  as	  high	  as	  that	  experienced	  in	  the	  British	  offshoots,	  as	  we	  saw	  
in	  section	  3.	  Bates	  et	  al.	  explain	  the	  initial	  poor	  performance	  as	  being	  due	  to	  the	  political	  
instability	  of	  the	  time:	  international	  and	  civil	  wars,	  foreign	  military	  incursions	  and	  a	  general	  
atmosphere	  of	  violence.	  This	  is	  suggestive,	  since	  wars	  and	  violence	  have	  been	  prevalent	  in	  
post-­‐independence	  Africa	  as	  well,	  and	  it	  is	  often	  suggested	  that	  this	  is	  one	  reason	  for	  the	  
continent’s	  poor	  growth	  performance.	  Perhaps	  the	  transition	  to	  post-­‐colonial	  independence	  
for	  new	  states,	  with	  arbitrarily	  drawn	  borders,	  is	  inherently	  difficult.	  If	  so,	  Africa	  may	  yet	  see	  
a	  brighter	  21st	  century,	  as	  it	  gradually	  leaves	  these	  transition	  problems	  behind.	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9.3.	  The	  Natural	  Resource	  Curse	  
	  
One	  major	  reason	  for	  long-­‐term	  growth	  failure	  which	  has	  received	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  
in	  the	  literature	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘natural	  resource	  curse’.	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  tendency	  for	  
countries	  with	  large	  natural	  resource	  exports	  or	  minerals	  production	  relative	  to	  GDP	  to	  grow	  
relatively	  slowly	  at	  best,	  and	  experience	  prolonged	  periods	  of	  negative	  growth	  at	  worst	  .	  	  A	  
number	  of	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  put	  forward	  to	  explain	  this	  correlation	  and	  there	  is	  a	  
substantial	  body	  of	  empirical	  work	  that	  examines	  issues	  of	  robustness	  and	  causality.37	  	  The	  
standard	  suggested	  mechanisms	  explaining	  the	  natural	  resource	  curse	  include	  crowding	  out	  
of	  tradable	  goods	  sectors	  with	  greater	  productivity	  growth	  potential	  (Dutch	  Disease);	  
promoting	  low	  quality	  institutions	  which	  undermine	  growth;	  making	  civil	  war	  more	  likely;	  
and	  engendering	  macroeconomic	  volatility.	  	  There	  is	  some	  empirical	  support	  for	  all	  these	  
arguments	  (van	  der	  Ploeg	  2011).	  	  It	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  historical	  
experience	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  explained.	  Some	  countries	  have	  indeed	  been	  cursed	  by	  natural	  
resources,	  for	  example,	  Angola,	  Congo,	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Sudan.	  However,	  others	  have	  been	  
blessed	  including,	  for	  example,	  Australia,	  Canada,	  Chile	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  
	  
It	  seems	  highly	  plausible	  that	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  resource	  windfall	  will	  differ	  depending	  on	  
whether	  there	  are	  good	  or	  bad	  institutions.	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  it	  might	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  
bonanza	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  productive	  activities	  while	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  even	  more	  
resources	  will	  be	  devoted	  to	  rent-­‐seeking.	  	  The	  evidence	  of	  growth	  regressions	  is	  consistent	  
with	  this	  prediction.	  Mehlum	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  use	  a	  variable	  interacting	  institutional	  quality,	  as	  
measured	  by	  the	  ICRG	  index	  popularized	  by	  Knack	  and	  Keefer	  (1995),	  and	  resource	  
abundance.	  They	  find	  that	  values	  above	  0.60	  for	  the	  ICRG	  index	  make	  mineral	  resources	  
good	  for	  growth.	  	  This	  accords	  with	  common	  sense:	  oil	  has	  been	  very	  good	  for	  Norway,	  but	  
bad	  for	  Nigeria.	  
	  
An	  economic	  history	  perspective	  allows	  some	  of	  these	  ideas	  to	  be	  taken	  further.	  	  First,	  the	  
most	  notable	  success	  story	  in	  recent	  African	  economic	  history	  is	  Botswana,	  a	  resource	  
abundant	  country	  in	  which	  diamonds	  are	  a	  large	  share	  of	  GDP.	  Botswanan	  success	  is	  based	  
not	  only	  on	  diamonds,	  but	  also	  on	  high	  institutional	  quality	  and	  secure	  property	  rights	  plus	  
good	  policies.	  	  The	  underpinnings	  of	  good	  institutions	  were	  a	  combination	  of	  historical	  
accident	  and	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  the	  pre-­‐diamond	  era	  elite,	  the	  cattle	  ranchers	  
(Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  2003).	  There	  was	  thus	  a	  bulwark	  against	  the	  pursuit	  of	  mineral	  rents	  which	  
led	  to	  rent-­‐seeking	  and	  states	  which	  were	  ineffective	  modernizers	  elsewhere	  in	  Africa,	  for	  
example	  Angola	  and	  Nigeria	  (Isham	  et	  al.	  2005).	  	  	  
	  
Second,	  going	  beyond	  the	  argument	  that	  good	  institutions	  make	  natural	  resources	  more	  of	  a	  
blessing	  than	  a	  curse,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  natural	  resource	  ‘endowments’	  actually	  reflect	  
the	  amount	  of	  effort	  devoted	  to	  their	  discovery	  and	  effective	  exploitation.	  This	  depends	  
inter	  alia	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions	  and	  policies.	  	  A	  classic	  example	  is	  the	  19th	  century	  
United	  States	  whose	  status	  as	  a	  leading	  minerals	  producer	  was	  the	  product	  of	  big	  
investments	  in	  exploration	  and	  human	  capital	  underpinned	  by	  a	  favourable	  property	  rights	  
regime	  (David	  and	  Wright	  1997).	  
	  
Third,	  the	  implications	  of	  mineral	  resources	  seem	  to	  have	  varied	  over	  time	  for	  reasons	  which	  
still	  need	  to	  be	  fully	  researched	  but	  link	  to	  ideas	  familiar	  from	  new	  economic	  geography.	  	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  For	  an	  excellent	  recent	  survey	  article,	  see	  van	  der	  Ploeg	  (2011)	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the	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries,	  industrialization	  was	  encouraged	  by	  the	  proximity	  of	  coal,	  
whereas	  in	  the	  later	  20th	  century	  it	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  discouraged	  by	  the	  proximity	  of	  oil.	  	  
Regression	  evidence	  for	  the	  natural	  resource	  curse	  relates	  to	  samples	  drawn	  only	  from	  the	  
recent	  past.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  now	  and	  then	  is	  likely	  to	  relate	  to	  much	  higher	  
transport	  costs	  for	  minerals,	  especially	  over	  land,	  in	  the	  past	  and	  changes	  in	  energy	  sources	  




The	  convergence	  of	  a	  succession	  of	  countries	  onto	  the	  technological	  frontier	  is	  a	  process	  
whose	  roots	  lie	  in	  the	  great	  divergence	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  That	  divergence	  was	  due	  to	  new	  
industrial	  technologies	  being	  implemented	  in	  some	  regions	  of	  the	  world	  but	  not	  in	  others,	  
and	  was	  magnified	  in	  the	  short	  run	  by	  the	  globalization	  of	  the	  period	  which,	  given	  
technological	  asymmetries,	  created	  a	  stark	  division	  of	  labour	  between	  an	  industrializing	  
West	  and	  a	  deindustrializing	  Rest.	  
	  
The	  key	  to	  reducing	  the	  resulting	  regional	  inequalities	  has	  been	  the	  erosion	  of	  these	  
technological	  asymmetries,	  via	  the	  spread	  of	  modern	  industrialization.	  The	  succession	  of	  
growth	  miracles	  briefly	  surveyed	  above	  seems	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  process	  of	  sequential	  
convergence	  on	  the	  frontier	  modelled	  by	  Lucas	  (2000,	  2009).	  Since	  industrial	  technologies	  
are	  transferable	  across	  borders,	  convergence	  should	  not	  surprise	  us.	  But	  neither	  should	  we	  
assume	  that	  convergence	  will	  be	  as	  smooth	  as	  simple	  growth	  models	  assume:	  the	  economic	  
history	  of	  20th	  century	  growth	  is	  also	  a	  story	  of	  the	  various	  frictions	  that	  can	  impede	  this	  
process.	  In	  addition	  to	  successes,	  there	  have	  been	  a	  variety	  of	  failures.	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  repeatedly	  throughout	  this	  chapter,	  innovation	  tends	  to	  reflect	  the	  
economic	  circumstances	  of	  the	  leading	  economy	  of	  the	  time.	  This	  was	  Britain	  until	  some	  
time	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  thereafter.	  Even	  in	  the	  best	  of	  all	  
institutional	  worlds,	  with	  no	  political	  or	  other	  frictions	  and	  Scandinavian	  levels	  of	  social	  
capability,	  directed	  technological	  change	  would	  be	  a	  factor	  preventing	  or	  at	  least	  slowing	  
down	  the	  process	  of	  technological	  convergence.	  Nor	  is	  this	  just	  a	  story	  of	  developing	  
countries	  finding	  it	  uneconomical	  to	  adopt	  best	  practice	  technology,	  since	  European	  
economies,	  and	  even	  Britain	  itself,	  found	  themselves	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  when	  it	  came	  to	  
adopting	  American	  techniques	  that	  had	  been	  developed	  with	  American	  factor	  prices,	  and	  
the	  American	  market,	  in	  mind.	  	  
	  
What	  is	  more,	  we	  do	  not	  live	  in	  the	  best	  of	  all	  institutional	  worlds,	  frictions	  of	  all	  sorts	  are	  
prevalent	  and	  we	  are	  not	  all	  Scandinavian.	  Social	  capability	  matters	  for	  growth	  and	  not	  all	  
countries	  have	  it.	  Institutions	  are	  path	  dependent,	  and	  can	  be	  an	  impediment	  to	  growth.	  
And	  even	  in	  countries	  where	  they	  have	  always	  been	  an	  asset,	  they	  can	  become	  a	  liability,	  
since	  the	  ‘right’	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  may	  change	  over	  time	  as	  countries	  converge	  on	  the	  
technological	  frontier,	  or	  as	  the	  nature	  of	  frontier	  technologies	  change.	  Chasing	  a	  moving	  
target	  can	  be	  a	  tricky	  business	  in	  a	  world	  where	  history	  matters.	  
	  
Geography	  is	  another	  reason	  why	  convergence	  is	  not	  as	  smooth	  in	  practice	  as	  it	  can	  seem	  in	  
theory.	  First-­‐nature	  geography	  matters,	  although	  it	  may	  matter	  in	  different	  ways	  at	  different	  
points	  in	  time:	  resource	  abundance	  may	  be	  a	  blessing	  in	  some	  time	  periods,	  but	  a	  curse	  in	  
others,	  depending	  on	  the	  tradability	  of	  resources,	  on	  their	  nature,	  and	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  frontier	  technologies	  are	  resource-­‐using.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  a	  blessing	  or	  a	  curse	  
depending	  on	  a	  country’s	  institutional	  set-­‐up,	  which	  may	  in	  turn	  reflect	  that	  country’s	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geography	  as	  well	  as	  its	  history.	  Being	  far	  from	  trade	  routes,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  never	  
been	  good	  for	  growth	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  it	  should	  become	  so	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
Finally,	  economic	  historians	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  wars,	  ideological	  revolutions,	  
financial	  crises,	  and	  other	  events	  that	  are	  typically	  regarded	  as	  exogenous	  ‘shocks’	  in	  
economic	  models,	  but	  which	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  world	  in	  which	  we	  live.	  The	  First	  
World	  War,	  the	  Russian	  Revolution	  or	  the	  Great	  Depression	  were	  not	  mere	  complications	  in	  
the	  story	  of	  20th	  century	  economic	  growth,	  but	  a	  part	  of	  its	  very	  fabric.	  Even	  episodes	  which	  
are	  conventionally	  regarded	  as	  ‘short	  run’	  in	  nature,	  having	  to	  do	  with	  macroeconomic	  or	  
financial	  policy,	  can	  if	  handled	  sufficiently	  badly	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  economic	  
growth	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  lifetime,	  which	  is	  what	  most	  of	  us	  tend	  to	  care	  about.	  History,	  
and	  economic	  history,	  have	  not	  yet	  ended.	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Source:	  	  Broadberry	  (2013).	  




1348 777 876 1376 1030
1400 1090 1245 1601 885 948
1500 1114 1483 1403 889 909
1600 1123 2372 1244 944 852 682 791
1650 1100 2171 1271 820 638 838
1700 1630/1563 2403 1350 880 843 622 879
1750 1710 2440 1403 910 737 573 818
1800 2080 2617/1752 1244 962 639 569 876
1850 2997 2397 1350 1144 600 556 933
JapanEngland/Great=Britain Italy Spain China India
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Table	  2.	  	  Growth	  accounting	  estimates	  (per	  cent	  per	  annum)	  
	  












Sources:	  Crafts	  (2004a,	  2005)	  revised	  to	  incorporate	  new	  output	  growth	  estimates	  from	  
Broadberry	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  
	  
Notes:	  growth	  accounting	  imposes	  the	  standard	  neoclassical	  formula	  in	  parts	  a)	  and	  b).	  	  
To	  allow	  for	  embodiment	  effects	  in	  part	  c)	  the	  standard	  growth	  accounting	  equation	  is	  
modified	  as	  follows	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  types	  of	  capital	  and	  different	  sectors:	  
Δln(Y/L)	  =	  αOΔln(KO/L)	  +	  αMΔln(KM/L)	  +	  γΔlnAO	  +	  ΦΔlnAM	  
where	  the	  subscripts	  O	  and	  M	  denote	  capital	  in	  the	  old	  and	  modernized	  sectors,	  respectively,	  
γ	  and	  Φ	  are	  the	  gross	  output	  shares	  of	  these	  sectors,	  and	  αO	  and	  αM	  are	  the	  factor	  shares	  of	  
the	  capital	  used	  in	  these	  sectors.	  	  





1760:1801 0.4*1.0'='0.4 0.6*0.8'='0.5 0.3 1.2
1801:1831 0.4*1.7'='0.7 0.6*1.4'='0.8 0.2 1.7
1831:1873 0.4*2.3'='0.9 0.6*1.3'='0.8 0.7 2.4
Capital'Deepening
Contribution
1760'1801 0.4*0.29=90.1 0.3 0.3
1801'1831 0.4*0.39=90.1 0.2 0.3
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Sources:	  Maddison	  (2010)	  and	  Bairoch	  (1982)	  
Note:	  ‘industrialization	  level’	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  index	  of	  the	  volume	  of	  industrial	  
output/person	  relative	  to	  a	  base	  of	  UK	  in	  1900	  =	  100.	  











Austria 1863 3465 1.46 13 32
Belgium 2692 4220 1.05 36 88
Denmark 2003 3912 1.58 11 33
Finland 1140 2111 1.45 13 21
France 1876 3485 1.46 24 59
Germany 1839 3648 1.61 20 85
Greece 880 1592 1.39 6 10
Ireland 1775 2736 1.01
Italy 1499 2564 1.26 11 26
Netherlands 2757 4049 0.91 12 28
Norway 1360 2447 1.38 14 31
Portugal 975 1250 0.59 9 14
Spain 1207 2056 1.25 12 22
Sweden 1359 3073 1.92 20 67
Switzerland 2102 4266 1.67 32 87
UK 3190 4921 1.01 76 115
Europe 1971 3437 1.31 20 45
Aide%Memoire
United%States 2445 5301 1.83 30 126
China 530 552 0.1 4 3
	   74	  




Sources:	  derived	  from	  data	  presented	  in	  the	  following	  original	  growth	  accounting	  studies:	  
Austria	  :	  Schulze	  (2007);	  Germany:	  Broadberry	  (1998);	  Netherlands:	  Albers	  and	  Groote	  
(1996);	  Spain:	  Prados	  de	  la	  Escosura	  and	  Roses	  (2009);	  Sweden:	  Krantz	  and	  Schön	  (2007);	  
United	  Kingdom:	  Feinstein	  et	  al.	  (1982);	  	  United	  States:	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  (2001)	  
	  
Note:	  all	  estimates	  impose	  a	  standard	  neoclassical	  growth	  accounting	  equation	  based	  on	  Y	  =	  
AKαL1	  –	  α,	  calibrated	  with	  α	  =	  0.35;	  	  
	  
	   	  
Labour'Productivity'Growth Capital'Deepening'Contribution TFP'Growth
Austria
''''''''1870A1890 0.9 0.64 0.26
''''''''1890A1910 1.69 0.66 1.03
Germany
''''''''1871A1891 1.1 0.39 0.71
''''''''1891A1911 1.76 0.58 1.18
Netherlands
''''''''1850A1870 1.02 0.5 0.52
''''''''1870A1890 0.94 0.61 0.33
''''''''1890A1913 1.35 0.46 0.89
Spain
''''''''1850A1883 1.2 1 0.2
''''''''1884A1920 1 0.7 0.3
Sweden
''''''''1850A1890 1.18 1.12 0.06
''''''''1890A1913 2.77 0.94 1.83
United'Kingdom
''''''''1873A1899 1.2 0.4 0.8
''''''''1899A1913 0.5 0.4 0.1
United'States
''''''''1855A1890 1.1 0.7 0.4
''''''''1890A1905 1.9 0.5 1.4
''''''''1905A1927 2 0.5 1.3
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Sources:	  Investment	  ratios:	  Carreras	  and	  Josephson	  (2010)	  and	  Rhode	  (2002);	  Years	  of	  
schooling:	  Morrisson	  and	  Murtin	  (2009);	  Polcon:	  data	  base	  for	  Henisz	  (2002);	  Market	  
potential:	  Liu	  and	  Meissner	  (2013)	  
	  
Notes:	  “I/Y”	  is	  the	  investment	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  in	  percent.	  ‘Polcon’	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  constraints	  
on	  the	  executive;	  the	  United	  States	  in	  recent	  times	  has	  scored	  a	  little	  over	  0.40.	  ‘Market	  
potential’	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  proximity	  to	  markets	  which	  reflects	  trade	  costs	  and	  the	  spatial	  
distribution	  of	  GDP.	  








Austria 3.48 5.58 0.07 55
Belgium 4.45 5.39 0.4 0.48 28
Denmark 8 12.5 4.74 6.08 0.45 20
Finland 12.4 12 0.51 1.12
France 10.3 12.2 4.04 7.35 0.56 59
Germany 20.8 23.2 5.25 6.92 0.11 62
Greece 1.45 2.79 7
Ireland 2.15 5.5
Italy 8.8 17.7 0.88 3.06 0.27 40
Netherlands 12.4 21.2 5.33 6.07 0.45 0.55 30
Norway 12.2 20.7 5.67 6.06 0.39 15
Portugal 0.79 2.03 0 0 11
Spain 5.2 12.2 2.43 4.93 0.17 0 26
Sweden 7.7 12 4.86 6.7 0.45 22
Switzerland 6.17 7.65 0.34 0.45 22
UK 7.7 7.5 4.13 6.35 0.33 0.47 89
United%States 16.9 19.7 5.57 7.45 0.28 0.39 100
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Sources:	  Bolt	  and	  van	  Zanden	  (2013)	  and	  Maddison	  (2010).	  
	  
	   	  
1820 1870 1913
Western.Europe 1,455 2,006 3,488
Eastern.Europe 683 953 1,726
British.offshoots 1,302 2,419 5,233
Latin.America 628 776 1,552
Asia 591 548 691
Africa 420 500 637
World 707 874 1,524
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1870 1913 1950 1973 1990 2007
Western/Europe 2,006 3,488 4,517 11,346 15,905 21,607
British/offshoots 2,419 5,233 9,268 16,179 22,346 30,548
Japan/ 737 1,387 1,921 11,434 18,789 22,410
West 1,914 3,690 5,614 13,044 18,748 25,338
Asia/minus/Japan 539 652 639 1,223 2,120 4,830
Latin/America 776 1,552 2,505 4,517 5,065 6,842
Eastern/Europe/and/former/USSR 1,519 2,594 5,741 6,458 7,731
Africa 500 637 889 1,387 1,425 1,872
Rest 853 1,091 2,068 2,711 4,744
World 874 1,524 2,104 4,081 5,149 7,504
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Sources:	  Based	  on	  Bolt	  and	  van	  Zanden	  (2013),	  Maddison	  (2010).	  This	  is	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  








	   	  
1870%1913 1913%1950 1950%1973 1973%1990 1990%2007 1913%2007
Western0Europe 1.29 0.70 4.09 2.01 1.82 1.96
British0offshoots 1.81 1.56 2.45 1.92 1.86 1.89
Japan0 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.96 1.04 3.00
West 1.54 1.14 3.73 2.16 1.79 2.07
Asia0minus0Japan 0.45 %0.06 2.87 3.29 4.96 2.15
Latin0America 1.63 1.30 2.60 0.68 1.78 1.59
Eastern0Europe0and0former0USSR 1.64 1.46 3.51 0.69 1.06 1.75
Africa 0.57 0.90 1.95 0.16 1.62 1.15
Rest 0.73 0.67 2.82 1.61 3.35 1.84
World 1.30 0.87 2.92 1.38 2.24 1.71
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Table	  9.	  World	  shares	  of	  GDP,	  1870-­‐2007	  (per	  cent)	  
	  
	  
Sources:	  Bolt	  and	  van	  Zanden	  (2013),	  Maddison	  (2010).	  	  
	  
	   	  
1913 1950 1973 1990 2007
Western.Europe 33.3 26.0 25.5 22.2 17.4
British.offshoots 21.3 30.8 25.4 24.6 22.1
Japan. 2.6 3.0 7.8 8.6 5.8
West 57.3 59.7 58.6 55.4 45.2
Asia.minus.Japan 22.1 15.6 16.4 23.3 37.0
Latin.America 4.6 7.8 8.7 8.3 7.9
Eastern.Europe.and.former.USSR 13.1 13.0 12.9 9.8 6.3
Africa 2.9 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.6
Rest 42.7 40.3 41.4 44.6 54.8
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table	  10.	  	  Accounting	  for	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  in	  OECD	  Countries,	  1913-­‐1950	  (per	  
cent	  per	  annum)	  
	  	   K/L	   HK/L	   TFP	   Y/L	  
France	   0.59	   0.36	   1.06	   2.01	  
Germany	   0.19	   0.22	   0.74	   1.05	  
Japan	   0.62	   0.61	   0.49	   1.72	  
Netherlands	   0.43	   0.27	   0.88	   1.58	  
UK	   0.42	   0.32	   0.83	   1.57	  
	  
Source:	  Maddison	  (1987)	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Table	  11.	  Proximate	  sources	  of	  labour	  productivity	  growth,	  1960-­‐2003	  (per	  cent	  per	  
annum)	  
	  	   K/L	   HK/L	   TFP	   Y/L	  
Industrial	  Countries	   	   	   	   	  
1960-­‐70	   1.4	   0.3	   2.3	   4	  
1970-­‐80	   1	   0.5	   0.4	   1.9	  
1980-­‐90	   0.6	   0.2	   0.9	   1.7	  
1990-­‐2003	   0.8	   0.2	   0.6	   1.6	  
East	  Asia	   	   	   	   	  
1960-­‐70	   1.7	   0.4	   1.6	   3.7	  
1970-­‐80	   2.7	   0.6	   1	   4.3	  
1980-­‐90	   2.5	   0.6	   1.3	   4.4	  
1990-­‐2003	   2	   0.5	   0.6	   3.1	  
Latin	  America	   	   	   	   	  
1960-­‐70	   0.8	   0.3	   1.7	   2.8	  
1970-­‐80	   1.3	   0.3	   1.1	   2.7	  
1980-­‐90	   0	   0.5	   -­‐2.3	   -­‐1.8	  
1990-­‐2000	   0.1	   0.3	   -­‐0.1	   0.3	  
Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	   	   	   	   	  
1960-­‐70	   0.8	   0.2	   1.9	   2.9	  
1970-­‐80	   1.3	   0.1	   -­‐0.4	   1	  
1980-­‐90	   -­‐0.1	   0.4	   -­‐1.5	   -­‐1.2	  
1990-­‐2000	   0	   0.4	   -­‐0.5	   -­‐0.1	  
	  
Sources:	  Bosworth	  and	  Collins	  (2003)	  and	  website	  update.	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Source:	  Duval	  and	  de	  la	  Maisonneuve	  (2010)	  
Notes:	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (Y/P)	  is	  measured	  at	  PPP.	  Estimates	  derived	  by	  imposing	  the	  
production	  function	  Y	  =	  Kα	  (AhL)1-­‐α	  	  where	  h	  is	  human	  capital	  per	  worker	  (HK/L).	  	  This	  can	  be	  
re-­‐written	  as	  Y/L	  =	  (K/Y)	  α/(1	  -­‐α)Ah	  so	  that	  Y/P	  =	  (K/Y)α/(1	  -­‐α)Ah(L/P)	  which	  is	  the	  formula	  used	  for	  
the	  decomposition.	  
	   	  
Y/P K/Y HK/L L/P TFP
United'States 100 100 100 100 100
Japan 72.6 130.7 100.4 105.1 52.6
EU27'+'EFTA 64.7 114.1 91.2 91.3 67.8
Russia 28.6 97.4 84.9 99.3 31.5
Brazil 20.5 103.1 70.1 96.8 29.3
China 9.8 105.2 57.3 119.5 13.6
India 5.2 98.3 47.7 87.1 12.7
World 22.8 104.2 64.2 95.8 27.9
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Table	  13.	  	  Decomposing	  TFP	  levels	  relative	  to	  the	  United	  States	  (USA	  =	  1.00)	  
	  
	  	   1960	   1995	  
	  	   TFP	   E	   T	   TFP	   E	   T	  
France	   0.72	   0.71	   1.01	   0.77	   0.87	   0.89	  
Greece	   0.49	   0.57	   0.86	   0.56	   0.58	   0.97	  
Spain	   0.64	   0.74	   0.86	   0.76	   0.85	   0.9	  
Italy	   0.67	   0.71	   0.94	   0.84	   0.88	   0.96	  
UK	   0.85	   0.89	   0.95	   0.82	   0.85	   0.97	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
India	   0.3	   0.41	   0.74	   0.29	   0.44	   0.67	  
Indonesia	   0.31	   0.55	   0.57	   0.37	   0.54	   0.69	  
Japan	   0.48	   0.56	   0.86	   0.68	   0.79	   0.86	  
Korea	   0.33	   0.37	   0.88	   0.49	   0.49	   0.99	  
Singapore	   0.47	   0.54	   0.87	   0.85	   1	   0.85	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Argentina	   0.76	   0.79	   0.96	   0.57	   0.65	   0.88	  
Brazil	   0.42	   0.49	   0.86	   0.5	   0.6	   0.84	  
Chile	   0.51	   0.57	   0.89	   0.58	   0.73	   0.8	  
Mexico	   0.65	   0.72	   0.9	   0.49	   0.58	   0.84	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
DR	  Congo	   0.38	   0.58	   0.65	   0.23	   0.35	   0.67	  
Malawi	   0.23	   0.39	   0.6	   0.16	   0.27	   0.61	  
Mauritius	   0.62	   0.71	   0.88	   0.8	   1	   0.8	  
Tanzania	   0.15	   0.22	   0.69	   0.11	   0.17	   0.64	  
	  
Source:	  Jerzmanowski	  (2007)	  
Note:	  TFPi	  	  =	  Efficiencyi*Technologyi	  =EiTi	  where	  Ei	  is	  obtained	  by	  estimating	  an	  efficient	  
production	  frontier,	  TFP	  is	  obtained	  by	  growth	  accounting	  in	  levels	  and	  T	  is	  then	  inferred.	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Source:	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  (2001,	  Table	  1:	  IVA)	  
Note:	  ‘capital	  quality’	  reflects	  the	  adjustment	  required	  to	  move	  from	  a	  capital	  stock	  to	  a	  
capital	  services	  basis	  
	   	  
K/L Crude&TFP Labour&Quality Capital&Quality Refined&TFP Y/L
1800:1855 0.19 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.39
1855:1871 0.53 :0.39 0 0 :0.39 0.14
1871:1890 0.84 1 0 0 1 1.84
1890:1905 0.55 1.38 0.1 0 1.28 1.93
1905:1927 0.48 1.57 0.19 0 1.38 2.05
1929:1948 0.07 1.89 0.38 0.08 1.43 1.96
1948:1966 0.81 2.3 0.43 0.4 1.47 3.11
1966:1989 0.57 0.66 0.31 0.31 0.04 1.23
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Table	  15.	  Sources	  of	  labour	  productivity	  growth,	  United	  States	  non-­‐farm	  business	  sector,	  




Source:	  Corrado	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  
Note:	  accounting	  with	  intangibles	  is	  based	  the	  formula	  
Δln(Y*/L)	  =	  sTK*Δln(TK/L)	  	  	  +	  sIK*Δln(IK/L)	  	  +	  ΔA/A	  
where	  Y*	  includes	  expenditure	  on	  intangible	  investments	  and	  sTK*	  and	  sIK*	  are	  the	  factor	  
shares	  of	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  capital	  in	  Y*.	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Table	  16.	  Accounting	  for	  growth	  during	  ‘economic	  miracles’	  (per	  cent	  per	  annum)	  
a) Sources	  of	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  
	  
	  
b) Sources	  of	  output	  growth	  
	  
	  
Sources:	  Bosworth	  and	  Collins	  (2003	  and	  web	  update);	  for	  USSR	  derived	  from	  Ofer	  (1987)	  
and	  for	  China	  and	  India	  derived	  from	  Bosworth	  and	  Collins	  (2008),	  in	  each	  case	  assuming	  α	  =	  
0.35.	  
	  
Notes:	  Ireland	  and	  USSR	  are	  GNP	  not	  GDP.	  Education	  is	  included	  in	  TFP	  growth	  for	  USSR.	  
	  
	  
K/L HK/L TFP Y/L
Western'Europe'196001970
France 2.02 0.29 2.62 4.93
Germany 2.1 0.23 2.03 4.36
Italy 2.39 0.36 3.5 6.25
Spain 2.45 0.38 3.73 6.56
East'Asia'196002003
Korea 2.7 0.7 1.28 4.68
Singapore 2.86 0.46 1.2 4.52
Taiwan 3.04 0.54 2.16 5.74
Ireland
1990@2003 0.49 0.26 2.24 2.99
USSR
1928@1940 2 0.5 2.5
1940@1950 @0.1 1.6 1.5
1950@1970 2.6 1.4 4
1970@1985 2 @0.4 1.6
China
1978@1993 2.1 0.4 3.9 6.4
1993@2004 3.7 0.3 4.5 8.5
India
1978@1993 0.8 0.3 1.3 2.4
1993@2004 1.6 0.4 2.6 4.6
K L#=#Employment#+#Education TFP Y
Western'Europe'196001970
France 2.24 0.42+++++0.29 2.62 5.57
Germany 2.13 0.06+++++0.23 2.03 4.45
Italy 2.2 90.35+++++0.36 3.5 5.71
Spain 2.74 0.55+++++0.38 3.73 7.4
East'Asia'196002003
Korea 3.64 1.75+++++0.70 1.28 7.37
Singapore 4.03 2.18+++++0.46 1.2 7.87
Taiwan 3.97 1.74+++++0.54 2.16 8.41
Ireland
199092003 1.7 2.24+++++0.26 2.24 6.44
USSR
192891940 3.2 2.1 0.5 5.8
194091950 0.1 0.5 1.6 2.2
195091970 3.1 0.9 1.4 5.4
197091985 2.4 0.8 90.4 2.8
China
197891993 3 1.6+++++0.4 3.9 8.9
199392004 4.1 0.8+++++0.3 4.5 9.7
India
197891993 1.5 1.4+++++0.3 1.3 4.5
199392004 2.3 1.2+++++0.4 2.6 6.5
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Table	  17.	  	  The	  Knowledge	  Economy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  	  
	  	  Sources:	  R	  &	  D	  Expenditure:	  Edgerton	  and	  Horrocks	  (1994),	  Nelson	  and	  Wright	  (1992)	  and	  National	  Science	  Board	  (2012)	  R	  &	  D	  stock:	  Abramovitz	  and	  David	  (2001)	  Tertiary	  Education:	  Barro	  and	  Lee	  (2012)	  and	  Maddison	  (1987)	  	   	  
1920 0.2 1900&10 0.03 1913 0.2
1935 1.8 1929 4.5
1953 1.4 1948 13 1950 0.42
1964 2.9 1973 38.2 1970 0.674
1990 2.7 1990 47.7 1995 1.474
2007 2.7 2005 1.682
R"&"D"Expenditure/GDP"(%) R"&"D"Stock/GDP"(%) Tertiary"Education/Person"(years)
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Table	  18.	  Productivity	  growth	  arising	  from	  U.S.	  research,	  1980s	  (per	  cent	  of	  
total	  in	  each	  country)	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Table	  19.	  	  Resource	  Abundance	  
	  
a) U.S.	  Share	  of	  World	  Totals	  (per	  cent)	  
	  
	  
Source:	  David	  and	  Wright	  (1997)	  	  
b) Ratio	  of	  Labour	  Cost/Hour	  to	  Electricity	  Cost/Hour	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Melman	  (1956)	  	   	  
1913$Output 1989$Reserves 1989$+$Cumulative$1913589$Production
Petroleum 65 3 19.8
Copper 56 16.4 19.9
Phosphate 43 9.8 36.3
Coal 39 23 23.3
Bauxite 37 0.2 0.5
Zinc 37 13.9 14
Iron@Ore 36 10.5 11.6
Lead 34 15.7 18.1
Gold 20 11.5 8.6







	   90	  
Table	  20.	  	  Supply	  and	  Demand	  for	  College	  Educated	  Workers	  and	  Changes	  
in	  the	  College	  Wage	  Premium,	  1915-­‐2005	  (100	  x	  Annual	  Log	  Changes)	  	  
	  	  Source:	  Goldin	  and	  Katz	  (2008)	  Note:	  estimates	  assume	  the	  elasticity	  of	  substitution	  between	  college	  and	  high	  school	  graduates	  =	  1.64	  	   	  
Relative(Wage Relative(Supply Relative(Demand
1915$1940 $0.56 3.19 2.41
1940$1960 $0.51 2.63 1.92
1960$1980 $0.02 3.77 3.74
1980$2005 0.9 2 3.27
1915$2005 $0.02 2.87 2.83
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Memorandum	  Item:	  Real	  Price	  Falls	  (per	  cent)	  
	  
	  	  Sources:	  	  	  Growth	  accounting:	  Crafts	  (2002)	  (2004b)	  and	  Oliner	  et	  al.	  (2007).	  Price	  falls:	  Crafts	  (2004b),	  Edquist	  (2010)	  and	  Oulton	  (2012).	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Table	  22.	  	  Sources	  of	  Labour	  Productivity	  Growth	  in	  the	  Market	  Sector,	  
1995-­‐2005	  (per	  cent	  per	  annum)	  
	  
	  	  Source:	  Timmer	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  	   	  
Labour'Quality ICT'K/hour'worked Non9ICT'K/hour'worked TFP Labour'Productivity'
Growth
EU 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.5
France 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9 2.1
Germany 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.4 1.6
UK 0.5 0.9 0.4 0.8 2.6
USA 0.3 1 0.3 1.3 2.9
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Source:	  Collier	  (2007)	  
Note:	  numbers	  in	  parentheses	  refer	  to	  percentages	  of	  population	  by	  region	  in	  each	  category.	  	   	  
Resource(Scarce+&+Coastal Resource(Scarce+&+Landlocked Resource(Rich
Africa 0.50*(33%) /0.36*(33%) 0.29*(33%)
Other*Developing 3.79*(88%) 1.40**(1%) 2.89*(11%)







Figure	  1.	  US	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  1800-­‐2007	  (1990	  international	  dollars)	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Figure	  2.	  Regional	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  1870-­‐2007	  (percentage	  of	  US	  level)	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Figure	  3.	  GDP	  per	  capita	  growth,	  1950-­‐1987	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Figure	  4.	  GDP	  per	  capita	  growth,	  1950-­‐2000	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